

Proclus

Collected Works

DELPHI CLASSICS

Ancient Classics Series

The Collected Works of

PROCLUS

(412-485)

Contents

Version 1

The Collected Works of

PROCLUS LYCIUS



By Delphi Classics, 2023

COPYRIGHT

Collected Works of Proclus

First published in the United Kingdom in 2023 by Delphi Classics.

ISBN: 978 1 80170 120 4

Delphi Classics
is an imprint of
Delphi Publishing Ltd
Hastings, East Sussex
United Kingdom
Contact: sales@delphiclassics.com

DELPHI CLASSICS

www.delphiclassics.com

The Translations

An artist's impression of ancient Constantinople. Proclus was born in 412 AD in Constantinople to a family of high social status from Lycia.

Commentary on Timaeus

Translated by Thomas Taylor, 1820

CONTENTS



Medieval manuscript of Calcidius' Latin Timaeus translation

Introduction

OF THAT GOLDEN chain of philosophers, who, having themselves happily penetrated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato, Proclus is indisputably the largest and most refulgent link. Born with a genius transcendently great, and accompanied through life with a fortune singularly good, he exhibited in his own person a union of the rarest kind, in which power concurred with will, the benefit resulting from genuine philosophy with the ability of imparting it, and in which Wisdom was inseparable from Prosperity. The eulogium therefore of Ammonius Hermeas, "that Proclus possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgement of the nature of things, in the highest perfection possible to humanity,"[1] will be immediately assented to by every one, who is an adept in the writings of this incomparable man.

I rejoice therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting to the English reader a translation of one of the greatest productions of this Coryphean philosopher; though unfortunately like most of his other works, it has been transmitted to us in a mutilated state. For these Commentaries scarcely explain a third part of the Timæus; and from a passage in Olympiodorus On the Meteors of Aristotle,[2] there is every reason to believe that Proclus left no part of the Timæus without his masterly elucidations. This is likewise more than probable, from what Marinus says in his life of him, "that he was a man laborious to a miracle;" for it cannot be supposed that such a man would leave the greater part of one of the most important dialogues of Plato unelucidated, and particularly as these Commentaries were written by him (as the same Marinus informs us) in the flower of his age, and that he preferred them beyond all his other works.[3] Fortunately however, the most important part of this work is preserved; or that part in which the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are unfolded; the corporeal nature of it is represented as fabricated with forms and demiurgic sections, and distributed with divine numbers; and soul is produced from the Demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic ratios, and divine and fabricative symbols. The whole mundane animal too, is here shown to be connected, according to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world; and the parts which it contains are so disposed as to harmonize with the whole, both such as are corporeal, and such as are vital. For partial souls such as ours, are introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane Gods, and become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected. The progression of the elements likewise from their first incorporeal subsistence to their subterranean termination, and the nature of the heavens and heavenly bodies, are beautifully developed. And as the result of the most scientific reasoning, it is shown that every planet is surrounded with satellites,[4] that the fixed stars have periodic revolutions on their axes, though the length of their duration is to us unknown; and that the stars, which at times disappear and again become visible, are the satellites of other fixed stars of a more primary dignity, behind the splendours of which they are occasionally concealed.[5] These and many other most interesting particulars, are unfolded in these Commentaries, with an accuracy and perspicuity which have seldom been equalled, and have never been excelled.

When I speak however, of the perspicuity with which these particulars are developed, I do not mean that they are delivered in such a way, as to be obvious to

every one, or that they may be apprehended as soon as read; for this pertains only to the fungous and frivolous productions of the present day; but my meaning is, that they are written with all the clearness, which they are naturally capable of admitting, or which a genuine student of the philosophy[6] of Plato can desire. And this leads me to make some remarks on the iniquitous opinion which, since the revival of letters, has been generally entertained of the writings of Proclus and other philosophers, who are distinguished by the appellation of the latter Platonists, and to show the cause from which it originated.

The opinion to which I allude is this, that Plotinus and his followers, or in other words, all the Platonists that existed from his time to the fall of the Roman empire, and the destruction of the schools of the philosophers by Justinian, corrupted the philosophy of Plato, by filling it with jargon and revery, and by ascribing dogmas to him, which are not to be found in his writings, and which are perfectly absurd. It might naturally be supposed that the authors of this calumny were men deeply skilled in the philosophy, the corruptors of which they profess to have detected; and that they had studied the writings of the men whom they so grossly defame. This however is very far from being the case. For since the philosophy of Plato, as I have elsewhere shown, is the offspring of the most consummate science, all the dogmas of it being deduced by a series of geometrical reasoning, some of them ranking as prior, and others as posterior, and the latter depending on the former, like the propositions in Euclid, certain preparatory disciplines are requisite to the perfect comprehension of these doctrines. Hence a legitimate student of this philosophy must be skilled in mathematics, have been exercised in all the logical methods, and not be unacquainted with physics. He must also be an adept in the writings of Aristotle, as preparatory to the more sublime speculations of Plato. And in addition to all this, he must possess those qualifications enumerated by Plato in the 7th book of his Republic; *viz.* he must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent and orderly, and the friend and ally of justice, truth, fortitude, and temperance. Since the revival of letters however, this philosophy has not been studied by men, who have had the smallest conception that these requisites were indispensably necessary, or who have attempted the acquisition of it, in this regular and scientific method. Hence, they have presumed to decide on the excellence of works, with the true merits of which, as they were thus unqualified, they were wholly unacquainted, and to calumniate what they could not understand. They appear likewise to have been ignorant, that Plato, conformably to all the other great philosophers of antiquity, wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of his doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing, that they would only be profaned by them without being understood; the eye of the multitude, as he says, not being sufficiently strong to bear the light of truth. Hence, as Proclus well observes,[7] "it is needless to mention, that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of dogmas before the multitude, Plato himself asserting that all these are ridiculous to the many, but in an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also, the Pythagoreans said, that of discourses, some are mystical, but others adapted to be delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise, some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself, wrote some things conformable to truth, but others to opinion; and Zeno calls some assertions true, but others adapted to the necessary purposes of life." The men therefore, who have defamed the latter Platonists, being thus unqualified, and thus ignorant of the mode of writing adopted by the great ancients, finding from a superficial perusal of the most genuine disciples of Plato many dogmas which were not immediately obvious in his writings, and which were to them incomprehensible, confidently asserted that these dogmas were spurious, that the authors of them were

delirious, and that they had completely corrupted and polluted the philosophy of their master. It may also be added, as Olympiodorus justly observes, that the writings of Plato like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and in short, multifariously; and that he who does not consider them, will in vain attempt to unfold the latent meaning they contain. By the latter Platonists however, they have been explored in this way, and he who is capable of availing himself of the elucidations of these most benevolent and most sagacious men, will find the arduous sublimities of Plato accessible, his mystic narrations conformable to scientific deductions, and his apparent obscurity, the veil of conceptions, truly luminous and divine. And thus much as to the cause of the prevailing iniquitous opinion, respecting the writings of the latter Platonists; for the authors of it, I have not been able to discover. But of this I am certain, and posterity will confirm the decision, that whoever they were, they were no less ignorant than arrogant no less contemptible than obscure.

With respect to the following translation, I have only to observe, that I have endeavoured to the utmost of my ability to unite in it faithfulness with perspicuity; and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the original Independent of the difficulties inseparable from such an undertaking, and which arise from the abstruseness of the subjects that are discussed in this work, the original abounds with errors, not of a trifling, but of the most important nature; errors, which so materially affect the sense, that no one can read these Commentaries, unless he corrects them, and yet no one can correct the greater part of them, unless he is well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato. Of this the reader may be convinced by perusing the notes which accompany this translation, in which he will find upwards of eleven hundred *necessary* emendations. I call them *necessary* because they are not the offspring of conjecture, but such as the sense indubitably demands. Of translations too, of this work, I could not avail myself; for of the whole of it there are none; and a Latin translation of a part of the 3rd book, by Nicholæus Leonicus Thomæus,[8] is the only aid that has been afforded me in this arduous undertaking. From this translation I have been able, as the learned reader will perceive, to give many important emendations of the printed original, and not infrequently to add to it, not only particular words, but entire sentences that were wanting.

And now I shall conclude with observing, that though like most others who have laboured greatly for the good, not merely of their country, but of all mankind, I have only met with ingratitude from the public for those labours; and that though on this account I am not much indebted,[9] yet I sincerely wish well to my native land, and to every individual in it. That I have neither been influenced by the expectation of sordid emolument, nor of the honours of the multitude, in the prosecution of these labours, must be evident from the nature of them, to the most careless observer. The most perfect conviction indeed, that a greater good than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was never imparted by divinity to man, and the consequent persuasion, that I could not confer a more real benefit on the present age and posterity than by a dissemination of it in my native tongue, as they induced me to engage in such a difficult undertaking, have also been attended with the purest delight, from a conviction that I was acting rightly, and therefore in a way pleasing to divinity. Hence in accomplishing this Herculean task, I have been satisfied with exploring myself, and imparting to others, the treasures of ancient wisdom; and with endeavouring to deserve the favourable regard of that ineffable principle, whose approbation is not only the highest honour that either mortals or immortals can obtain, but the most durable and substantial gain.

Names of the Philosophers Quoted by Proclus in these Commentaries.

ADRASTUS APHRODISIENSIS, ONE of the genuine Peripatetics, according to Simplicius On the categories of Aristotle.

AGLAOPHEMUS, one who initiated Pythagoras in the mysteries of Orpheus.

ALBINUS, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished about the time of Galen.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, a Peripatetic philosopher, who flourished under the Emperor Severus.

AMELIUS, a Platonic philosopher, and a disciple of Plotinus.

AMMONIUS SACCAS, the preceptor of Plotinus.

ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, flourished about the 70th Olympiad.

ANTONINUS, a disciple of Ammonius Saccas.

ARISTOTLE, the disciple of Plato, was born in the first year of the 99th Olympiad.

ARISTOTLE, the Rhodian.

ATTICUS, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.

CHRYSIPPUS, a celebrated Stoic philosopher, died in the 143rd Olympiad.

CRANTOR SOLENSIS, the first interpreter of Plato, also a fellow disciple with Xenocrates of Plato, and an auditor of Polemo.

DEMOCRITUS, the celebrated philosopher of Abdera, flourished about the 80th Olympiad.

EMPEDOCLES, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, was an auditor when a young man of Pythagoras.

EPICURUS, was born in the 109th Olympiad.

EUDEMUS, the Rhodian, a disciple of Aristotle, and to whom Aristotle inscribed his Eudemian Ethics.

EURYMACHUS, the Epicurean.

GALEN, the physician, who was also a Platonist. He wrote 200 Volumes, (most of which were burnt in the temple of Peace,) and flourished under the Emperor Adrian.

HARPOCRATIAN, the Platonist, an Argive, and the familiar of Augustus Cæsar.

HERACLIDES PONTICUS, a disciple of Plato and Speusippus.

HERACLITUS EPHESIUS, surnamed *the obscure,* flourished about the 70th Olympiad.

HERMES TRISMEGISTUS.

JULIAN, the Theurgist, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.

IAMBLICHUS, a Platonic philosopher, surnamed *the divine,* flourished under the Emperor Constantine.

IAMBLICHUS, a Platonic philosopher, surnamed *the divine,* flourished under the Emperor Constantine.

NICOMACHUS, the Pythagorean, was, according to Fabricius, somewhat posterior to the age of Antoninus Pius.

NUMENIUS, a Pythagoric and Platonic philosopher, flourished prior to Plotinus.

OCELLUS LUCANUS, an auditor of Pythagoras, and one of his most eminent disciples.

ORIGEN, (not a father of the Church,) a disciple of Plotinus.

PARMENIDES, the Elean, a Pythagoric philosopher, flourished about the 70th Olympiad.

PHERECYDES, the Syrian, the preceptor of Pythagoras.

PHILOLAUS, of Tarentum, an eminent Pythagorean philosopher, and an auditor of Pythagoras.

PLATO, was born in the 4th year of the 88th Olympiad, and died in the 108th Olympiad.

PLOTINUS, one of the most eminent of the Platonic philosophers, flourished under the Emperors Gordian and Galienus.

PLUTARCH, of Chæronea, in Boeotia, the preceptor of Trajan, and the celebrated biographer.

PORPHYRY, a disciple of Plotinus, and distinguished by the appellation of *the philosopher.*

POSIDONIUS, a Stoic philosopher, flourished under the reign of Julius Cæsar.

PRAXIPHANES, a disciple of Theophrastus.

PROCLUS MALLOTES, is mentioned by our Proclus as one of the ancient philosophers.

PYTHAGORAS, the father of philosophy, flourished about the 60th Olympiad.

SEVERUS, a Platonist, but the time in which he flourished is not known.

SOCRATES, the celebrated preceptor of Plato, was born in the 4th year of the 77th Olympiad.

SOCRATES, the Platonist, was posterior in time to Amelius.

SOLON, the Legislator, flourished about the 46th Olympiad.

STRATO LAMPSACENUS, an auditor and successor of Theophrastus.

SYRIANUS, the preceptor of Proclus. See the notes to this work.

THALES, was born in the first year of the 35th Olympiad, and died in the 58th Olympiad.

THEODORUS, ASINÆUS, a disciple of Plotinus, and surnamed *the great.*

THEOPHRASTUS, the celebrated disciple and successor of Aristotle.

XENARCHUS, a Peripatetic philosopher, and the friend of Augustus Cæsar.

XENOCRATES, a disciple, and successor of Plato.

XENOPHANES, the Colophonian, author of the Eleatic method of masoning, flourished in the 60th Olympiad. For an account of this method, see the additional notes on this work.

ZENO ELEATES was an auditor of Parmenides, and flourished about the 30th Olympiad.

N.B. The Olympic games were restored by Iphicus, 442 years after their first institution, and about 777 years before Christ. From this last institution the Greeks began to reckon by Olympiads, each of which contained the space of 4 years. And this continued even to the reign of Constantine.

BOOK I.

THAT THE DESIGN of the Platonic Timæus embraces the whole of physiology, and that it pertains to the theory of the universe, discussing this from the beginning to the end, appears to me to be clearly evident to those who are not entirely illiterate. For this very treatise of the Pythagoric Timæus *Concerning Nature,* is written after the Pythagoric manner; and Plato being thence impelled, applied himself to write the Timæus, according to Sillographus.[10] On this account we have prefixed the treatise of Timæus to these Commentaries, in order that we may know what the Timæus of Plato says that is the same with what is asserted in the treatise of Timæus [the Locrian], what it adds, and in what it dissents. And that we may investigate not in a careless manner the cause of this disagreement. All this dialogue, likewise, through the whole of itself, has physiology for its scope, surveying the same things in images and in paradigms, in wholes and in parts. For it is filled with all the most beautiful boundaries[11] of physiology, assuming things simple for the sake of such as are composite, parts for the sake of wholes, and images for the sake of paradigms, leaving none of the principal causes of nature uninvestigated.

But that the dialogue deservedly embraces a design of this kind, and that Plato alone preserving the Pythagoric mode in the theory concerning nature, has prosecuted with great subtlety the proposed doctrine, ought to be considered by those who are more sagacious and acute. For since, in short, physiology receives a threefold division, and one part of it is conversant with matter and material causes, but another part also adds the investigation of form, and evinces that this is the more principal cause; and again, since a third part demonstrates that these have not the relation of causes, but of concauses, and admits that there are other causes, which are properly so called, of things generated by nature, *viz.* the effective, paradigmatic and final cause; this being the case, among the multitude of physiologists prior to Plato, that directed their attention to matter, there was a diversity of opinion respecting the subject of things. For Anaxagoras, who appears to have seen, while the rest were asleep, that intellect is the first cause of generated natures, made no use of intellect in his explanation of things, but rather employed certain airs and æthers as the causes of things that are generated, as Socrates says in the Phædo. But of those posterior to Plato, who were the patrons of a sect, not all, but such of them as were more accurate than the rest,[12] thought fit to survey physical form in conjunction with matter, referring the principles of bodies to matter and form. For if they any where mention the producing cause, as when they say that nature is a principle of motion, they rather take away its efficacious and properly effective power [than allow the existence of it] by not granting that it contains the reasons [or productive principles] of the things effected by it, but admitting that many things are generated casually. To which we may add, that they do not acknowledge that there is a pre-existing producing cause of, in short, all physical things, but of those only that are borne along in generation. For of eternal natures they clearly say, that there is no effective cause; in asserting which they are ignorant that they must either give subsistence to the whole of heaven from chance, or evince that what is causal is itself productive of itself.

Plato however alone, following the Pythagoreans, delivers indeed, as the concauses of natural things, a universal recipient, and material form, which are subservient to causes properly so called, in the generation of things. But prior to these, he investigates principal causes, *viz.* the producing cause, the paradigm, and the final

cause. Hence also, he places a demiurgic intellect over the universe, and an intelligible cause in which the universe primarily subsists, and *the good,* which is established prior to the producing cause, in the order of the desirable. For since that which is moved by another thing, is suspended from the power of that which moves, as it is evidently not adapted either to produce, or perfect, or save itself, in all these it is in want of a producing cause, and is conducted by it. It is fit, therefore, that the concauses of natural things, should be suspended from true causes, from which they are produced, with a view to which they are fabricated by the father of all things, and for the sake of which they were generated. Justly, therefore, are all these delivered, and investigated with accuracy by Plato; and the remaining two, form and the subject-matter, suspended from these. For this world is not the same with the intelligible or intellectual worlds, which, according to some, subsist in pure forms; but one thing in it has the relation of reason and form, and another, of a subject. But that Plato very properly delivers all these causes of the fabrication of the world, *viz. the good,* the intelligible paradigm, the maker, form, and the subject nature, is evident from the following considerations. For if he had spoken concerning the intelligible Gods, he would have evinced that *the good* alone is the cause of these; for the intelligible number is from this cause. But if concerning the intellectual Gods, he would have shown that *the good* and the intelligible are the causes[13] of these. For the intellectual multitude proceeds from the intelligible unities, and the one fountain of beings. And if he had spoken concerning the supermundane Gods, he would have produced them from the intellectual and total fabrication, from the intelligible Gods, and from the cause of all things. For this cause gives subsistence to all things of which secondary natures are generative, but in a primary, ineffable, and inconceivable manner. But since he discusses mundane affairs and the whole world, he gives to it matter and form, descending into it from the supermundane Gods, suspends it from the total[14] fabrication, assimilates it to intelligible animal, and demonstrates it to be a God by the participation of *the good;* and thus he renders the whole world an intellectual, animated God. This, therefore, and such as this, is, as we have said, the scope of the Timæus.

This however being the case, the order of the universe is appropriately indicated in the beginning of the dialogue, through images; but in the middle of it, the whole fabrication of the world is delivered; and in the end, partial natures, and the extremities of fabrication, are woven together with wholes. For the resumption of the discourse about a polity, and the narration respecting the Atlantic island, unfold through images the theory of the world. For if we direct our attention to the union and multitude of mundane natures, we must say that the polity which Socrates summarily discusses, is an image of their union, establishing as its end the communion which pervades through all things; but that the war of the Atlantics with the Athenians, which Critias narrates, is an image of the division of mundane natures, and especially of the opposition[15] according to the two co-ordinations of things. But if we divide the universe into the celestial and sublunary regions, we must say that the [Socratic] polity, is assimilated to the celestial order; for Socrates says, that the paradigm of it is established in the heavens; but the war of the Atlantics, to generation, which subsists through contrariety and mutation. These things therefore, for the reasons we have mentioned, precede the whole of physiology.

But after this, the demiurgic, paradigmatic and final causes of the universe are unfolded, in consequence of the pre-existence of which, the universe is fabricated both according to the whole and the parts of it. For the corporeal nature of it is fashioned with forms, and divided by divine numbers; soul also is produced from the

Demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic reasons, and divine and demiurgic symbols; and the whole animal is woven together conformably to the united comprehension of it in the intelligible world. The parts likewise of it, are arranged in a becoming manner in the whole, both such as are corporeal and such as are vital. For partial souls being introduced into the world, are arranged about their leading Gods, and through their vehicles become mundane, imitating their presiding deities. Mortal animals likewise, are fabricated and vivified by the celestial Gods; where also man is surveyed, and the mode of his subsistence, and through what causes he was constituted. Man indeed is considered prior to other things, either because the theory respecting him pertains to us who make him the subject of discussion, and are ourselves men; or because man is a microcosm, and all such things subsist in him partially, as the world contains divinely and totally. For there is an intellect in us which is in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same[16] father, and the same vivific Goddess, as the soul of the universe; also an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body derived from the four elements, and with which likewise it is coordinate. If therefore, it is necessary that the universe should be surveyed multifariously, in the intelligible, and in the sensible world, paradigmatically, iconically, totally and partially, it will be well, if the nature of man is perfectly discussed in the theory of the universe.

You may also say that conformably to the Pythagoric custom, it is necessary to connect the discussion of that which surveys with that which is surveyed. For since we are informed what the world is, it is requisite I think to add also, what that is which considers these things, and makes them the subject of rational animadversion. But that Plato directs his attention likewise to this, is evident from what he says near the end of the dialogue, that it is necessary that the intellect of him who intends to obtain a happy life, should be assimilated to the object of his intellection. For the universe is always happy; and our soul will likewise be happy, when it is assimilated to the universe; for thus it will be led back to its cause. For as the sensible man is to the universe, so is the intelligible man to animal itself. But there secondary natures always adhere to such as are first, and parts subsist in unproceeding union with their wholes, and are established in them. Hence, when the sensible man is assimilated to the universe, he also imitates his paradigm after an appropriate manner, becoming a world through similitude to the world, and happy through resemblance to that blessed god [the universe.] The ends also of fabrication are subtly elaborated by Plato, according to genus and species, and also what pertains to meteors, together with productions in the earth, and in animals, such things as are preternatural, and such as are according to nature; in which part of the Timæus, likewise, the principles of medicine are unfolded. For the physiologist ends at these; since he is a surveyor of nature. For a subsistence according to nature, exists together with nature; but the preternatural is a departure from nature. It is the business, therefore, of the physiologist to understand in how many modes this aberration subsists, and how it becomes terminated in moderation and a natural condition. But it is the province of the medical art to unfold such particulars as are consequent to these. And in these things especially, Plato has something in common with other physiologists. For they were conversant with the most material, and the ultimate works of nature, neglecting the whole heaven, and the orders of the mundane Gods, in consequence of directing their attention to matter; but they bade farewell to forms and primary causes.

It also appears to me that the dæmoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as possible the doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole of his discussion concerning nature, perceiving that the things which are common to every thing that has a natural subsistence are, form and a subject, that from whence the principle of motion is

derived, motion, lime, and place; all which are delivered by Plato in this dialogue, *viz.* interval, and time which is the image of eternity, and is consubsistent with the universe; the various species of motion; and the concauses of things which have a natural subsistence. But with respect to the things peculiar to substances according to an essential division, of these Aristotle discusses in the first place such as pertain to the heavens, in a way conformably to Plato; so far as he calls the heaven unbegotten, and a fifth essence. For what difference is there between calling it a fifth element, or a fifth world, and a fifth figure, as Plato denominates it? But in the second place, he discusses such things as are common to every thing that has a generated subsistence. And with respect to things of this kind, Plato deserves to be admired, for having surveyed with much accuracy the essence and powers of them, and for having rightly preserved their harmony and contrarieties. And of these, such indeed as pertain to meteors, Plato has delivered the principles, but Aristotle has extended the doctrine respecting them beyond what is fit. But such as pertain to the theory of animals, are distinguished by Plato according to all final causes and concauses, but by Aristotle are scarcely, and but in few instances, surveyed according to form. For his discussion for the most part stops at matter; and making his exposition of things that have a natural subsistence from this, he shows to us that he deserts the doctrine of his preceptor. And thus much concerning these particulars.

In the next place it is requisite to speak of the form and character of the dialogue, and to show what they are. It is universally acknowledged, then, that Plato receiving the treatise of the Pythagoric Timæus, which was composed by him after the Pythagoric manner, began to write his Timæus. Again, it is also acknowledged by those who are in the smallest degree conversant with the writings of Plato, that his manner is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. If, therefore, he has any where mingled the Pythagoric and Socratic peculiarity, he appears to have done this in the present dialogue. For there are in it from the Pythagoric custom, elevation of conception, the intellectual, the divinely inspired, the suspending every thing from intelligibles, the bounding wholes in numbers, the indicating things mystically and symbolically, the anagogic, the transcending partial conceptions, and the enunciative or unfolding into light. But from the Socratic philanthropy, the sociable, the mild, the demonstrative, the contemplating beings through images, the ethical, and every thing of this kind. Hence it is a venerable dialogue; forms its conceptions supernally from the first principles; and mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative. It also prepares us to understand physics, not only physically, but likewise theologically. For Nature herself who is the leader of the universe, being suspended from, and inspired by the Gods, governs the corporeal-formed essence. And she neither ranks as a Goddess, nor is without a divine peculiarity, but is illuminated by the truly existing Gods.

If, likewise, it be requisite that discourses should be assimilated to the things of which they are the interpreters, as Timæus himself says, it will be fit that this dialogue also should have the physical, and should also have the theological; imitating nature, which is the object of its contemplation. Farther still, according to the Pythagoric doctrine, things receive a threefold division into intelligibles, things physical, and such as are the media between these, and which are usually called mathematical. But all things may be appropriately surveyed in all. For such things as are media, and such as are last, pre-subsist in intelligibles after a primordial manner, and both these subsist in the mathematical genera; first natures indeed iconically, but such as rank as the third, paradigmatically. In physical entities, also, there are images of the essences prior to them. This, therefore, being the case, Timæus, when he constitutes the soul,

very properly indicates its powers, its productive principles, and its elements through mathematical names. But Plato defines its peculiarities by geometrical figures, and leaves the causes of all these primordially pre-existing in the intelligible and demiurgic intellect. And thus much concerning these things; since when we descend to particulars, we shall be able to know more perfectly the manner of the dialogue. But the hypothesis of it is as follows:

Socrates having come to the Piræus for the sake of the Bendidian festival and solemn procession, discoursed there concerning a polity with Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, Glauco and Adimantus, and likewise Thrasymachus the sophist. But on the day after this, he narrates the conference in the Piræus, as it is laid down in the Republic, in the city, to Timæus, Hermocrates and Critias, and to another fourth anonymous person. Having, however, made this narration, he calls upon the other associates, to feast him in return on the day after this, with the banquet of discourse. The auditors therefore and speakers assembled together on this day, which was the third from the conference in the Piræus. For in the Republic it is said, "I went down yesterday to the Piræus;" but in this dialogue, "Of those who were received by me yesterday at a banquet of discourse, but who ought now in their turn to repay me with a similar repast." Not all of them however, were present at this audition, but the fourth was wanting through indisposition. What, therefore, you will say, are these three auditors of a discussion about the whole world? I reply, that it is fit the father of the discussion should be considered as analogous to [the Demiurgus, or] the father of works. For the fabrication of the world in words, is the image of the fabrication of it according to intellect. But the triad of those that receive the discussion of Timæus, is analogous to the demiurgic triad which receives the one and total motion of the father; of which triad Socrates is the summit, through an alliance of life immediately conjoining himself to Timæus, just as the first of the paradigmatic triad is united to the father, who is prior to the triad. These things, however, if the Gods please, we shall render more manifest through what follows. As we have therefore spoken concerning the scope and management of the dialogue, have shown how admirable the character of it is, and what is the whole of the hypothesis, and have indicated the adaptation of the persons to the present discussion, it will be proper that, betaking ourselves to the words of Timæus, we should investigate every particular to the utmost of our power.

Since, however, the word *nature,* being differently understood by different persons, disturbs those who love to contemplate the conceptions of Plato, let us in the first place show what it appeared to him to be, and what his opinion was of its essence. For the knowledge of what nature is, whence it proceeds, and how far it extends to productions, will be adapted to the dialogue, which has for its object the physical theory. For of the ancients, some indeed, as Antipho, called matter nature; but others form, as Aristotle, in many places. Others again called the whole of things nature, as some prior to Plato, of whom he speaks in the Laws. Others[17] denominated nature things which subsist by nature. But others gave the appellation of nature to physical powers, such as gravity and levity, rarity and density, as some of the Peripatetics, and still more ancient physiologists. Others called things which have a natural subsistence the art of God; others soul; and others something else of this kind. Plato, however, does not think fit to give the appellation of nature primarily, either to matter, or material form, or body, or physical powers, but is averse to call it immediately soul. Placing, however, the essence of it in the middle of both, I mean, between soul and corporeal powers, the latter being inferior to it, in consequence of being divided about bodies, and incapable of being converted to themselves, but

nature surpassing things posterior to it, through containing the reasons or productive principles of all of them, and generating and vivifying all things, he has delivered to us the most accurate theory concerning it. For, according to common conceptions, nature is one thing, and that which subsists according to, and by nature, another. For that which is artificial, is something different from art, and the intellectual soul is one thing, and nature another. For nature, indeed, verges to bodies, and is inseparable from them. But the intellectual soul is separate from bodies, is established in herself, and at one and the same time belongs to herself and to another. She belongs to another, indeed, in consequence of being participated, but to herself, through not verging to the participant; just as the father of soul is of himself being imparticipable, and, if you are willing, prior to him the Intelligible paradigm itself of the whole world. For these follow each other, *viz. itself; of itself; of itself and of another; of another; another.* And with respect to the last of these, it is evident that it is every thing sensible, in which there is interval and all-various division. But of the next to this, [*viz.* that which is of another,] it is nature which is inseparable from bodies. That which immediately precedes this [*viz.* that which is both of itself and of another,] is soul which subsists in herself, and imparts by illumination a secondary life to another thing. The next to this [or that which is of itself,] is the demiurgic intellect who abides [as Plato says] in himself in his own accustomed manner. And the next to this [or itself,] is the intelligible cause of all things, which is the paradigm of the productions of the Demiurgus, and which Plato on this account thinks fit to call animal itself.

Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal-formed and sensible essence. She is also the boundary of the extent of incorporeal essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she directs and governs mundane beings. And she is a Goddess indeed, in consequence of being deified, but she has not immediately the subsistence of a deity. For we call divine bodies Gods, as being statues of Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers, containing the heavens indeed in the summit of herself, but ruling over generation through the heavens; and every where weaving together partial natures with wholes. Being however such, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess [Rhea.] [For according to the Chaldean oracle] "Immense Nature is suspended from the back of the Goddess;" from whom all life is derived, both that which is intellectual, and that which is inseparable from the subjects of its government. Hence, being suspended from thence, she pervades without impediment through, and inspires all things; so that through her, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and such things as are corruptible, remain perpetually in the world, being held together by the causes of forms which she contains. For again the Oracle says, "Unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward, that Heaven may run an eternal course," etc. So that if some one of those who assert that there are three demiurgi, is willing to refer them to these principles, *viz.* to the demiurgic intellect, to soul, and to total nature [or to nature considered as a whole,] he will speak rightly, through the causes which have been already enumerated. But he will speak erroneously, if he supposes that there are three other demiurgi of the universe, beyond soul. For the Demiurgus of wholes is one, but more partial powers, distribute his whole fabrication into parts. We must not therefore admit such an assertion, whether it be Amelius or Theodorus [Asinæus] who wishes to make this arrangement; but we must be careful to remain in Platonic and Orphic hypotheses.

Moreover, those who call nature demiurgic art, if indeed they mean the nature which abides in the Demiurgus, they do not speak rightly; but their assertion is right, if they mean the nature which proceeds from him. *For we must conceive that art is*

triple, one kind subsisting in the artist, in unproceeding union; another, proceeding indeed, but being converted to him; and a third being that which has now proceeded from the artist, and subsists in another thing. The art therefore, which is in the Demiurgus, abides in him, and is himself, according to which the sensible world[18] is denominated the work of the artificer, and the work of the artificer of the fiery world. But the intellectual soul is art indeed, yet art which at the same time both abides and proceeds. And nature is art which proceeds alone; on which account also it is said to be the organ of the Gods, not destitute of life, nor alone alter-motive, but having in a certain respect the self-motive, through the ability of energizing from itself. For the organs of the Gods are essentialized in efficacious reasons, are vital, and concur with the energies of the Gods.

As we have therefore shown what nature is according to Plato, that it is an incorporeal essence, inseparable from bodies, containing the reasons or productive principles of them, and incapable of perceiving itself, and as it is evident from these things that the dialogue is physical, which reaches us concerning the whole mundane fabrication, — it remains that we should connect what is consequent with what has been said. For since the whole of philosophy is divided into the theory concerning intelligible and mundane natures, and this very properly, because there is also a twofold world, the intelligible and the sensible, as Plato himself says in the course of the dialogue, — this being the case, the Parmenides comprehends the discussion of intelligibles, but the Timæus that of mundane natures. For the former delivers to us all the divine orders, but the latter all the progressions of mundane essences. But neither does the former entirely omit the theory of the natures contained in the universe, nor the latter the theory of intelligibles; because sensibles are in intelligibles paradigmatically, and intelligibles in sensibles iconically. But the one is exuberant about that which is physical, and the other about that which is theological, in a manner appropriate to the men from whom the dialogues are denominated: to Timæus, for he wrote a treatise of this kind about the universe; and to Parmenides, for he wrote about truly-existing beings. The divine Iamblichus, therefore, says rightly, that the whole theory of Plato is comprehended in these two dialogues, the Timæus and Parmenides. For every thing pertaining to mundane and supermundane natures, obtains its most excellent end in these, and no order of beings is left uninvestigated. To those also who do not carelessly inspect these dialogues, the similitude of discussion in the Timæus to that in the Parmenides, will be apparent. For as Timæus refers the cause of every thing in the world to the first Demiurgus, so Parmenides suspends the progression of all beings from *the one.* And this is effected by the former, so far as all things participate of the demiurgic providence; but by the latter, so far as beings participate of a uniform hyparxis, [or of an hyparxis which has the form of *the one.*] Farther still, as Timæus, prior to physiology, extends through images the theory of mundane natures, so Parmenides excites the investigation of immaterial forms, prior to theology. For it is requisite after having been exercised in discussions about the best polity, to be led to the knowledge of the universe; and after having contended with strenuous doubts about forms, to be sent to the mystic theory of the unities [of beings.] Having however, said thus much, it is now time to consider the words of Plato, and investigate their meaning to the utmost of our ability.

"[I see] One, two, three, but where, friend Timæus,[19] is the fourth person of those who having been received by me yesterday at a banquet of discussion, ought now to repay me a similar repast?"

Plato here, together with the grace and beauty of the words, raises and exalts the whole period. Praxiphanes however, the disciple of Theophrastus, blames Plato, first because he makes an enumeration of one, two, three, in a thing which is manifest to sense and known to Socrates. For what occasion had Socrates to numerate, in order that he might know the multitude of those that assembled to this conference? In the second place he blames him, because he makes a change in using the word *fourth,* and in so doing, does not accord with what had been said before. For the word *four,* is consequent to one, two, three; but to the *fourth,* the first, second, and third are consequent. These, therefore, are the objections of Praxiphanes. The philosopher Porphyry however directly replies to him, and in answer to his second objection observes, that this is the Grecian custom, for the purpose of producing beauty in the diction. Homer[20] therefore has said many things of this kind:

Full on the brass descending from above,
Through six bull hides the furious weapon drove,
Till in the seventh it fix'd.

And in a similar manner in many other places. Here also the mutation has a cause. For to numerate the persons that were present, was to point them out. For to say one, two, three, is indicative; but he signifies the person that was absent (since it was impossible to point him out) through *the fourth.* For we use the term *the fourth,* of one that is absent. But to the former objection Porphyry replies, that if as many had been present as was requisite, it would have been superfluous to numerate them, but one of them being absent, of whose name we are ignorant, the enumeration of those that are present contains a representation of the one that is wanting, as desiring that which remains, and as being in want of a part of the whole number. Plato therefore indicating this, represents Socrates enumerating the persons that were present, and requiring him who was wanting. For if he had known him, and had been able to manifest him by name, he would perhaps have said, I see Critias, and Timæus, and Hermocrates, but that man I do not see. Since however, he who was absent was a stranger, and unknown to him, he only knew through number that he was wanting, and manifests to us that so many were present. All these observations, therefore, are elegant, and such others of the like kind as may be devised by some in subserviency to the theory of the words before us. But it is necessary to remember that the dialogue is Pythagorean, and that it is requisite interpretations should be made in a way adapted to the philosophers of that sect.

Such ethical Pythagoric dogmas therefore, as the following, may be derived from the present text: Those men established friendship and a concordant life, as the scope of all their philosophy. Hence Socrates prior to every thing else adduces this, by giving Timæus the appellation of *friend.* In the second place, they thought that the compacts which they made with each other, should be stably preserved by them; and for the fulfilment of these, Socrates desires the presence of the fourth person. In the third place, they embraced communion in the invention of dogmas, and the writings of one, were common to all of them. This also Socrates establishes, calling on them to become both guests and hosts, those that fill, and those that are filled, those that teach, and those that learn. Others, therefore, have written arts concerning disciplines through which they think they shall improve the manners of those that are instructed by them; but Plato delineates the forms of appropriate manners, through the imitation of the most excellent men, which have much greater efficacy than those which are deposited in mere rules alone. For imitation disposes the lives of the auditors,

conformably to its own peculiarity. Hence, through these things it is evident what that is about which the philosopher is especially abundant, that it is about the hearing of discussions, and what he conceived to be a true feast; that it is not such as the multitude fancy it to be; for this is of an animal and brutal nature; but that which banquets in us the [true] man. Hence too, there is much in Plato about the feast of discourse. These therefore and such particulars as these, are ethical.

But the physical Pythagoric dogmas are as follow: they said that every physical production was held together by numbers, and that all the fabrications of nature subsisted conformably to numbers. These numbers however are participated, just as all mundane forms are participable. Very properly, therefore, does the dialogue at its commencement proceed through numbers, and use numbers as things numbered, and not those very things themselves of which they participate. For the monad, duad, and triad are one thing, and one, two, three, another. For the former are simple, and each of these subsists itself by itself; but the latter participate of the former. Aristotle therefore, is not right in asserting, that these men considered numbers as subsisting in sensibles. For how could this be admitted by those who celebrate number as the father of Gods and men, and the tetractys, as the fountain of ever-flowing nature? But since the dialogue is physical, it makes its commencement from participated numbers, such as are all numbers that are physical. Farther still, these men venerated physical communion, both that which is in generation, according to which all things are rendered effable and commensurate with each other, and that which is in celestial natures. For these impart to each other their proper powers. Rightly therefore, and in a way adapted to the thing proposed, does Socrates think fit, that the same persons should become both hosts and guests.

From these things also, you may survey such theological conceptions as the following: These men generated all things through the first numbers, and which also rank as rulers and leaders; and from three Gods, gave subsistence to all mundane natures. Of these three, the monad, duad and triad, are indicative; so that it is requisite to begin from these, and that he who surveys nature inwardly should look to these. Farther still, the concauses of natural things were also contemplated by other philosophers, as by Anaxagoras and Zeno; but the final, the paradigmatic, and the producing[21] cause, were peculiarly investigated by Plato. These causes therefore are manifested through the above numbers. The final, indeed, through the monad; for it presides over numbers in the order of *the good.* But the paradigmatic through the duad; for the difference of beings separates the primary causes of wholes. And besides this, the duad is the principle of the tetractys of intelligible paradigms. But the producing cause is signified through the triad. For intellect is adapted to the triad, since it is the third from being through life as the medium, or from the father through power, or from the intelligible through intelligence. For as the monad is to the duad, so is being to life, father to power, and the intelligible to intelligence. But as the duad is to the triad, so is life, and also power and intelligence, to intellect. Again, all divine natures are in all, and are united to each other, so that all of them are in one, and each is in all, and they are connected together through divine friendship. The sphere also which is there, comprehends the one union of Gods. Hence Socrates who looks to divinity, very properly begins from communion and concord, and likewise calls the other persons of the dialogue to this. Moreover, the words *feasting* and *banquet,* are words adapted to the Gods, and especially to the mundane Gods. For they proceed together with the liberated Gods to the banquet and delicate food, as Socrates says in the Phædrus: and the feasting on the nativity of Venus, was in conjunction with the great Jupiter. These things therefore, Socrates thinks should subsist analogously with

them, in their mutual participations of divine conceptions. And it is not at all wonderful that Timæus should feast others, and be feasted by them. Farther still, communications and participations of powers are celebrated by theologists, divine natures filling and being filled by each other. For thus we hear from poets inspired by Phœbus, that the Gods communicate with each other in intellectual or providential energies in the works which they effect in the universe.

In golden cups the Gods each other pledge,
And while they drink their eyes are fix'd on Troy.[22]

They also know and intellectually perceive each other.

For Gods are to each other not unknown.[23]

But the intelligible according to the Chaldean oracle is nutriment to that which is intellective. From all which it is evident, that a reciprocation of banqueting, subsists primarily in the Gods. And of men, those that are more wise, imitating in this respect the Gods, impart to each other in unenvying abundance, their own proper intellectual conceptions.

"TIMÆUS. A certain infirmity has befallen him, Socrates: for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present."

The philosopher Porphyry says, that what is delineated in these words: that this is the one cause with wise men of relinquishing such like associations, *viz.* infirmity of body; and that it is requisite to think that every thing of this kind depends on circumstances and is involuntary. Another thing also is delineated, that friends should make fit apologies for friends, when they appear to have done any thing rightly, which is contrary to common opinion. The present words therefore, comprehend both these, indicating the manners of Timæus, and the necessity of one being absent; exhibiting the former as mild and friendly to truth, but the latter, as an impediment to the life of a lover of learning. But the divine Iamblichus speaking loftily on these words, says that those who are exercised in the survey of intelligibles, are unadapted to the discussion of sensibles; as also Socrates himself says in the Republic,[24] "that those who are nurtured in pure splendour, have their eyes darkened when they descend into the cavern, through the obscurity which is there; just as it likewise happens to those who ascend from the cavern, through their inability to look directly to the light." Through this cause therefore, the fourth person is wanting, as being adapted to another contemplation, that of intelligibles. It is also necessary that this his infirmity, should be a transcendency of power, according to which he surpasses the present theory. For as the power of the wicked, is rather impotency than power, thus also imbecility with respect to things of a secondary nature, is transcendency of power. According to Iamblichus therefore, the person who is wanting, is absent in consequence of being incommensurate to physical discussions; but he would have been willingly present, if intelligibles were to have been considered. And nearly with respect to every thing [in this dialogue] prior to physiology, one of these, *i.e.* Porphyry, interprets every thing in a more political manner, referring what is said to virtues, but the other, Iamblichus, in a more physical way. For it is necessary, that everything should accord with the proposed scope: but the dialogue is physical, and not ethical. Such therefore, are the conclusions of the philosophers about these particulars. For I omit to mention those who labour to evince, that this fourth person was Theætetus, because he was known to those who came out of the Eleatic[25] school, and because we are informed [elsewhere] that he was ill. Hence he is said to have been now absent on account of illness. For

thus Aristocles infers, that the absent person was Theætetus, who a little before the death of Socrates, became known to Socrates, and to the Elean stranger. But admitting that he had been long before known to the latter, what is there in common between Timæus and him? The Platonic Ptolemy however, thinks that the absent person was Clitophon: for in the dialogue which bears his name, he is not thought deserving of an answer by Socrates. But Dercyllides is of opinion that it was Plato: for he was absent through illness, when Socrates died. These, therefore, as I have said, I omit; since it is well observed by those prior to us, that these men neither investigate what is worthy of investigation, nor assert anything that can be depended on. All of them, likewise, attempt a thing which is of a slippery nature, and which is nothing to the purpose, even if we should discover that which is the object of their search. For to say that it was either Theætetus or Plato, on account of illness, does not accord with the times. For of these, the former is said to have been ill when Socrates was judged, but the latter when Socrates was dead. But to say it was Clitophon is perfectly absurd. For he was not present on the preceding day, when Socrates narrates what Clitophon said the day before, during the conference in the Piræus; except that thus much is rightly signified by Atticus, that the absent person appears to have been one of those strangers [or guests] that were with Timæus. Hence Socrates asks Timæus where that fourth person was; and Timæus apologizes for him, as a friend, and shows that his absence was necessary, and contrary to his will. And thus much for what is aid by the ancient interpreters.

What, however, our preceptor [Syrianus] has decided on this subject, must be narrated by us, since it is remarkably conformable to the mind of Plato. He says, therefore, that in proportion as the auditions are about things of a more venerable and elevated nature, in such proportion the multitude of hearers is diminished. But the discussion in the Timæus becomes, as it proceeds, more mystic and arcane. Hence in the former discussion of a polity during the conference in the Piræus, the hearers were many, and those who had names were six. But in the second conference, which is narrated by Socrates, those who receive the narration are four in number. And in the present conference, the fourth person is wanting; but the auditors are three. And by how much the discussion is more pure, and more intellectual, by so much the more is the number of auditors contracted. For everywhere that which is discussed is a monad. — But at one time, it is accompanied with contention; on which account also, the auditors have the indefinite, and the definite is extended into multitude, in which the odd is complicated with the even. At another to me, however, the discussion is narrative, yet is not liberated from opposition, and dialectic contests. Hence also, the auditors are four in number; the tetrad through its tetragonic nature, and alliance to the monad, possessing similitude and sameness; but through the nature of the even, possessing difference and multitude. And at another time[26] the discussion is exempt from all agonistic doctrines, the theory being unfolded enunciatively, and narratively. Hence, the triad is adapted to the recipients of it, since this number is in every respect connascent with the monad, is the first odd number, and is perfect. For as of the virtues, some of them subsist in souls the parts of which are in a state of hostility to each other, and measure the hostility of these parts; but others separate indeed from this hostility, yet are not perfectly liberated from it; and other are entirely separated from it; — thus also of discussions, some indeed are agonistic, others are enunciative, and others are in a certain respect media between both. Some, indeed, being adapted to intellectual tranquillity, and to the intellectual energy of the soul; but others to doxastic energies; and others to the lives that subsist between these. Moreover, of auditors likewise, some are commensurate to more elevated auditions, but others to

such as are of a more grovelling nature. And the auditors indeed of grander subjects, are also capable of attending to such as are subordinate; but those who are naturally adapted to subjects of less importance, are unable to understand such as are more venerable. Thus also with respect to the virtues, he who has the greater possesses likewise the less; but he who is adorned with the inferior, is not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues.

Why, therefore, is it any longer wonderful, if an auditor of discussions about a polity, should not be admitted to hear the discussion about the universe? Or rather, is it not necessary that in more profound disquisitions, the auditors should be fewer in number? Is it not likewise Pythagoric, to define different measures of auditions? For of those who came to the homacoion [or common auditory of the Pythagoreans] some were partakers of more profound, but others of more superficial dogmas. Does not this also accord with Plato, who assigns infirmity as the cause of the absence of this fourth person? For the imbecility of the soul with respect to more divine conceptions, separates us from more elevated conferences, in which case the involuntary also takes place. For every thing which benefits us in a less degree, is not conformable to our will. But the falling off from more perfect good is involuntary; or rather it is itself not voluntary. But the falling off which not only separates us from greater goods, but leads us to the infinity of vice, is involuntary. Hence also Timæus says, that this fourth person was absent not willingly from this conference. For he was not absent in such a way as to be perfectly abhorrent from the theory, but as unable to be initiated in greater speculations. It is possible, therefore, for an auditor of disquisitions about the fabrication of the world, to be also an auditor of discussions about a polity. But it is among the number of things impossible, that one who is adapted to receive political discourses, should through transcendency of power, omit to be present at auditions about the universe. This fourth person, therefore, was absent through indigence, and not as some say, through transcendency of power. And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the others to him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbecility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend from the speculation of sensibles, such as Socrates relates in the Republic; yet he who becomes an auditor of political discussions, cannot through a transcendency unknown to those that are present, be absent from the theory of physics. It likewise appears to me, that the words "*has befallen him*," sufficiently represent to us the difference between him and those that were present, with respect to discussions, and not with respect to transcendency. His being *anonymous* also, seems to signify, not his being exempt from and circumscribed by those that were present, but the indefiniteness and inferiority of his habit. Plato, therefore, is accustomed to do this in many places. Thus in the Phædo, he does not think him deserving of a name, who in that dialogue answered badly. He also mentions indefinitely,[27] the father of Critobulus, who was absent from the discussion of the subjects that were then considered; and likewise very many others. An auditor therefore of this kind would in vain[28] have been present at these discussions; since of those that were present, Critias indeed himself says something; but Hermocrates is silently present, differing only from him who is absent in a greater aptitude to hear, but being inferior to all the rest, through his inability to speak.

"SOCRATES. It is your business, therefore, O Timæus, and that of the company present, to fill up the part of this absent person."

This also accords with what we have said. For in natures which are more causal and divine, quantity is always contracted, and multitude diminished, but power transcends. And this also is a dogma of the Pythagoreans, with whom the triad is more venerable than the tetrad, the tetrad than the decad, and all the numbers within, than those posterior to the decad. And in short, that which is nearer to the principle, has a more primordial nature. But that which is more primordial is more powerful; since all power is antecedently comprehended in the principle, and from the principle is imparted to other things. If, therefore, the principle of things was multitude, it would be requisite that what is more multitudinous, should be more primordial and powerful than what is less so. Since, however, the principle is a monad, that which is more monadic, is more excellent and more powerful than things which are more separated from their cause. Hence Socrates very properly makes a diminution of number to be a symbol of superior perfection, which antecedently comprehends according to power all secondary natures, and fills up their deficiency. But since, as we have observed, Socrates is the summit of this triad of auditors, and he conjoins himself to the monad that disposes the conference, conformably to the image of demiurgic Gods, it is worth while to observe, how he exempts Timæus from the rest, and how he is extended to him, as to the dispensator of the whole discussion. He conjoins, however, the other auditors to himself, as being inferior to him in desert. For these things may be referred to divine causes, in which the first of the [demiurgic] triad is united to the primary monad, and extends the other parts of the triad to it. It also calls forth, indeed, the productive energy of the monad, but excites the energies of the rest to fabrication. These things, therefore, are conformable to what has been before said. But according to Porphyry, the ethical doctrine contained in these words is this, that friends ought to endure all things for each other, both in words and deeds, and to supply their wants, and cause them to be unindigent, by filling up their deficiency.[29] For these are the peculiarities of pure and genuine friendship. Iamblichus, however, having supposed that the anonymous person was superior to those that were present, and was a lover of the contemplation of intelligibles, says, that Socrates indicates by these words, that though generated fall short of the nature of truly-existing beings, yet a certain similitude is divulsed from these beings. And conformably to this, the theory which is conversant with nature, participates in a certain respect of the science of intelligibles, and this the filling up the part of the absent person manifests.

"TIMÆUS. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished. For it would not be just, that we, who were yesterday entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received, should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight."

The manners of Timæus are indicated by these words; for they are shown to be superb and modest, elevated and elegant, friendly and philanthropic. For the words "*Entirely so*," indicate his promptitude respecting the absent person, and the perfection of the science according to which he is readily disposed to fill up what is wanting in others; and they also indicate his genuine sincerity. But the words, "*We shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished*," sufficiently present to our view, his firmness in the fulfilment of his promises, and his modesty in speaking of himself. Such, therefore, are the ethical indications that may be surveyed in these words. But the physical indications are these, that the remuneration of discussion, conveys an image of the communion and compensation of powers, through which all things are coordinated, and contribute to

the one harmony of the universe. Likewise, that the energies of nature are changed according to time, different energies operating at different times on different subjects. For to these indications the words, "*return the hospitality to you, by whom we were yesterday entertained in such a manner as guests ought to be received*," are similar. That which is theologically indicated is this, that the demiurgic cause proceeds through, and fills all things, and cuts off every deficiency through his own power, and his prolific abundance, according to which he leaves nothing destitute of himself. For he is characterised by the super-plenary, the sufficient, and the all-perfect. Moreover, the expression, *return the hospitality,* is derived from the banqueting in divine fables, according to which the Gods pledge each other:

In golden goblets they each other pledge. Iliad iv, 2.

being filled with nectar from the mighty Jupiter. Nor is it simply said, *to feast,* but *to return the hospitality* (or *to feast in return*). For a reciprocation of feasting, comprehends the entire, and completely perfect plenitude of banqueting. But this also is seen in wholes. For the visible orders of things call forth invisible powers, through their own consummate aptitude; and the latter through transcendency of goodness perfect the former. All these likewise, are conjoined with each other, and the communication of perfection, becomes the retribution of calling forth. Farther still, to do all these things, accompanied with justice, conveys an image of Justice which arranges all things in conjunction with Jupiter. But the *becoming* [or in such a manner as guests *ought* to be received] is an image of the cause which illuminates wholes with demiurgic beauty. And the term *guests,* is an image of the variety which is defined according to divine peculiarities. For each of the divine natures possesses appropriate powers and energies. As therefore Socrates feasted Timæus with the discourses of his own philosophy, thus also each of the Gods, energizing conformably to his proper powers, contributes to the one and transcendent providential attention of the Demiurgus to the whole of things. And these particulars are exhibited as an exercise to the theory of things, which presents itself to the view[30] after the manner of an image, in the introduction to the dialogue.

From these things likewise, the times of the dialogues, the Republic, and the Timæus, are manifest; since the one is supposed to have taken place during the Bendidian festival in the Piræus, but the other on the allowing day of the festival. For that the Bendidian festival was celebrated in the Piræus on the 19th of April, is acknowledged by those who have written concerning festivals, so that the Timæus must be supposed to have taken place on the 20th of the same month. But if, as will be observed in what follows, this dialogue is supposed to have taken place during the Panathenæan festival, it is evident that this was the less Panathenæa. For the greater were celebrated on the 28th of June, according to the narration of those whom we have just mentioned.

"SOCRATES. Do you remember, therefore, the magnitude and quality of the things which I proposed to you to explain?"

In the first place, it is requisite to attend to the order of the heads of what is said, of which, that concerning the multitude of those that form the conference, is the leader. The next to this pertains to the filling up the part of him who is absent. And the third is that which is now added, and respects the explication of the things proposed to be discussed. But these are in continuity with each other. And with reference to the order, it is requisite to understand the accuracy of the words. For the words "*Do you remember*," exhibit distributed knowledge in the participations of discourse. For in

the Demiurgus the recollection of all things, is a separate, exempt, and uniform knowledge, according to the Mnemosyne which he contains, and which is the firm establishment of divine intelligence. And this in the secondary Gods, is a subordinate intellection; of both which the present persons are images. Through this memory likewise, which pre-exists in the universe, whole souls are established in intelligibles, and the demiurgic reasons, [or productive principles] possess an immutable and an immoveable nature; so that such[31] beings as are deprived of it, as is the case with partial souls, and the natures of things that are generated, fall off from their proper causes. But the terms "*such things*," and "*about which*," are indicative of the quantity and quality of the productive principles, which proceed indeed from the total fabrication, and also proceed from more partial Gods. And with respect to the words "*which I proposed to you to explain*," if they were addressed to Critias and Hermocrates, it is evident how they are to be referred to things, and to the principles of the fabrication of the world; but if also to Timæus, they are not a symbol of transcendency [in Socrates], but of an evocation of the intellectual conceptions of Timæus. Besides these things, however, let us survey the answer of Timæus.

"TIMÆUS. Some things indeed, I recollect; but such as I have forgotten, do you recall into my memory."

That which is ethical in these words, you will find to be this, as Porphyry says, that they are a medium between irony and arrogance. For Timæus does not say that he recollects every thing, nor that he recollects nothing; but that he recollects some things, and not others. That which is logical in them is, that they afford a pretext for the summary repetition of the problems: for to do this is the province of dialectic. The physical indication of the words is this, that physical productive principles always remain, and are always refluxive, just as the present remembrance [of Timæus] is partly preserved, and partly lost. For what is said by the man must be transferred to the whole of nature. And the theological indication is, that the one fabrication [which is that of the Demiurgus] possesses indeed from itself, the immutable and undefiled in its generations; but through secondary and third powers, is sustained as it proceeds, and is in itself separate; these powers attending it as guards, and running as it were before it repress the tumult of generated natures. Or rather, that this fabrication is such, through placing secondary powers over the subjects of its government. Farther still, *the recalling into the memory,* brings with it an image of the renovation of the productive principles in the universe. For that which is effluxive in them, is circularly recalled to the same, and the similar. And the order of generation remains never-failing, through the circular motion of the heavens. But this motion subsists always after the same manner through intellect which connectedly contains and adorns all its circulation, by intellectual powers. It is very properly, therefore, Socrates that recalls into the memory the discussions, who is the narrator of the polity, of which the celestial is the paradigm.

"Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly established in our memory."

The polity [of Socrates] being triple, the first description of it was truly difficult on account of sophistical contests; the second was easier than that which preceded it; but the third was [perfectly] easy; containing in itself contractedly every species of a polity. The recapitulation however of it pertains to physical things, through the regeneration which is in them, and the circular return to the same form; from which

also, forms permanently remain in the world, revolution recalling their efflux and their destruction. Through this cause likewise, the heavens are perpetually moved, and evolving many periods, return to the same life. What, however, is the reason that in the [first] narration of a polity, Socrates neither makes mention of the persons, nor the promises, but here adds both these? It is because in wholes, paradigms indeed comprehend all the productive principles of images, but the things which proceed from them, have not strength sufficient to comprehend all the power of their causes. As, therefore, in the second description of a polity, mention is made of the persons that were in the first conference in the Piræus, thus also in the third, he commemorates those that were passed over in silence in the first. For effects may be surveyed more perfectly in their more superior causes. You may also say theologically, that Timæus, as being established analogous to the total fabrication, comprehends all the persons, the promises, and the discussions themselves. But Socrates in the Republic, being arranged analogous to the summit of the triple fabrication, fashions only the form of a polity, this form being celestial. Here, therefore, as in one all-perfect animal, all things are comprehended, *viz.* things first, middle, and last, and all the evolution of wholes. But how, and through what cause is a polity narrated the third time? Is it because the life also[32] of the soul is triple? The first indeed, being that which represses and adorns the irrational[33] part by justice, and governs it in a becoming manner. But the second being that which is converted to itself, and desires to perceive itself intellectually, in consequence of subsisting according to its own justice. And the third ascending to its causes, and establishing in them its proper energies. To which may be added, that "*to speak in a cursory manner*," brings with it an image of a life conspiring to one intellect, which comprehends all things through an intelligible essence. The words also "*run over the whole*" afford an admirable indication of an elevation to the highest end, of perfection, and if you are willing so to speak, of a more eternal intelligence. For this signifies to be mote established, and to possess that which is more firm and more eternal about the same things.

"SOCRATES. Let it be so. And to begin: the sum of what was said by me yesterday is this, What kind of polity appeared to me to be the best, and of what sort of men such a polity ought to consist."

Some, considering the resumption of a polity in a more ethical point of view, say that it indicates to us, that those who apply themselves to the theory of wholes, ought to be adorned in their manners. But others think that it is placed before us as an image of the orderly distribution of the universe. And others, as an indication[34] of the whole of theology. *For it was usual with the Pythagoreans, prior to scientific doctrine, to render manifest the proposed objects of enquiry, through similitudes and images; and after this, to introduce through symbols the arcane indication respecting them.* For thus, after the excitation of the intellection of the soul, and the purification of its eye, it is requisite to introduce the whole science of the things which are the subjects of discussion. Here, therefore, the concise narration of a polity, prior to physiology, iconically places us in the fabrication of the universe; but the history of the Atlantics accomplishes this symbolically. For it is usual with fables to indicate many things through symbols. So that the physiologic character pervades through the whole of the dialogue; but differently in different places, according to the different modes of the doctrine which is delivered. And thus much concerning the scope of the proposed words.

That in the present discussion, however, the summary repetition of a polity very properly takes place, may be multifariously inferred. For the political science subsists primarily in the Demiurgus of the universe, as we may learn in the Protagoras. And true virtue shines forth in this sensible world. Hence also Timæus says, that the[35] world is known and is friendly to itself through virtue. Farther still, the polity of Socrates being triple, and the first being referred to the total fabrication, as we have elsewhere shown, the form of this is very properly delivered here contractedly, where it is proposed to survey the whole Demiurgus, generating and adorning the universe. These things, therefore, are capable of being still farther discussed. Let us however return to the text, and the words of Socrates. But in these, there is much contention among the interpreters, who oppose each other about a certain punctuation, and with reference to this differently explain the scope of the discussion. For some, making a stop at the word *polity,* define the scope of it to be conformable to the inscription, and adduce Plato as a witness that it is concerning a polity. Others again, making a stop at the words *what was said,* evince that the scope of it is about justice; and that Socrates has given a certain summary of what was said about justice, which is concerning a polity. If, however, it is requisite not to trifle in asserting and contradicting, it must be said that both concur with each other. For the discourse concerning justice, is a disquisition of the polity which is within the soul. For it rightly disposes the communion of the powers that we contain. The discourse, likewise, about a polity, is a discussion of the justice which subsists in multitude. Both, therefore, pertain to the same thing. And *the same thing is indeed justice in the soul, a polity in a city, and gracefulness in the world.* Nor is it fit to separate from each other, things which are conjoined by nature. And thus much for this particular.

Longinus however and Origen contend with each other from another principle, about what kind of polity Socrates speaks, in these words; whether about the first, or the middle polity. For in the latter, the polity is seen living physically, politically and intellectually. Longinus therefore thinks, that what is here said pertains to the middle polity, because Socrates calls the assistants guardians, and says that the guardians are warriors. But Origen is of opinion that what is said respects the first polity. For in this Socrates delivers disciplines to the guardians. We however say in answer to suchlike assertions, that it is not proper to divulse the one polity; nor to separate the continuity of life from itself. For the polity is one, perfecting itself, and co-augmenting itself by more perfect additions. But the whole polity possesses the physical in the mercenaries, the warlike in the auxiliaries, and the intellectual in the guardians. So that the discussion is about the whole polity. And it is not proper to contend about these things, but rather to consider this, how the polity may very properly be said to be both subordinate to, and superior to physiology.[36] For so far as it has for its matter human concerns, and is desirous of adorning these, it has an order secondary to, and more partial than physiology. But so far as it subsists in universal reasonings, and is arranged incorporeally, and immaterially, it is superior to, and more total than physiology. The world also is a certain polity, and a partial polity [with reference to the intelligible world], because every body is partial. In short, the polity *pre-exists* indeed in the intelligible, but *exists* in the heavens, and subsists in the last place in human lives. So that if it is superior to physical fabrication, it was very properly discussed prior to the Timæus; but if it is inferior to it, because it is an ethical world, but the other is mundane and all-perfect, we are very properly required to recur from things subordinate to such as are of a more venerable nature. And both are true, through the above-mentioned causes. Since, however, as we have said, the form of the polity is universal, and is impressed in a partial matter, hence also Socrates employs

the words *what kind* for the sake of the form, but the words *of what sort of men* on account of the matter.

"TIMÆUS. And what was said, Socrates, was in the opinion of all of us very conformable to intellect."

A narration conformable to intellect, but neither conformable to pleasure, nor the decision of the vulgar, indicates the admirable perfection and intellectual nature of the discussion [contained in it]. And prior to this, it obscurely signifies the concordant congress of all secondary causes about one intellect, and one united fabrication. The word *very* too, which is added, unfolds the transcendent union, through which all demiurgic causes converge as to one centre, and one paternal cause of all things.

"SOCRATES. Did we not then, in the first place, separate husbandman and other artificers from the belligerent genus?"

The discourse about a polity, and the conglomerated and concise repetition, in a summary way, of the genera contained in it, contributes to the whole narration of the mundane fabrication. For it is possible from these as images to recur to wholes. This very thing also was in a remarkable degree adopted by the Pythagoreans, who investigated the similitudes of beings from analogies, and betook themselves from images to paradigms; which likewise is now in a prefatory manner effected by Plato, who points out to us, and gives us to survey in human lives those things which take place in the universe. For the polities of worthy men are assimilated to the celestial order. It is necessary, therefore, that we also should refer the images which are now mentioned [to their paradigms], and in the first place, what is said about the division of the genera. For this section of genera, imitates the demiurgic division in the world, according to which incorporeal natures are not able to pass into the nature of bodies, nor mortal bodies to leave their own essence and migrate into an incorporeal hypostasis. According to which, also, mortal natures remain mortal; immortal natures eternally continue to be never-failing; and the different orders of them have paradigmatic causes pre-subsisting in wholes. For if you are willing to arrange the whole city analogous to the whole world; since it must not be said that man is a microcosm, and a city not; and to divide it into two parts, the upper city and the lower, and to assimilate the former to the heavens, and the latter to generation, you will find that the analogy is perfectly appropriate. Likewise, according to a division of it into three parts, you may assume in the city, the mercenary, the military, and the guardian: but in the soul, the epithymetic part, which procures the necessities of the body; the irascible part, whose office is to expel whatever is injurious to the animal, and is also ministrant to our ruling power; and the rational part, which is essentially philosophic and has a regal authority over the whole of our life. In every multitude of souls, however, there are that which performs the part of a mercenary about generation, that which is ministrant to the mundane providence of the Gods, and that which is elevated to the intelligible. But in all mundane natures, there are, in short, the tribe of mortals, the tribe of dæmons,[37] and the order of the celestial Gods; for they are truly the guardians and saviours of the whole of things. And again, dæmons precede as in a solemn procession the fabrication of the celestial Gods, and suppress all the confusion and disorder in the world. There is likewise a certain physical providence of mortal natures, which generates and comprehends them conformably to a divine intellect.

Farther still, according to another division, the agricultural tribe of the city is analogous to the Moon, which comprehends the sacred laws of nature, the cause of

generation. But the inspective guardian of the common marriages, is analogous to Venus, who is the cause of all harmony, and of the union of the male with the female, and of form with matter. That which providentially attends to elegant allotments, is analogous to Hermes, on account of the lots of which the God is the guardian, and also on account of the fraud which they contain. But that which is disciplinative and judicial in the city, is analogous to the Sun, with whom, according to theologists, the mundane Dice, *the elevator and the seven-fold* reside. And that which is belligerent, is analogous to the order proceeding from Mars,[38] which governs all the contrarieties of the world, and the diversity of the universe. That which is royal, is analogous to Jupiter, who is the supplier of ruling prudence, and of the practical and adorning intellect. But that which is philosophic, is analogous to Saturn, so far as he is an intellectual God, and ascends as far as to the first cause. These things, therefore, may thus be assumed through analogies. Plato, however, appears to have divided the city into two parts, and to have established as one genus, that which is agricultural and that which pertains to the arts, which is called demiurgic; but that which is belligerent, as another; not that he now recapitulates the military polity, as Longinus says, but because through the word *belligerent,* he comprehends the auxiliaries and the guardians. For of these, the former war with their hands, but the latter by their counsels. Just as also among the Greeks, Ajax indeed fights, as being the barrier of the Greeks, and Nestor likewise fights, who is the guardian of the Greeks; the latter as a defender, repelling the enemy by his counsels; but the former, by employing his hands. Unless it should be said, that Plato now peculiarly makes mention of the military tribe, because he wishes to narrate the warlike actions of a polity of this kind.

"SOCRATES. And when we had assigned to every one that which is accommodated to his nature, and had prescribed one employment only to each of the arts,[39] we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only."

In the first place, there is a two-fold reading of these words. For it either is "And when we had prescribed one employment conformable to nature to each of the citizens, in order that each might perform his proper work," or, "When we had prescribed to each to pursue an employment conformable to nature, which is adapted to each according to the present aptitude of his nature." In the next place, it must be enquired through what cause Socrates makes such a division, or on what account he says, "*that each employment is rightly pursued by him who is naturally adapted to it, and who in a becoming manner engages in it*." For neither is diligent attention, when deprived of aptitude, able to accomplish with rectitude any thing perfect, nor can dexterity without diligent attention proceed into energy. The end, therefore, is from both. If, however, this be the case, it is not possible for him who engages in many works, to be similarly adapted to all of them, or to pay attention similarly to all; in consequence of his ardour being divided about a multitude of things. Hence in this case, the pursuits of the citizens must necessarily appear to be of a viler nature. But if this is not right, one employment should be assigned to each of the citizens, to which he to whom it is distributed is adapted, and he should be ordered to extend all his care and attention to one thing. For he who is properly adapted to this particular life, and pursues it in a becoming manner conformably to nature, will, it is likely, perform in the best way his proper work. In human polities, therefore, it is easy to survey a division of this kind; for our nature is partible. But how is this true with respect to the Gods? For a divine nature is all-powerful and all-perfect. Or may we not say that with the Gods all things are in all of them, but that each is all things according to the

peculiarity of himself, and possesses the cause of all things, one after a Solar, but another after a Mercurial manner? For peculiarity originating from the divine unities, proceeds through intellectual essences, through divine souls, and through the bodies of these souls. Hence of these, some participate of demiurgic, others of prolific, others of connective, and others of a dividing power. And after this manner they energize about generation. In divine natures themselves therefore peculiarity pre-exists, defining the unities according to the infinity which is there, and the divine duad. But in intellects, difference is pre-existent, which separates wholes and parts, and distributes intellectual powers, imparting a different peculiar order to a different intellect, through which the purity of intellects is not confounded. In souls progression and division pre-subsist, according to a different life in different souls, some of them being allotted a divine, others an angelic, others a dæmoniacal, and others a different hyparxis. But in bodies, interval pre-exists, producing different powers in different bodies. For in these, there are ultimate representations of intelligibles, according to which this particular body is effective of this thing, but another of that. And this body has a sympathy with this thing, but another sympathizes with something else. As, therefore, in this universe, each thing acts according to nature upon that which it was arranged by the fabrication of things to act upon; thus also in the city, the employments of the citizens are divided, and each is arranged to perform that for which he is naturally adapted. What, therefore, the works are of the military tribe, Timæus clearly shows in what follows:

"I mean that they ought to be only guardians of the city, so as to protect it from the hostile incursions both of external and internal enemies; but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with warlike fierceness towards their enemies in battle." {17d-18a}

In these words Plato is willing that the guardians and auxiliaries should be judges of those that act ill within the city, but contenders against those that are out of it; in one way the auxiliaries, and in another the guardians, as we have before observed. To be *only guardians,* however, is not a diminution of power. For when we assert of the first cause that he is one alone, we do not by this diminish him, and entirely enclose him within narrow bounds; since neither is that which is *only* the most excellent, diminished by being so. But on the contrary, every addition to a thing of this kind is a diminution; so that by asserting *not only* of a thing which was such from the beginning, you diminish its excellence. And thus much for suchlike particulars.

Again, however, it is requisite to consider how we may survey what is now said in wholes. For what is that which is external in the universe? And how can it be said that the universe does not comprehend all things? May we not reply, that evil has a twofold subsistence in the world, *viz.* in souls and in bodies? And it is necessary that those who exterminate confusion and disorder from the universe, should extend justice and measure to souls, but should be antagonists to the unstable nature of matter. For some souls, indeed, are naturally adapted to the intelligible, on which account, also, they may be said to be *internal,* and to belong to the extent of the intelligible universe; but others, being material and remote from the Gods, are in a certain respect aliens, strangers, and external. Hence, those who are the accomplishers of justice, use the former mildly, as being naturally friends; but are severe to those that are borne along in bodies in a confused and disorderly manner, as being incommensurate towards them, and as entirely abolishing their privation of order, and

amputating the inexhaustible avidity of matter. For some things, indeed, cannot sustain ornament of this kind, but immediately vanish into non-entity. But others which are moved confusedly and disorderly, are repressed by the justice which prevails in the universe, and by the invincible[40] strength of the order of guardian powers. Hence he now says, that they are *severe* to those who are hostile to the city. For they are such as cannot endure to behold them. In short, there are elevating and cathartic powers about souls, and also inspective guardians of judgement and justice. And it is evident, that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to auxiliaries. About bodies, too, some are connective, but others dissolving powers: and it is manifest that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to those that are belligerent. For these powers expand into the universe, things which are no longer able to remain in their proper series, in order that all things may have an arrangement, and that nothing may be indefinite or confused. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the Demiurgus himself of wholes, and to the immutable and invariable nature of the intellects, which divine poetry calls the guards of Jupiter, you will also have in the father [of the universe] the pre-existent cause of these twofold genera. For through the demiurgic *being* which he contains, he adorns all things; but through the immutable guard which is established in himself, every eternal order remains, all disorder being entirely abolished. You may also see there Justice governing all things in conjunction with Jupiter. For Justice follows him, being the avenger of the divine law. At the same time too, you may perceive the armed order with which he arranges the universe, as those assert who have written the wars of the Titans and Giants. These things, however, we shall hereafter discuss.

The words, however, *external* and *internal,* may be understood as follows: The confused and disordered flux of bodies, at one time arises from the impotence of the reasons, [or productive principles participated by bodies,] and at another, from the inexhaustible avidity of matter. Reasons, however, are familiar and allied to producing causes; but matter, through the indefiniteness of itself, and the remoteness of its diminution, is a stranger to its adorning causes. Hence, the invincible strength of the Gods, and the immutable guard of fabrication, all variously subverting its confusion, renovates the reasons of matter, and remedies their imbecility; but vanquishes the avarice of matter. Not that matter resists the Gods who produced it, but that because on account of its indefiniteness it flies from ornament, it is vanquished by forms through the demiurgic guard, against which nothing is able to prevail. But it is necessary that all things in the world should be obedient to it, in order that they may perpetually remain, and that the Demiurgus may be the father of eternal natures.

"SOCRATES. For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philosophic in a remarkable degree; so that they might be mild to their friends, and severe to their enemies."

The philosophic and the irascible comprehend both the genera, *viz.* the auxiliary, and that which is peculiarly called the guardian genus, just as the epithymetic accords with the third genus, which is called the mercenary. For because Socrates distinguishes the upper from the lower city, he manifests by these two-fold names the differences of the orders contained in the city; just as if some one having divided the world into heaven and generation, should say that in the former there are dæmoniacal and divine orders, and should call both of them the guardians of generation and the universe. For the universe is guarded by the Gods, and it is also guarded by dæmons. By the former indeed totally, unically, and exemptly; but by the latter partially, multitudinously, and

in a manner more proximate to the natures that are guarded by them. For about every God a multitude of dæmons is arranged, which divides his one and total providence. The term philosophic, therefore, pertains to the Gods, so far as they are united to the intelligible, and so far as they are filled with being. But the irascible pertains to dæmons, so far as they exterminate all confusion from the universe, and so far as they are the saviours of the divine laws, and of the sacred institutions of Adrastia. Through these causes, however, they are mild to their familiars, aptly applying a remedy to their imbecility, as being allied to them by nature, but severe to those that are external [*i.e*. to those that are strangers to them] as abolishing the indefiniteness of their nature, in an exempt manner, and according to supreme transcendency.

"SOCRATES. But what did we assert concerning their education? Was it not that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and all other becoming disciplines?"

The assertions that have been already made, are certain common types, extending to all things, according to the demiurgic allotment, and divine difference, defining employments adapted to every one, and distributing powers appropriately to the recipients. But in the present words, the life of the citizens is unfolded, through education, employments, communion, and the procreation of children, proceeding in a becoming manner from the beginning to the end. What then is education, and how is it assimilated to the universe? For in the [Socratic] city, it is the discipline of the soul, rightly adorning the irrational part through music and gymnastic, the former giving remission to the strength of anger, but the latter exciting desire, and rendering it as it were elegant and commensurate with anger, in consequence of its being vehemently remiss, and through its descent to a material nature, filled from thence with a privation of life. But this discipline adorns reason through the mathematical sciences, which have something of an attractive nature, are capable of exciting in us the recollection of true being, and elevate our intellectual part to that which is itself the most splendid of being. All which is evident to those who are not entirely forgetful of the arrangements in the Socratic republic.

It is now, however, our business to investigate, what education, gymnastic and music are in the universe, and what the disciplines are of the guardians of the universe. Perhaps, therefore, we shall speak rightly if we say, that education is the perfection which fills each thing with the good pertaining to it, and causes it to be sufficient to itself, according to intellectual perceptions and providential energies. But with respect to music and gymnastic, that the former causes the lives in the universe to be harmonious, and the latter renders divine motion rhythmical and elegant, so as always to preserve the same form, and the same immutable habit of the divine vehicles. For through these things Plato elsewhere calls divine souls Sirens, and shows that the celestial motion is harmoniously elegant; for gymnastic is indeed in them. But medicine is in things sublunary is consequence of their receiving that which is preternatural. If, therefore, we assert these things, we shall, as I have before observed, perhaps speak rightly. For powers proceed supernally from intelligibles to all heaven, and impart to the celestial lives by illumination the most excellent harmony, and to their vehicles undecaying strength. But the disciplines which are in the universe, are the intellectual perceptions of souls, and of celestial natures, according to which they run back to the intelligible, following the mighty Jupiter, and surveying number characterized by unity, the truly-existing heaven, and intellectual figure. Hence you may say, that the most true arithmetic, astronomy and geometry are

in them. For they behold swiftness itself, and slowness itself, which are the paradigms of the celestial periods. And, in short, they survey the primordial and intellectual circulation, divine number, and intellectual figures. You may likewise say, that prior to these, they contain dialectic, according to which they intellectually perceive the whole of an intelligible essence, and are united to the one cause of all the unities. And if it is necessary to speak by making a division, we may say, that through such like disciplines they energize about first natures; but through gymnastic, preside over things secondary with undefiled purity; and through music, harmonically contain the colligation of wholes.

"SOCRATES. We likewise established, that those who were so educated, should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar kind, as their own private property."

Those things which are to be ordained in a city governed by the most equitable laws, have an evident cause, and were mentioned by Socrates in the Republic. But how can we transfer them to the heavens? Must it not be by surveying through what cause men pursue the acquisition of gold and silver, and from what conceptions they are induced to cherish this infinite love? It is evident that it is because they wish to supply their wants, and desire to procure such things as may administer to their pleasures. *For on this account, they are stupidly astonished about much beloved wealth.* They say, therefore, conformably to Cephalus, that the rich have many consolations. If, however, these things thus subsist, the perfection of the celestial Gods, since it is sufficient to itself, and is converted to the beautiful and the good, is not at all in want of this adventitious and apparent self-sufficiency, nor does it look to convenience, or regard as its scope vulgar utility; but being established remote from all indigence and material necessity, and replete with good, it has a leading and ruling order in the universe. Moreover, it does not admit partible and divided good. But it pursues that which is common and impartible, and extends to wholes, and is especially characterized according to this. Hence it harmonizes with what is now said, "*that those who are so educated should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar kind, as their own private property*."

If you are willing also, it may be said, that *gold and silver, and each of the metals, as likewise other things, grow in the earth, from the celestial Gods, and from an effluxion thence derived.* It is said therefore that gold pertains to the Sun, silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn and iron to Mars. Hence these are generated from thence. But they subsist in the earth, and not in the celestial Gods who emit the effluxions. For they do not receive any thing from material natures. And all things there, are indeed from all, but at the same time a different peculiarity has dominion in a different divinity, — here, in a Saturnian, but there, in a solar manner; to which those who love to contemplate these things directing their attention, refer one material substance to this, but another to a different power. These things, therefore, are not the private, but the common property of the Gods; for they are the progeny of all of them. Nor do they subsist in them. For as they produced them, they are not in want of them; *but the metals which are here, derive their concretion from the effluxions of the celestial Gods.* Why, therefore, are these things earnestly pursued by men in a partible manner? It is because they have a material life, and are extended to a partial nature, apostatizing from the whole. For on this account there is much among them of *mine* and *not mine.* But they abandon the union and communion of life.

"But that rather, after the manner of auxiliaries, they should receive the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve; and that their recompense should be as much as is sufficient for temperate men. That besides this, they should spend their stipend in common, and live cohabiting with each other, and neglecting other pursuits should pay attention to virtue alone."

It is not at all wonderful that in human lives there should be donation and retribution, and a reward of beneficence. For it is well said by Socrates in the Republic, that the mark at which he aims is to render the whole city happy, but not one particular genus of it, such as the guardian. If, however, this be right, it will be requisite that some persons in the city should be the saviours of it by their providential care and prudence, but that others by ministrant aid and servitude, should supply the saviours of the polity with the necessaries of life; just as the nature which is in us, by fashioning and preserving the organ, prepares milk for the energies adapted to it. But in the world, what retribution can there be, or what recompense can be made by mortals to the celestial Gods? For may we not say that these are the peculiarities of human imbecility, in consequence of not possessing self-sufficiency, but that every God is sufficient to himself, and in conjunction with the self-sufficient is superfull?[41] Hence through the union of super-plenitude with self-sufficiency, he fills all secondary natures with good, but receives nothing from them. Or it may be said, that though divinity receives nothing, as being sufficient and unindigent, yet at the same time he requires certain remunerations from us, retributions of beneficence, the acknowledgement of thanks, and equity, through which we are converted to him, and are filled with greater good. For being good,[42] he is desirous that all things should look to him, and should remember that all things are from him and on account of him. For the preservation of the natures posterior to him, is for each of them to be suspended from a divine cause. If, however, we interpret these things after this manner, referring remunerations to conversions, and the acknowledgement of thanks, how can it still further be inferred, that the Gods cohabit with us in common, and spend a remuneration of this kind? It is better, therefore, to understand remuneration in a more physical way. For since effluxions proceed from the heavens to the mortal place, but exhalations ascend thither, and through these the fabrication of the Gods about mortal natures receives its completion, hence Socrates calls suchlike mutations and transitions of terrestrial natures, remunerations or wages from sublunary matter,[43] which are perfected by the heavens, in order that generation may never fail. But it must be said, that the cohabiting in common, is the one conspiration of divine fabrication, and the concordant providence of the celestial Gods, through which every thing that undergoes a mutation from the earth is consumed, and generation is variously changed through the harmonious dance of the celestial divinities; to which also Timæus looking says, "*that the whole world is friendly and known to itself through virtue, and that its corruption is the source of its nutriment, in consequence of effecting all things in, and suffering all things from itself.*"

What then is the end of this one and common life of the citizens? Socrates says virtue, *viz.* divine virtue. For virtue subsists first with the Gods; afterwards from them, in the genera superior to man; and a certain portion of it descends also to us. The guardians of the world, therefore, living conformably to this, are also unoccupied by other pursuits. For they do not look to convenience, nor to externals; for all things are within themselves. They likewise are the saviours of all things, and fill them with what is beautiful and good, being ministrant to, and cooperating with the one father and Demiurgus of wholes. Since, however, they give measure to the mutations of the

earth, not in so doing departing from, but being converted to themselves, and subsisting in themselves, on this account Socrates says, "*a recompense such as is sufficient for temperate men*." For being temperate and prudent in what relates to themselves, they measure secondary natures, comprehending their all various mutations in the simplicity of their own life. Thus therefore what is said may be explained in this way. But in another way we may say, that piety and a conversion to the Gods, especially contain a measure, and are occupied by *the good.* This measure, however, is defined by the Gods themselves according to divine prudence, since the Gods are able both to save themselves and others.

"SOCRATES. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in such a manner that their natures might be aptly conformed so as to be similar to those of men; with whom they should perform in common both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business of life."

Plato very properly thought that the virtues of men and women are common, since he evinces that both have one human form, but not the male one, and the female another. For things which have a different perfection according to form, are also different in species. But things which are the same in species, have likewise one and the same perfection. This, however, is denied by others, who assert that there is a difference according to form between men and women, though Plato has shown that it is both possible and advantageous for women to have the same virtues as men. It is possible, indeed, because this, history confirms. For there have been found well educated women, who have been superior to men. But it is advantageous, because it is better to have double than half the number of those who exhibit virtue in their works. As therefore we form the male guardians from such a particular education, and from such particular disciplines, thus also we form the female guardians from the same: and in a similar manner, the female warriors from the same institutes as the male.

In order, however, that we may admire in a greater degree the conceptions of Plato, we must betake ourselves to wholes, and to the order of the universe, where we may survey a wonderful conspiration of the male and female nature. For in the Gods, indeed, these are so connascent with each other, that the same divinity is called both male and female, as is the case with the Sun and Mercury, and certain other Gods. Where also they are distinguished from each other, the works of the male and female that are of the same order, are common, so as that they primarily proceed from the male, but in an inferior degree from the female. Hence, likewise, in mortals, nature evinces that the female is more imbecile in all things than the male. Whatever, therefore, proceeds from the male, this the female also can produce in a diminished degree. Hence Juno proceeds together with Jupiter, generating all things in conjunction with the father. Hence, too, she is said to be equal in rank with Jupiter, as is likewise Rhea with Saturn. For this Goddess is the bosom of all the Saturnian power. Earth also is equal in dignity with Heaven. For Earth is the mother of all things, of which Heaven is the father. And prior to these elements, if we direct our attention to bound and infinity, which rank in the order of principles, we shall find that all things whatever, which proceed into existence, are generated from both these. You have therefore, in the intelligible, in the intellectual, and in the supermundane Gods, the harmonious conjunction of the male with the female. You may also see the same in the heavens. For the whole of generation is governed by the Sun and Moon; in a greater and paternal degree by the former; but secondarily, by the latter. Hence also, the Moon is denominated by some, a lesser Sun. *And among the male divinities*

in the Sun, there are likewise lunar Gods, and analogous orders. But if you direct your attention to dæmons, you will every where see the providence of these two-fold genera conjoined. For divine female dæmons, unitedly effect all things in a secondary degree, which are accomplished by divine male dæmons primarily. Female psychical likewise, and female corporeal dæmons, have to the males the relation of mothers to fathers, and of duads to monads. For they generate all things with diminution, which the males produce paternally and unitedly. If therefore we before rightly assimilated the guardians to the celestial Gods, but the auxiliaries to dæmons their attendants, and who are ministrant to their providential energies, Plato very properly embraces in these genera, a similar conjunction of the male with the female, and imparts to both common virtue, and common employments; just as Nature binds these genera to, and causes them to procreate the same things in conjunction with each other. But she does not divide the one from the other, since whatever is generated from both is unprolific, when either of them is separated; though there is a greater difference in the physical organs than in the lives of these; yet at the same time in these also, Nature makes the work of them to be common. Much more, therefore, does the communion of them in their employments, and the whole of their life, deserve to be honoured.

"SOCRATES. But what did we establish concerning the procreation of children? Though perhaps you easily remember this on account of its novelty.[44] For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common; as we were particularly careful that none might be able to distinguish their own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred. That hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sisters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children and grandsons.

TIMÆUS. These things indeed, as you say, are easily remembered." {18c-18d}

If some one should inquire why that which is unusual is easily remembered, it is not difficult to reply, that it excites our phantasy in a greater degree as being unexpected; and inserts in us a clearer impression of itself. Moreover, it is easy conformably to Plato, to show how what is here said of marriages and children being common, applies to women. For he wished, according to the intention of the rulers, that their connexion with men should take place in definite times, accompanied with sacrifices and prayers; and that the woman that had connexion with a man, should not be the property of any one man, but should be separated after connexion, and dwell apart, and again at other times should be copulated with that man whom the guardians might approve. But these things are thus indicated in what is said in the Republic.

Referring, however, the theory of these particulars to nature, let us show how they pertain to the order of the universe. For these things by a much greater priority exist in the Gods, on account of the union of the divinities. For all things[45] are the progeny of all the Gods, though different things are characterized by a different peculiarity. All the Gods likewise are in all, and all are united to all, in conjunction with an unmingled purity adapted to all, to which Socrates directing his attention, embraces this communion, and this distribution of employments, assigning one to each of the arts, conformably to nature. For not to know their own progeny as peculiarly their own, takes place with the Gods. On which account, indeed, their intellectual perceptions, and also their productions are common. Each of them, however, benefits and preserves that which is generated, as being the common offspring of all of them.

Moreover, to consider all those as brothers and sisters that are of an equal age, those that are elder as fathers and grandfathers, and the younger as children and grandsons, originates from the Gods, and is transferred from thence to this polity. For similitude of essence, derived from the same cause, is that which is fraternal in them. But prolific cause, is in them that which is analogous to father and grandfather. And an efflux of essence proceeding into a second and third series, exhibits the form of offspring. For that the same Goddess is conjoined with different Gods, or the same God with many Goddesses, may be assumed from mystical treatises, and from what are called Sacred Marriages in the mysteries, which Plato as much as possible imitating in what he ordains about politics and marriages, calls the marriages *sacred.* In physical productive powers also, we may see that there is one and the same recipient of different powers; and one productive power presenting itself to the view in a multitude of recipients, and pervading through many receptacles. But forms are analogous to males, and receptacles to females. Why therefore is this very thing beheld in the universe, but is paradoxical in human lives? I say it is because these lives are cut off from wholes, and every human soul is partible. Hence the dogmas which embrace this communion appear to it most difficult to be admitted. If, therefore, some one should take away the condition of his present subsistence, and elevate himself to the whole of things, he would immediately admit this communion, and despise the sympathy which is divided by the multitude. So far, however, as each of us is extended, and minutely distributed about a part, and thus relinquishes the whole and one, so far also he leaps to a life of this kind, which is an unrestrained habitude, a disorderly arrangement, and an invisible division.

"SOCRATES. But that they might from their birth acquire a natural disposition as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league, the worthy were mingled with the worthy; that no discord may arise in this connexion, when it does not prove prosperous in the end, but that all the blame may be referred to fortune, and not to the guardians of such a conjunction." {18d-18e}

Plato particularly assumes in his Republic similitude, sameness, and geometrical, in conjunction with arithmetical equality, in order that the similitude of it to the heavens, as in sensibles, or to the intelligible, as in supercelestial lives, may be perfectly preserved. For through this cause, in marriages also, he preserves the union of the best woman with the best man, and of the less excellent woman with the less excellent man. For in the Gods likewise, primary natures are more connascent with those of the first rank, and secondary with those of the second rank; and together with union there is unmingled purity. Hence in the second genera after the Gods, a distribution of this kind conformably to the intention of the Gods, is effected according to desert. On this account, divine female dæmons are co-arranged with divine male dæmons, psychical female with psychical male, and material female with material male dæmons. And everywhere, the analogous in order proceeds as far as to the last of things. To which we may add that the rulers contriving that this connexion may take place latently, sufficiently adumbrates to us that the cause of such a conjunction of genera subsists unapparently with the Gods; being thence primarily derived, but secondarily from dæmons,[46] and from the order of each, which *the lot* indicates; possessing the power of colligation from similitude of life, according to which each is co-arranged with the similar, the divine with the divine, the material with the material, and that which has a middle subsistence, with the middle. On this account, likewise, all sedition and

dissension is removed from divine natures, each loving that which is allied to itself, according to its own order, perceiving that this order is spontaneous, and not adventitious and devised; of all which, the citizens being conjoined in marriage by lot, and not looking to elegance and ornament in the connexion, is an image. For in natural things, also, receptacles are distributed to forms appropriately; and each form may ascribe the cause of its own coordination to material variety. At the same time, likewise, this is effected according to causes[47] which preside over the whole fabrication of things, and which are analogous to guardians. And thus much, therefore, has been said, for the sake of the theory of wholes.

Longinus, however, doubts here, whether Plato was of opinion, that souls are emitted together with the seed: for in order that they may become most excellent, he conjoins similars with similars. And Porphyry replies indeed to the doubt, but not satisfactorily. Our preceptor, however, thinks that in the first place it should be observed, that Plato himself adds, "In order that they might acquire a *natural* disposition as far as possible the best." *For children receive a physical similitude from their parents, and participate of a certain dignity and excellence from their begetters, according to the physical virtues.* In the next place, it must be observed, that though it is not true that souls are emitted together with the seed, yet there is a distribution of the organs according to desert. For all souls are not introduced into casual organs, but each into that organ which is adapted to it.

Εσθλα μεν εσθλος εδυνε, χειρα δε χειρονι δοσκεν,[48]

says Homer. Farther still, *as an initiator into the mysteries, by placing certain symbols about statues, renders them more adapted to the participation of superior powers; thus also total nature fashioning bodies, by physical productive powers, the statues of souls, disseminates a different aptitude in different bodies for the reception of different souls, the better and the worse;* which the politician likewise rightly understanding, pays attention to the emission of seed in the city, and to all physical aptitude, in order that the most excellent souls may be generated for him in the most excellent natures. And thus much in answer to the doubt of Longinus. But why does Plato conceive it is better to think that Fortune is the cause of this distribution to the citizens? Shall we say it is because it is advantageous to us to know the cause of things which we think to be good, but better to conceive the presence of such as we apprehend to be evil, to be causeless, than to accuse the cause which distributes these [seeming evils] for a good purpose? For this excites to a contempt, or rather to a hatred of the giver; because every one avoids that which becomes to him productive of evil.

> "SOCRATES. Moreover, we ordered that the children of the good should be educated, but that those of the bad should be secretly sent to some other city."

These things also are established in the *Republic,* but by a much greater priority take place in the universe. With respect, therefore, to the productions of Gods and Dæmons, some genera abide in them, pure and remote from generation, which on this account are called undefiled; but others descend into generation, not being able to remain in the heavens without a downward inclination. And some of these are the offspring of good, but others of less excellent powers. For the term *bad* is indicative of *less excellent.* The horses, therefore, and charioteers of the Gods, are all of them good; but those of partial souls are of a mixed nature.[49] Hence in these, there is preponderation, a verging downward, and a defluxion of wings, which the celestial Gods send into generation, and dæmons who preside over the descent of souls. The

celestial and undefiled genera of souls, therefore, are nourished following the Gods to the banquet and delicious food, as it is said in the Phædrus. And those that are subservient to generation, communicate with it, being latently sent into it from the heavens, as Socrates says, indicating by the word *latent* the invisible and occult cause in the Gods of the psychical descents, and that souls which thence descend, become subject [latently] to another providential inspection, and to other guardians who preside over generation.

"Yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; while, on the contrary, those who were retained from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished."

In the Republic, Socrates makes a transition not only from those that were distributed from the upper into the lower city, but also from those of the golden race that were born there. Here, however, the reference is made to those who are recalled from exile. Do these things, therefore, accord with each other? Perhaps, indeed, it is possible to reconcile what is here said, with what is there determined, if we understand the word *adult,* as not only pertaining to those sent from the upper city, but likewise to all those that are educated in the lower city. For, in short, the natural disposition is to be considered of those adults who were born in the lower city, or of those who were sent from the upper into the lower city, and thus those that are worthy are to be recalled from exile. But if some one is willing to understand the words according to our first explanation of them, it must be said, that what Socrates now delivers is conformable to the things proposed to be considered. For descending [rational] souls again ascend, but not such souls as had their hypostasis from the beginning in generation, and about matter, such as are the multitude of irrational souls. And thus much for the words themselves. See, however, how the same things take place in wholes, as those which Socrates ordains in his polity. For some things always have the same order in the heavens, remaining divine and immutable; but others are always conversant with generation; and others are in a certain respect the media between both; at one time, indeed, being suspended from divine natures themselves, but at another being mingled with those that embrace generation. It is not, therefore, the dæmoniacal genius which ascends or descends, nor is this to be asserted of multiform lives, nor are dæmons subject to death, but partial souls, which are at one time conversant with generation, and at another are transferred into a divine dæmoniacal allotment; which things being known by Socrates in the Republic, he legislatively ordains that which is analogous to them. For the celestial Jupiter presides over the Gods in the heavens, over dæmons that elevate partial souls [to their paternal port], and also over others that lead souls into generation, in order that the ascents and descents of souls may be never failing in the universe. "For though you should see this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet the father send; another to be annumerated," according to the divinely-inspired indication[50] about these things.

"SOCRATES. Have we, therefore, again sufficiently resumed the epitome of the discussion of yesterday, or do we require any thing further, friend Timæus, which has been omitted?"

The resumption of the polity teaches us, through images, how the universe is filled with the most excellent productive powers. For generated natures in it are separated from each other, and each communicating with other things, energizes according to its

own peculiarity. And primary, indeed, are exempt from secondary natures, yet employ their energies, as necessary to the completion of the universe. But secondary are adorned by primary natures. The most excellent, however, of mundane beings, are connascently conjoined with the most excellent, middle with middle, and last with such as are last. But the same productive powers pervade through many subjects, and the same recipients participate of many productive powers. Lives, also, at different times have different allotments, according to their desert. All these particulars, therefore, sufficiently place before our view the order of the universe. For in definite heads, Socrates has, in a becoming manner, epitomized every form of the polity, recurring to intellectual impartibility, in order that he might imitate the God who adorns the celestial polity intelligibly and paternally. But since every where measures and perfection are definitely imparted to secondary natures from [primary] causes, on this account also Socrates requests Timæus to inform him, whether he has comprehended [in his epitome] every form of the polity. For every intellect being firmly fixed in the deity prior to itself, defines itself by looking to it. To which we may add, that to speak summarily is a symbol of the first parts, and the head of the universe being adorned by the fabricator of the heavens; which the Demiurgus of the universe adorns in a more perfect manner, looking to the whole, and the one life of the world. And thus much respecting the analogy of partial natures to wholes.

The investigation, however, is not attended with any difficulty, whether the words mean, "*Have we now epitomized the polity which we discussed yesterday*?" or "*Have we again epitomized today, the polity which we epitomized yesterday*?" For whether yesterday Socrates spoke more diffusely, but now summarily, or he spoke summarily in both, the divine Iamblichus approves of either of the readings, and we do not at all differ from him. Perhaps, however, the latter construction is more consonant. For again to discuss the polity summarily, manifests that it was summarily discussed yesterday. And it is not at all wonderful, that the summary discussion which took place in the Republic, should not be brought to light. For many other things which are asserted here, as being said on the former day, are not to be found in that dialogue. Unless it should be said that the word *again,* does not refer to the *epitomizing,* but to *resuming* the *discussion.* For he *resumes,* who narrates at great length what had been before said; but he *again resumes,* who summarily contracts the narration. But whichever of the constructions is adopted, neither of them is attended with any difficulty.

"SOCRATES. Hear now, then, how I am affected towards this polity which we have discussed."

What Socrates says in the words that follow, comprehends, that I may speak summarily, these five particulars. First, what that is which in what has been said, he desires should take place, after the narration of the polity. Secondly, that he is not sufficient to effect this himself. Thirdly, that neither is any one of the poets sufficient. Fourthly, that it is not proper to commit a work of this kind to the sophists. Fifthly, that the auditors alone can accomplish that which is earnestly desired by Socrates, in a becoming manner. What, therefore, is this? For it is necessary, in the first place, to speak concerning that which Socrates desires to see after this polity, *viz.* to see, as he says, a city of this kind in motion, engaging in contests and labours, and warlike actions, in order that after the peaceful life which he had delivered, he might have to narrate the energies of the city arising from circumstances of times and places. This, therefore, is what he wishes to see accomplished.

Some one, however, may doubt to what the desire of Socrates is directed, and on what account he wishes this to be accomplished. Porphyry therefore dissolves the doubt by saying, that energies perfect habits, not only those energies that are prior to habits, but also those that proceed from them. For the perfection in habit, is in conjunction with energy, since otherwise habit will be in a certain respect in capacity, and at rest through remission of energy. Socrates therefore, in order that he may survey the polity truly perfect, requires that in words it may be beheld in motion, engaged in warlike actions, and contending with others. And it appears, says he, from hence, to be manifest that Plato does not admit that the habit of virtue by itself, but when energizing, is sufficient to felicity. It may, however, be said, in answer to Porphyry, that if the end was military, it would be requisite to assert that war gives perfection to the polity. But if the end of it is peace, what occasion is there to solve Platonic doubts by introducing Peripatetic explanations? Or though the end is not military, yet war exhibits the magnitude of virtue in a greater degree than peace, just as mighty waves and a tempest, show in a stronger light the skill of the pilot's art. And in short, this is effected by circumstances, as the Stoics also are accustomed to say, "Give circumstances, and take the man." For that which is not subdued by things which enslave others, manifests a life in every respect worthy. Perhaps, however, it is absurd to refer the cause to these things alone, though they have a political reason, and not to look to the whole scope of Plato, according to which the God who adorns the polity in the heavens, is willing also that generation should be governed by the celestial Gods, and that the war of forms in matter should always subsist; in order that the circle of generation may adumbrate the celestial circulation. And this it is to see the city excited to war, to see generation co-arranged with the celestial regions, and the whole of it governed from thence. It appears likewise, that this is analogous to what is shortly after said by the Demiurgus of the universe, "*That when the generating father understood that this generated resemblance* [*the world*] *of the eternal Gods moved and lived, he was delighted with his work*." In a similar manner, therefore, Socrates wished to see his city moving and energizing; just as the God who comprehends the celestial polity wished to behold the natures which it contains energizing, and adorning the contrariety produced by generation. Such an analogy, therefore, as this, takes place in the present instance.

If, however, we arranged before, the lower city as analogous to generation, but now as analogous to war, you must not wonder. For the same things may be safely arranged among different things according to different analogies. For generation also, according to the lives in it which are inseparable from matter, resembles the lower city; but according to its contrarieties and material tumult, it is similar to war, and warlike dissensions. That we may, however, co-adapt every thing to the theory of mundane wholes, prior to the consideration of every particular, let us direct our attention to the second thing said by Socrates, and see how it accords with this theory. For since Socrates is analogous to the first of the three fathers who adorn the first of things, he says he is not sufficient to fashion what follows. For the divinity who gives subsistence to all things, is different from him who constitutes things of a middle nature; and this God again is different from him who is the cause of things that rank as the third. But the third particular is, that neither are the poets sufficient for this purpose. Nor, in the fourth place, the sophists. The former, indeed, because they imitate the things in which they have been nourished; but the latter, because they are wanderers, and not at one and the same time, philosophers and politicians.

Again, therefore, let us see how these things are conformable to what has been before said. For it is necessary that the powers that are to preside over generation

should not be separable[51] from material natures, but conversant with them. For these powers are analogous to poets who invent fables, and to imitators. For these are employed about images, alone praise material and partible natures which they only know, and are unable to ascend from matter. Nor is it fit that these powers should be inseparable,[52] and very mutable, at different times ascending or descending to different orders, such as are partial souls, who are assimilated to sophists; because they also possess all-beautiful productive powers, but at different times wander to different parts of the world. Hence it is necessary that the powers that connectedly contain generation, which is governed by the heavens, should at one and the same time be philosophical and political; in order that through the philosophic characteristic, they may be separate from the subjects of their government, but may energize providentially through the political peculiarity, performing the duties pertaining to their allotments according to intellect. For that which is physical, being productive, is inseparable from matter; but the form of partial souls being sophistical, is abundantly wandering. It is necessary, however, prior to things which are moved, that there should be the invariable and perpetually-permanent providence of the Gods, and immutable prior to mutable allotments. In the fifth place, therefore, Socrates delivers to us who these are, that are able to effect this. For these things are to be transferred from words to deeds; because the Demiurgus of the universe, and the rest of the fathers, fabricate totally and exemptly; the second of which fathers gives subsistence to middle, but the third to last natures. And to these Timæus, Critias, and Hermocrates, are analogous. But of these, the first is praised in an admirable manner, Socrates also adding, "*in my opinion*;" but the second, in a middle way, conformably to his order; and the third, in the last degree, *i.e.* according to the testimony of others.

"For I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose then that some one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture or really alive, but in a state of rest, should desire to behold them in motion, and engaging in some one of those contests which pertain to bodies."[53]

Longinus says, that Plato here decorates and beautifies his diction, through similitudes and the gracefulness of the words. But Longinus says this in answer to certain Platonists, who contend, that this mode of expression is spontaneous, and not the result of art. For Plato, he observes, pays attention to the selection of words, and does not employ them casually. It may, however, be said, that Plato made choice of this form of words from a mode of diction which was at that time common and usual, and that he was very attentive to what was customary. For the atoms of Epicurus would more rapidly by their concurrence produce the world, than nouns and verbs would form a correct sentence by a casual composition. But some blame Plato for employing metaphors in the use of words; though with respect to composition, all admire him. At the same time, however, it may be inferred, not from this circumstance alone, but from such care and industry as are exhibited in the present words, that he paid great attention to diction. For Socrates does not simply say, that he desires to see this accomplished by those that were with Timæus; but he speaks like one decorating his words and alluring the hearer, when he says: "*For I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose that some one on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture, or really alive,"*etc. And thus much for Longinus.

Origen, however, grants indeed, that Plato is attentive to the grace of diction, not as regarding that which is pleasing, as the end of it, but that he employs this image for the sake of exhibiting the manner in which he was himself affected. And we say, that

this similitude was written for the sake of the imitation of divine natures; that the grace of the words presents to us an image of the grace imparted by the Demiurgus to celestial natures; and that the artifice of the diction, which is mingled with the spontaneous, adumbrates divine production, which has indeed a boundary from itself, and also a progression from being and essence. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the image itself, *beautiful animals* manifest those natures that are resplendent with [divine] beauty; but *those represented in a picture, or really alive,* indicate corporal images, and true lives prior to these imitations. For the figures of the Gods are resemblances of the animals that are in them. But those that are in a *state of rest* exhibit to us the natures that are full of intellectual arrangement, and of an equable and continued life; those that are *in motion* such as proceed into another order, and a second fabrication; and *those which engage in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies,* are images of those that impart to more imperfect natures their own proper effluxions and powers, and operate by their own powers on other things. And thus much respecting the image. But the words *whether represented in a picture or really alive,* are rightly asserted in both respects of divine bodies. For they are depicted by the dodecahedron, and they thus possess efficacious and demiurgic lives. If, however, you consider the words separately, they will signify that the before-mentioned polity is indeed fashioned in words, and is assimilated to the heavens, but *exists, if not in human, yet in true or dæmoniacal lives.* Farther still, *to desire to see the city in motion,* is analogous to the words [in another part of the dialogue] "*as soon as the father saw the universe moving, he was delighted, and wished to assimilate it in a still greater degree to its paradigm*." For thus also the adorner of the heavens wished to see them in motion, and through motion governing the war of generation. But the words "*engaging in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies*," are employed, because of contests some belong to souls, but others to bodies; and the latter are such as running, wrestling, and gymnastic.

"In such a manner am I also affected towards the city which we have discussed. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests of our city with other cities, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during such an engagement in a way worthy of its education and discipline, both with respect to practical achievements, and verbal negotiations."

We have before shown through what cause, and with reference to what paradigm, Socrates wished to see his republic contending in war. Because cities, however, employ against their enemies both works and words; words indeed in embassies, in compacts, in exhortations to battle, and in every thing of this kind; but works in the pitching of camps, in spears, and the hurling of missive weapons; on this account Socrates wishes that a city of this kind should be celebrated according to both these. In words indeed, as prudent, cautious, magnanimous, and strenuous; but in deeds, as brave, vehement, and well exercised. For thus, according to both, it will imitate its paradigm, who, shining with physical and intellectual productions, adorns all the war of generation.

"For, indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise such men and such a city according to their desert."

This is the second of the proposed heads, of which we have before assigned the cause, and shall now again explore it according to another method. For now some of the more ancient [interpreters] have said, that the encomiastic form of writing is robust,

superb, and magnificent; but the Socratic character of diction is slender, accurate, and dialectic. The latter, therefore, is contrary to the former. Hence [say they] Socrates avoids panegyric, as knowing the power he possessed, and the subjects to which it was naturally adapted. Those, however, who assert this, in addition to their being directly refuted by the Menexenus, appear to me not to have perceived the magnificence of the diction of Socrates in the Phædrus. There are also those who say it is fit that the artificer of suchlike encomiums, should be skilled in warlike affairs. Hence many historians err in their disposition of armies, through ignorance of tactics. But Socrates having fought at Delos and Potidæa, was not unskilled in all suchlike particulars. Others again assert, that Socrates speaks ironically, just as he said with respect to other things, that he was ignorant of them, so here he says, that he did not know how to praise this city according to its desert. The irony, however, of Socrates was employed against sophists and young men, and not against wise and scientific men. It is better, therefore, instead of these things to say, that he guards against becoming the third from the truth. For the works of a rightly instituted city, are the third from the paradigm of truth [*i.e.* of the true or intelligible polity]. Hence, wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he says, he is not able to bear the descent to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abundance of power. For to be able to abide in paradigms, is effected through power which is transcendent. You may likewise see how this accords with what has been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the second fabrication is assimilated to the first, and on this account is proximate to it. For the whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with separation. Very properly, therefore, is Socrates precedaneously extended to Critias and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it fit that they should weave together the particulars that are next in order. For Timæus is about to deliver these things in a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgus of wholes, who paints the heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.

“Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets, both of the past and present age. Not that I despise the poetic genus; but it is perfectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner imitate things in which they have been educated. But that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in words.” {19d-19e}

This is the third of the before-mentioned heads of discussion, in which Socrates shows that none of the poets have been adequate to the praise of men and cities of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Longinus, however, and Origen, doubt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the poets, when he says, that he has not D only the same opinion of the poets then existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambitious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for virtuous actions. For who speaks more magnificently than Homer, who, representing the Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation, but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things? Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative

bulk, but that he is not capable of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to a philosophic life. But I should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should be thought fit to speak about them. It appears, therefore, to me, that Plato divides poetry into the divinely-inspired, and the artificial. And having made this division, he refers the magnificent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. For oracles in a remarkable degree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language. But he evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are educated in it. For if there is any artificial sublimity in some one of the poets, it has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a panegyrist, who exhibits in his praise a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of language, which is free from compulsion and pure; just as actions [in his Republic] have magnificence, not casually, but adapted to the education and discipline of the men. That Socrates, however, does not reject the divinely-inspired poet, nor the whole of poetry, but that only which is artificial, he manifests, I think, when he says, "*that he does not despise the poetic genus*." The poetic genus, therefore, is divine, as he elsewhere says. But he despises the imitative species of poetry; nor yet this simply; but that which is nourished in depraved manners and laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

The last part, however of the words of Socrates, being in a certain respect difficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are, "*that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in words*." For it seems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. Not a few, therefore, act sophistically, by exhibiting virtue as far as words, but in deeds being entirely alienated from it. Will it not, therefore, be better to interpret these words thus, *viz.*: To suppose *the most excellent education* is implied in the words, *that which is foreign to the education of any one*; but to assume, *in deeds and in words,* as equivalent to, *conformably to deeds, and conformably to words*; and *to imitate well,* as having the same meaning with *to be well imitated*? And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, it is difficult indeed according to deeds, but it is still more difficult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing proposed to be effected in poetry. And you may see how this accords with things themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men, composes a history. But he who narrates the speeches of these men, if he intends to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar to the speaker. For words are seen to differ according to the inward dispositions. For thus we deride most of those, except Plato, who have written the Apology of Socrates, as not preserving the Socratic manner in their composition. Though the narration of this very thing, that Socrates was accused, made an apology, and was sentenced to die, would not be thought worthy of laughter, but the dissimilitude of imitation in the composition, renders the imitators ridiculous. Since, also, to say of Achilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he performed such deeds, is not difficult; but to narrate copiously what he said, when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he would have said. This also is evident from Socrates in the Republic, very much blaming Homer respecting the imitation of words. But as to the Gods, it is said to be easy by language to *imitate*

the words or the deeds of the Gods. For who can *delineate* their works according to their desert? Or it may be said that it is the same thing with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For since their words are intellections, and their intellections are productions, the imitator of their words is also the imitator of their productions. So that by how much he fails in the one, by so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the other. Longinus, however, has the following doubts with respect to the proposed words. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a city as this, because they are not educated in the manners of the city, neither will Critias and his associates be able to effect this. For neither did they live performing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is because they have not science, but are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not be able to imitate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it may be said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of adducing words adapted to worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt of Longinus says it is. But Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance as the diurnal light, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most excellent polity imitated by poets, in consequence of transcending their power.

"But with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking, and in many other beautiful arts, yet as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, I am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and words."

With respect to the sophists, some of them frequently pretended to be skilled in astronomy, others in geometry, others in politics, and others in the art of dividing. Hence they are now said to be skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however, they did not possess a scientific: knowledge of these, it is added, that they are *skilled* in them. For *skill* manifests an irrational occupations in mere words, unaccompanied with the knowledge of *the why.* Because, however, they not only lived at different times in different cities, but were full of deception, of false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they are justly called *wanderers.* But as they led a disorderly and inerudite life, energizing according to passion, they are very properly said not to have *a settled abode;* since it is requisite that every one should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particulars, as are in a family and a city, are likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to be fitly governed. Who then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of the best polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? They are such as are both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in order that through the political character they may be able to perceive the works of the citizens; but through the philosophic, their words, in consequence of inwardly pre-assuming their life. And through the former, indeed, they comprehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic causes. For it is necessary that these also should be total and intellectual, in order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may possess iconically such things as the heavens primarily contain.

"The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education."

Longinus, not disdaining to survey these words, and those that precede them, says, that in that part of them beginning with, "*But with respect to the tribe of sophists, I am afraid, as they are wanderers*," etc. there is a difference of expression through the desire of dignity and gravity in the diction. That in the words that follow, "*Lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns*," etc. there is a distortion of phrase from what is natural. And that the third part, "*The genus therefore of your habit remains*," etc. is perfectly unusual. For it is not at all dissimilar to *the strength of Hercules,* το ιερη ις Τελεμαχοιο*, the sacred strength of Telemachus*,[54] and other such like expressions. But Origen admits, that the form of expression in the proposed words, is conformable to the manner of historians. For such like periphrases are adapted to a narration of this kind, as well as to poetry. We, however, say, that Plato everywhere changes his mode of diction, so as to be adapted to his subjects; and in unusual things, studies mutations of expression. But we do not admit that the proposed words are a periphrasis. For they do not manifest the same thing as the expression *you, like the strength of Hercules;* from which there would only be an ability of giving that which is adapted to the imitation of the best polity. For those who are both philosophers and politicians, by energizing according to the habit which they possess, and which differs from the poetical and sophistical habit, will be able to effect that which Socrates desires. And thus much for the words themselves.

Looking, however, to the conceptions which they contain, we must say, that Socrates excites Critias and Hermocrates to what remains to be accomplished in the polity. But likewise calls on Timæus to assist the undertaking. And this is the fifth head of the things proposed for elucidation. You may also see how magnificently Socrates celebrates the men from the very beginning, calling [the wisdom which they possess] a *habit,* in order that he may exempt them from sophistical wandering. But he says that they are partakers of the political science, both by nature and education, in order that you may contradistinguish it from poetical imitation, which is nourished by less excellent laws. And *he designates the perfect from nature and education; lest depriving nature of education, you should cause it to be lame;*[55] *or you should think that education* ought to be thrown into an unapt and incongruous recipient. And thus much has been said in common respecting the men. But if you wish to speak, proceeding to paradigms, the demiurgic genus, which is total and intellectual, *remains* to be arranged according to a providential attention to wholes. Let us, however, survey separately every particular.

"For Timæus here of Locris, an Italian city, governed by the best of laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has obtained in his own city the greatest honours, and the highest posts of government; and, in my opinion, has arrived at the summit of all philosophy."

What testimony, therefore, can be more admirable than this, or what praise can be greater? Does it not, in the first place, evince that Timæus was a political character; in the second place, that he possessed intellectual knowledge [in a most eminent degree], by saying, that he had arrived at the summit of all philosophy; and adding, *in my opinion,* which places a colophon on all the panegyrics? What other image also than this among men, is more capable of being assimilated to the one. Demiurgus? For, in

the first place, by *the political* and *the philosophic,* the image is Jovian. In the next place, by asserting that Timæus belonged to a city governed by the best of laws, it imitates the god who was nurtured in the intelligible by Adrastia. And by Timæus excelling in nobility of birth, it adumbrates the total, intellectual, and unical nature of the god. For all these the Demiurgus possesses, by participating of the fathers prior to himself. By asserting also that Timæus had obtained the highest posts of government, it represents to us the royal power of the Demiurgus, and which has dominion over wholes; his sceptre, according to theologists, consisting of four and twenty measures. But to add likewise that he had enjoyed the greatest honours, presents us with an image of that transcendency which is exempt from wholes, both in dignity and power. It is the Demiurgus, therefore, who also distributes honours to others. And it may be said, that the assertion that Timæus had arrived at the summit of philosophy, assimilates him to the god, who at once perfectly contains all knowledge in himself. So that, from all that has been said, you may apprehend, as from images, who the Demiurgus of the universe is; that he is an intellect comprehensive of many intellects, and arranged among the intellectual Gods; that he is full of the first intelligibles; and that he has a royal establishment, as surpassing in dignity the other demiurgic gods. If, however, Plato calls the city of Timæus Locris, it not being usual with the Greeks thus to denominate it, but to call it Locri only, in order to distinguish it from the Locris opposite to Euboea, we must not wonder. For Plato changes many things for the purpose of signifying in a clearer manner the thing proposed. But that the Locrians were governed by the best laws is evident; for their legislator was Zaleucus.

"Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of any of the particulars of which we are now speaking."

Critias, indeed, was of a generous and grand nature. He likewise engaged in philosophic conferences, and was called, as history informs us, an idiot among philosophers, but a philosopher among idiots. He tyrannized also, being one of the thirty. It is not, however, just to accuse Socrates on this account, because he now thinks him deserving of a certain praise. For, in the first place, we should attend to the manner in which he praises him. For he says, that "*he is not ignorant of any of the particulars of which we are now speaking*," both on account of his natural disposition, and his association with philosophers. In the next place, we should observe, that the tyrannical character is an argument of an excellent nature, as we learn from the fable in the [10th book of the] Republic, which particularly leads souls descending from the heavens to a tyrannical life. For being accustomed there to revolve with the Gods, and to govern the universe in conjunction with them, in these terrestrial regions also, they pursue apparent power; just as those who possess the remembrance of intelligible beauty, embrace visible beauty. That Critias, however, pertains, according to analogy, to the middle fabrication of things, may be learnt, in the first place, from his succeeding to the discourse of Socrates; in the next place, from his narrating the Atlantic history, the Atlantics being the progeny of Neptune; and, in the third place, from his own proper life. For the ruling peculiarity, and that which extends to many things, are the characteristics of this life. Power, likewise pertains to media, and therefore he possesses the middle place in the encomiums. For to assert of him, that he was not one of the vulgar, but a partaker of the prerogatives of Timæus, shows his inferiority to the first person of the dialogue. But that he was not entirely removed from him, indicates his alliance to him.

"Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of circumstances evince that he is, both by nature and education, adapted to all such concerns."

Hermocrates was a Syracusan general, desirous of living conformably to law. Hence also he participates, in a certain respect, of the political science and philosophy. He must be[56] referred, therefore, according to analogy, to the third fabrication[57] of things. For the command of an army is a power allied to the god, who arranges the last and most disorderly parts of mundane fabrication; and *to be testified by a multitude of circumstances,* indicates an analogy to the power that produces fabrication into all multitude, and an ultimate division. We therefore make this arrangement, in order that the men may have an analogy to the things. But others arrange Critias as inferior to Hermocrates; though the absent person was neither adapted to speak nor to hear, and of those that are present [at a conference], he who is an auditor, indeed, but is silent, is secondary to him who is both an auditor and a speaker, and in this respect imitates those that are about Socrates and Timæus. In the next place, this also must be considered, that Socrates gives the preference to Critias, in what he says, praising him immediately after Timæus. There are likewise those who attribute such an order as the following to these persons, *viz.* they arrange Timæus according to the paradigmatic cause, Socrates according to the efficient, and Critias according to the formal cause; for he leads into energy those that have been rightly educated; but Hermocrates according to the material cause. Hence also he is adapted indeed to hear, but not to speak. For matter receives productive powers externally, but is not naturally adapted to generate. And this arrangement indeed will be found to be very reasonable, if we abandon the former conceptions [relative to the analogy of the men].

"Hence when you yesterday requested me to discuss what pertains to a polity, I readily complied with your request; being persuaded that the remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained by any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion. For when you have properly adapted the city for warlike purposes, there is no one in the present age but you from whom it can acquire every thing fit for it to receive. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-mentioned particulars. Nor have you, indeed, refused this employment; but have, with common consent, determined to repay my hospitality with the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared, in a decorous manner, to receive the promised feast." {20b-20c}

The summary repetition of the polity appears, indeed, as Socrates now says, to have been made for the sake of the discussion of the contests in war of a rightly constituted city. Both the concise comprehension, however, of the polity, and the Atlantic war, refer us to the one fabrication of the world. For, as we have before observed, it is better, prior to the whole fabrication, and all the form of the production of the world, to make a survey from parts and images. Socrates, therefore, resuming the polity in certain forms, and, first, through this imitating the universe, very properly establishes himself, as it were, in essence; but excites others to the discussion, who celebrate the power of such a city, and imitate those who arrange the universe according to the middle demiurgic form, and uniformly comprehend the contrarieties and multiform motions which it contains. As, therefore, Jupiter, in Homer, being seated in his citadel on the summit of Olympus, and abiding in his accustomed unity, sends the Gods who preside over the mundane contrariety to the Grecian war; thus also Socrates, being

purely established in the intelligible form of a polity, prepares those after him that are able, to celebrate the motion and power of this polity, calling forth, indeed, the science of Timæus, to the survey of wholes totally, but preparing the others to the total and concise comprehension of partial natures. For as he had discussed the polity totally, after this manner also, he wishes that the power of it should be celebrated by the rest. Since, however, all these discourses bring with them an image of demiurgic works, and the whole conference adumbrates the fabrication of the world, Socrates very properly says, "*that he stands prepared, in a decorous manner, to receive the promised feast*," his words being invested with modesty, as a form adapted to virtue.

"HERMOCRATES. But we, O Socrates, as Timæus just now signified, shall cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire; for we cannot offer any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when we departed from hence, and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and in the way thither, we discoursed on this very particular."

It was requisite that Hermocrates should say something, and not be silently present, like the unemployed persons in a comedy. Hence also he is represented speaking to Socrates. And this indeed is logographic [or pertaining to the art of writing]; but it is likewise adapted to what has been before said. For it represents to us, as in an image, that the last parts, of the fabrication of things, follow the one father of wholes, and, through similitude to him, converge to the one providence of the world. For Hermocrates, following Socrates, says, that nothing shall be wanting, either of alacrity or power, to the accomplishment of the narrations investigated by Socrates. For these two things become especially impediments to us in our mutual energies, *viz.* our indolence, and any external impediment. Removing, therefore, both these, he says, that there cannot be any excuse sufficient to justify their neglect, or prevent them from accomplishing the mandate of Socrates. Very properly, therefore, does he call upon Critias for the narration respecting the city of the ancient Athenians, in which the mandate of Socrates terminates; just as Socrates calls on Timæus, and makes himself a partaker of his discourse. For on the preceding day, Hermocrates says, they discoursed on this very particular together with Critias, just as the third Demiurgus in the universe communicates with the production of the second. For the whole of generation is entirely in want of returns from the subterranean world. If, however, these things subsist after this manner, the Atlantic history will appear to have had the third narration. But those numbers, the duad and the triad, are said to be adapted to the middle fabrication, the former through power, and the latter through its demiurgic providence, and which is also perfective of mundane natures. So that whether you assign to this history a double or a triple narration you will, from either of the numbers, be able to recur to the conception of the intervening medium.

"He therefore narrated to us the following particulars from ancient rumour, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his request.

CRITIAS. It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timæus, the third associate of our undertaking.

TIMÆUS. I assent to your compliance."

You will find in these words an admirable indication, as in images, of divine natures. For, as in them, such as are secondary call forth the prolific powers of such as are primary, and produce them to the providential inspection of the subjects of their government; thus also here Hermocrates calls on Critias to speak, and gives completion to what was promised to Socrates. And as, among divine natures, effects convert themselves to the reception of their causes, thus also here, Hermocrates is extended to Critias, but Critias looks to the mandate of Socrates. As likewise all demiurgic causes are suspended from the one father of the universe, and govern all things conformably to his will; after the same manner here also all the persons fly to Timæus, and to his nod, or consent, or will, in order that, being impelled from that as from a root, they may dispose their narration agreeably to his desire. For thus what is going to be said will contribute to the discourse about the whole fabrication of the world. Moreover, the words "*from ancient rumour*," if the narration is historical, signify ancient according to time. But if they are an indication of what takes place in the universe, they will obscurely signify the reasons or productive powers which are from eternity inherent in souls. And if, likewise, they bring with them an image of divine causes, they show that these demiurgic causes, being supernally filled from more ancient Gods, impart also to secondary natures their own providential energies.

"CRITIAS. Hear, then, O Socrates, a narration surprising indeed in the extreme, *yet in every respect true,* which was once delivered by Solon, the wisest of the seven wise men."

With respect to the whole of this narration about the Atlantics, some say, that it is a mere history, which was the opinion of Crantor, the first interpreter of Plato, who says, that Plato was derided by those of his time, as not being the inventor of the Republic, but transcribing what the Egyptians had written on this subject; and that he so far regards what is said by these deriders as to refer to the Egyptians this history about the Athenians and Atlantics, and to believe that the Athenians once lived conformably to this polity. Crantor adds, that this is testified by the prophets of the Egyptians, who assert that these particulars [which are narrated by Plato] are written on pillars which are still preserved. Others again, say, that this narration is a fable, and a fictitious account of things, which by no means had an existence, but which bring with them an indication of natures which are perpetual, or are generated in the world; not attending to Plato, who exclaims, "*that the narration is surprising in the extreme, yet is in every respect true*." For that which is in every respect true, is not partly true, and partly not true, nor is it false according to the apparent, but true according to the inward meaning; since a thing of this kind would not be perfectly true. Others do not deny that these transactions took place after this manner, but think that they are now assumed as images of the contrarieties that pre-exist in the universe. For war, say they, is the father of all things, as Heraclitus also asserted. And of these, some refer the analysis to the fixed stars and planets: so that they assume the Athenians as analogous to the fixed stars, but the Atlantics to the planets. They likewise say, that these stars fight on account of the opposition in their circulation, but that the fixed stars vanquish the planets on account of the one convolution of the world. Of this opinion, therefore, is the illustrious Amelius, who vehemently contends that this must be the case, because it is clearly said in the Critias, that the Atlantic island was divided into seven circles. But I do not know of any other who is of the same opinion. Others, again, as Origen, refer the analysis to the opposition of certain dæmons, some of them being more, but others less, excellent. And some of them being superior in

multitude, but others in power: some of them vanquishing, but others being vanquished. But others refer it to the discord of souls, the more excellent being the pupils of Minerva, but the inferior kind being subservient to generation; who also pertain to the God that presides over generation [*i.e.* to Neptune]. And this is the interpretation of Numenius. Others, mingling, as they fancy, the opinions of Origen and Numenius together, say, that the narration refers to the opposition of souls to dæmons, the latter drawing down, but the former being drawn down. And with these men, dæmon has a triple subsistence. For they say, that one kind is that of divine dæmons; another, of dæmons according to habitude, to which partial souls give completion, when they obtain a dæmoniacal allotment; and another is that of depraved dæmons, who are also noxious to souls. Dæmons, therefore, of this last kind, wage this war against souls, in their descent into generation. And that, say they, which ancient theologists refer to Osiris and Typhon, or to Bacchus and the Titans, this, Plato, from motives of piety, refers to the Athenians and Atlantics. Before, however, souls descend into solid bodies, those theologists and Plato, deliver the war of them with material dæmons who are adapted to the west; *since the west, as the Egyptians say, is the place of the noxious dæmons.*[58] Of this opinion is the philosopher Porphyry, respecting whom, it would be wonderful, if he asserted any thing different from the doctrine of Numenius. These [philosophers] however, are in my opinion, very[59] excellently corrected by the most divine Iamblichus.

According to him, therefore, and also to our preceptor Syrianus, this contrariety and opposition are not introduced for the purpose of rejecting the narration, since on the contrary, this is to be admitted as an account of transactions that actually happened; but, as we are accustomed to do, we must refer that which precedes the subject of the dialogue, to the scope itself of the dialogue. Hence, they are of opinion, that this contrariety which is derived from human affairs, should, according to a similar form, be extended through the whole world, and especially through the realms of generation. That in consequence of this, we should survey every where how things participate of contrariety, according to the variety of powers. For since all things an; from *the one,* and from the duad after *the one,* are in a certain respect united to each other, and have an opposite nature; as in the genera of being, there is a certain opposition of sameness to difference, and of motion to permanency, but all things participate of these genera; — this being the case, we must survey after what manner mundane natures possess the contrariety which pervades through all things.

Moreover, if we consider the polity of Plato as analogous in every respect to the world, it is necessary that we should survey this war as existing in every nature. For the polity is analogous to existence and essences, but war, to the powers of these essences, and as Plato says, to their motions. We must, likewise, refer the polity, by making it common to all things, to the whole union of things; but it must be said, that war is to be assimilated to the mundane division, and[60] to the empire of victory. Whether, therefore, you give a twofold division to the universe, by separating it into the incorporeal and the corporeal; and again divide the incorporeal into the more intellectual and the more material natures, and the corporeal into heaven and generation; and heaven, into contrary periods, but generation into opposite powers; or in whatever way you assume this opposite life, whether in the mundane Gods, or in dæmons, in souls, or in bodies, — you may every where transfer the analogies from men to things. For of the Gods themselves, the divine Homer makes oppositions; representing Apollo as hostilely opposed to Neptune, Mars to Minerva, the river Xanthus to Vulcan, Hermes to Latona, and Juno to Diana. For it is requisite to survey generation in incorporeal natures, in bodies, and in both. *It is likewise necessary to*

consider Neptune and Apollo as the fabricators of the whole of generation, the one totally, but the other partially. But Juno and Diana, as the suppliers of vivification, the former rationally, but the latter physically. Minerva and Mars, as the causes of the contrariety which pervades through both existence and life; the former, of that which is defined according to intellect; but the latter, of that which is more material and passive. Hermes and Latona, as presiding over the twofold perfection of souls; the former indeed, over the perfection which is obtained through the gnostic powers,[61] *and the evolution into light of productive principles; but the latter, over the smooth, spontaneous, and voluntary elevation which is acquired through the vital powers. Vulcan and Xanthus, as the primary leaders of the whole of a corporeal constitution, and of the powers which it contains; the former, of those that are more efficacious; but the latter of those that are more passive, and as it were more material. But he leaves Venus by herself, in order that she may illuminate all things with union and harmony, and represents her as fighting on the worse side, because* THE ONE *in those that belong to this side, is less excellent than multitude.* For all contrariety is surveyed in a becoming manner in conjunction with a unity, which is either prior to it, or connascent with, or is in a certain respect and adjunct posterior to it. And Plato, as well as theologists, rightly perceiving that this is the case, have delivered a multitudinous contrariety prior to the one fabrication of the world, and parts prior to wholes. Finding, likewise, these things in images prior to paradigms, he surveys this contrariety in men, which also has an analogous subsistence in wholes, neither being in want of Titannic or Gigantic wars. For how could he narrate such wars to Socrates, who on the preceding day had blamed the poets for devising things of this kind? Receiving, therefore, transactions from history, in order that he might not assert of the Gods that they fight with each other, he ascribes these battles to men, but through a cautious and pious analogy, transfers them also to the Gods. For such like wars are delivered by divinely-inspired poets, prior to the one order of things. Their mode, however, of narrating them, is adapted to them, but the present mode to Plato; the latter, in conjunction with the political science, being more moderate, but the former, in conjunction with the telestic art, being more replete with divine inspiration. And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

In what is said by Critias, however, the word "*hear"* is proverbial, and is employed in those things to which we wish to call the attention of the hearer. The word *hear,* therefore, is equivalent to *receive what is worthy of attention.* But the word "*surprising"* (ατοπον) manifests that which happens contrary to expectation, as in the *Gorgias, "It is surprising, O Socrates*," (ατοπα γε ω Σοκρατης); or that which is paradoxical, as in the Crito, "*What a surprising dream, Socrates*;" (ως ατοπον ενυπνιον ω Σοκρατης) or the wonderful, as in the Theætetus, "*And it is not at all surprising, but it would be much more wonderful, if it were not a thing of this kind*." (και ουδεν γε ατοπον, αλλα πολυ θαυμαστοτερον ει μη τοιουτος ην.) But here it is assumed as that which deserves admiration. This, however, is evident from what follows, in which it is said, "*that the deeds of this city were great and admirable*." Moreover, the word "*narration*" (λογος), manifests the truth of what is going to be related. For thus it is said in the Gorgias, that a fable differs from λογος; [because the latter is true, but the former is not.] It is also very properly said, that "*Solon was the wisest of the seven wise men*;" as being asserted of one who was related to Plato; as being; said to another Athenian, and in the Panathenaiæ; and as indicating that the ensuing narration extends to all wisdom. Nor is it requisite to wonder how Solon is said to be the wisest of all the seven wise men, nor to be anxious to know, how he can be said to be the wisest of other men, but one of the wise men, when all of them were

most wise. For what absurdity is there, in calling a man the wisest of those that are of the same order with himself? But his legislation, his pretended insanity at Salamis, his armed attack of Pisistratus the tyrant, who said he was more prudent than those that were absent, and more brave than those that were present, his conference also with Croesus, and his answer to one who said, that he had established most beautiful laws; for he replied, that he had not established the most beautiful, but powerful laws, and that he knew laws that were more excellent than these; — all these particulars bear testimony to his wisdom. There is, likewise, a story told of a tripod that was dragged up in a net by certain young men, though it is not related by all historians, and that the oracle [of Apollo] being consulted on the occasion, the God answered, that it should be given to the wisest man. That in consequence of this, it was offered to Thales, but he sent it to another of the seven wise men, this again to another, and so on, till at last it came to Solon, all of them yielding it to him. Solon, however, sent it to the God, saying, that he was the wisest of beings.[62] Solon, also, is said to have found, that the lunar month does not consist of thirty days, and on this account he was the first that called it εν νεον[63] *a new one,* and νεας *new.* And, in short, the discovery, that the numbers of the days revert from the twentieth day, is ascribed to him. Some, also, assert, that prior to Anaxagoras, Solon showed that intellect presided over the whole of things. From all which it is evident, that he was a participant of a certain wisdom.

"Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropides, as he himself frequently[64] relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias (as the old man himself informed us) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheless were buried in oblivion through length of time, and the destruction of mankind."

The history of the race of Solon, and of the alliance of Plato to him, is as follows: The children of Execestides were, Solon and Dropides, and of Dropides Critias was the son, who is mentioned by Solon in his poems, where he sings,

Bid Critias with the yellow locks,
Attention to his father pay,
For by revering what he says,
No faulty leader he'll obey.

But Callæscrus and Glauco were the sons of Critias: and again the Critias of the present dialogue was the son of Callæscrus. This, however, is evident from Critias in the *Charmides,* calling the father of Charmides, his uncle. But Charmides and Perictione were the offspring of Glauco: and Perictione was the mother of Plato. So that Glauco was the uncle of Critias, but the father of Charmides. And Charmides was the uncle of Plato, but Solon was the brother of the great-grandfather of Critias. Such, therefore, is the truth [respecting the race of Solon.]

The divine Iamblichus, however, gives a different account of the succession of his race. For he immediately makes Glauco to be the son of Dropides. But others, as the Platonic Theon, assert, that Critias and Glauco were the sons of Callæscrus; though in the Charmides, Critias says, that "*Charmides is the son of Glauco our uncle, but is my cousin*." Hence Glauco is not the son of Dropides, nor the brother of the younger Critias. To a man, however, who pays attention to things, it is of no consequence in whatever manner these particulars may subsist. Passing on, therefore, to things, you may assume from these particulars as images, that all the discord of the world, and the twofold co-ordinations that are in it, are suspended from proximate demiurgic causes,

and are referred to other more intellectual and ancient causes; that the causes of this motion are continuous and united, and suspended from one cause; that the superior causes are more ancient in intellection; and that secondary receive the production of primary natures, differ from and yet have a connascent communion with them. In addition to these things also, you may assume, that *a twofold oblivion is produced in souls of the theory of great and admirable wholes, arising either from having abandoned for a long time a life of that kind, or through having fallen immoderately into generation. For this is for the real man to be truly corrupted*. But souls that have been recently perfected, and retain the memory of things in the intelligible world, in consequence of not falling into matter, easily acquire a reminiscence of the truth. And thus much for these particulars. We must not, however, wonder, if Critias calls Solon a *familiar.* For we not only call those with whom we associate, but also our kindred, *familiars.* But by likewise adding, "*and an intimate friend*," he indicates, that there was not merely a communion of race, but a sameness and similitude of life, in the ancestors of Plato. The prior Critias, also, is called an *old man,* which signifies his possession of prudence and intellect, and his being adapted to many disciplines.

"In particular, he informed me of one undertaking surpassing in magnitude all the rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation I may offer my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by celebrating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly, and in a manner agreeable to truth."

Longinus doubts what was the intention of Plato in the insertion of this narration. For he does not introduce it either for the purpose of giving respite to the auditors, or as being in want of it. And he dissolves the doubt, as he thinks, by saying, that it is assumed by Plato prior to physiology, in order to allure the reader, and soften the severity of that kind of writing. But Origen says, that the narration is indeed a fiction, and so far he agrees with Numenius and his followers, but he does not admit with Longinus, that it was devised for the sake of pleasure. He does not, however, add the cause of the fiction. We, therefore, have frequently said, that it contributes to the whole theory of nature; and we likewise say, that in these words, Plato calls the one and common productive principle of the twofold co-ordinations in the world, and the one contrariety which pervades through wholes, the greatest and most admirable of works, as containing the other fabrication of things in infrangible bonds, this fabrication consisting of participations of the contraries, bound and infinity, as Philolaus says, and as Plato also asserts in the Philebus. For he there says, "*that there is much bound and much infinity in the world, which are things most contrary to each other, and give completion to this universe*." Since, however, all things that contribute to the production of the world, are said to recompense the benefits bestowed by total causes, Critias says very properly, that it becomes him to repay his obligations to Socrates, who excited both the second and third powers. These things, therefore, may be immediately assumed [from the words before us.]

But will you not say, that the Minerval solemnity has an indication of demiurgic works? For the Goddess herself indeed, connectedly contains all the mundane fabrication, and possesses intellectual lives in herself, according to which she weaves together the universe, and unifying powers, according to which she governs all the mundane oppositions. The Minerval solemnity, however, indicates the gift of the Goddess which pervades through all things, and fills all things herself, and likewise the union which extends through all variety. For in solemnities, we especially

embrace a common and concordant life. If, however, we have asserted these things rightly, we may from these transfer ourselves to the various and one life of the world, and survey the difference between the *Parmenides* and this dialogue. For both have their hypothesis in the Panathenæa; but the former in the greater, and the latter in the lesser of these solemnities. For they were celebrated about the same time with the Bendidian festival; and this very properly. For since the productions of Minerva are twofold, total and partial, supermundane and mundane, intelligible and sensible; the former of these solemnities, indeed, pertains to the exempt productions of the Goddess, unfolding into light the intelligible series of the Gods, but the latter to her subordinate productions, interpreting the powers of the Gods about the world. And the Bendidian festival, indeed, appears to manifest the suppression of the contrariety externally acceding to the universe from a Barbaric tempest, by the Gods who are the inspective guardians of the festival. Hence it is said to have been celebrated in the Piræus, as being adapted to the extremities, and material parts of the universe. But the Panathenæan festival, exhibits the established order which proceeds into the world from intellect, and the unconfused separation of mundane contrarieties. For this Goddess is at one and the same time, a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war. Another veil, therefore, was referred to the Goddess [in the Bendidian festival,] representing the war in which the pupils of Minerva were victorious; just as the veil in the Panathenæan solemnity, represented the Giants vanquished by the Olympian Gods. The Goddess, however, is celebrated with hymns, justly and with truth; *justly,* indeed, because it is necessary that every thing which has proceeded, should be converted to its proper principle; but with *truth,* because the hymn is assumed through things and through beings. And because of hymns, some celebrate the essence, but others the providence of the Gods, and others praise the works that proceed from them,[65] and a hymn of this kind is the last form of celebration; (for the praise of the divine essence precedes all other panegyrics, as Socrates asserts in the Banquet) this being the case, the words "*celebrating as it were*," are very properly added. For he wishes to celebrate the Goddess from the deeds performed by the Athenians. But that the Panathenæan followed the Bendidian festivals, is asserted both by the commentators, and by Aristotle the Rhodian. For they say, that the Bendidia were celebrated in the Piræus on the twentieth day of April; but that the festival sacred to Minerva followed these.

"SOCRATES. You speak well. But what is this ancient achievement, which Critias once heard from Solon, and which is not narrated in history, but was once actually accomplished by this city."

Socrates exciting Critias to narration, requests that he would relate the mighty undertaking which the ancient Critias said he had heard from Solon, and which though not much celebrated, yet was really performed. In which, this in the first place deserves to be considered, that many things happen in the universe of which the multitude are ignorant. And in this, worthy men differ from others, that they see things of this kind, and understand the events that take place. But it is worth while secondly to observe, that the more perfect causes, rejoice in simplicity, and proceed from things of a composite nature, to such as are first. But subordinate beings on the contrary, descend from things simple to things composite. For thus also here Socrates recurs from that which is downward as far as to Solon, in an ascending progression; but Critias on the contrary, descends from Solon to the mention of himself.

"CRITIAS. I will acquaint you with that ancient history, which I did not indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in years."

Longinus here again observes, that Plato pays attention to elegance of diction, by narrating the same things differently. For he calls the *undertaking* αρχαιον but the *narration* παλαιος, and *the man, not a youth;* though as he signifies the same thing through all these, he might have denominated all of them after the same manner. Longinus, therefore, as Plotinus said of him, was a philologist, but not a philosopher. Origen, however, does not admit that Plato is studious of artificial delight and certain ornaments of diction, but that he pays attention to spontaneous and unadorned credibility, and accuracy in imitations. This mode also of expression has spontaneity, as being adapted to erudition. For it was rightly said by Aristoxenus, the lyric poet, that the dispositions of philosophers extend as far as to sounds, and exhibit in all things the arrangement which they possess; *just I think, as this mighty heaven, exhibits in its transfigurations clear images of the splendour of intellectual perceptions; being moved in conjunction with the unapparent periods of intellectual natures.*[66] The great Iamblichus, however, thinks that we should rather refer the variety of the words to things, and see how in nature contraries are vanquished by *the one;* how *the one* is varied, and how great a mutation the same productive principles exhibit; subsisting in one way in the intellect of the universe, in another, in soul, in another, in nature, and in the last place, subsisting in matter. And again, unfolding about matter a most abundant difference in conjunction with similitude. For these observations are worthy the conceptions of Plato, and not a solicitous attention to diction.

"For at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I was about ten."

These three persons are assumed, as having preserved this history, or mythology, Solon, the ancient Critias, and this junior Critias; because perfect causes precede the fabrication of the world, and perfective causes are antecedent to the subjects of their government. The elder Critias, however, heard this narration from Solon, one from one; from the elder Critias, it was heard by the junior Critias and Amynander; and from the junior Critias three persons received it. For the monad proceeds through the duad to the perfective providence of wholes. The numbers also of the ages, have much alliance to the things themselves. *For the decad manifests the conversion of all mundane natures to the one; and ninety the restitution again to the monad, in conjunction with progression. But both numbers are symbolical of the world.* You may say, therefore, that Solon is analogous to the cause of permanency; but the former Critias, to the cause which supplies progression; and the present Critias to the cause which converts and conjoins things which have proceeded, to their causes. And the first of these, indeed, preserves the relation of a ruling and leading cause; the second, of the cause which comes into contact with mundane fabrication in a liberated manner; and the third, of that which now pays attention to the universe, and governs the mundane war.

"When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us, which is known by the name of *Cureotis Apaturiorum,* nothing was omitted which boys during that festivity are accustomed to perform. For when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets

were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time entirely new."

The Apaturia was a festival sacred to Bacchus, on account of the duel between Melanthus and Xanthus the Boeotian, and the victory of Melanthus through deception; the Boeotians and Athenians waging war with each other for Œnoe. But this festival was celebrated for three days; of which the first day was called αναρρυσις, because many sacrifices were performed in it; and the victims were called αναρρυματα, *because they were drawn upward, and sacrificed.* The second day was called δορπια; *for on this day there were splendid banquets and much feasting.* But the third day was called κουρεωτις; *for on this day boys, three or four years old, were enrolled in their tribes.* On this day also, such boys as were more sagacious than the rest, sung certain poems, and those were victorious who retained the greater number of them in their memory.

They sang, however, the poems of the ancients. But with respect to the tribes, it must be observed, that after Ion there were four families, but from Clisthenes ten, and that after these, each twelve of the families was divided into three: the tribes were arranged into the same family and company, as being allied to each other: the enrolment of the boys was into these tribes; and this day, as we have before observed, was called Cureotis, from the boys that were enrolled And such is the information derived from history.

Again, however, let us direct our attention to things, and behold these: in the particulars that have been narrated, as in images. The festival, therefore, of the Apaturia, which had for its pretext the victory of the Athenians, pertains to the hypothesis according to which the Athenians conquered [the Atlantics], and all intellectual subdue material natures. *Deception,* likewise, is adapted to mundane forms, which separate themselves from impartible and immaterial principles, and become: apparent, instead of truly-existing beings. But the enrolment of the *boys,* imitates the arrangements of *partial souls* into their proper allotments, and their descents into different generations. *The festival* is an imitation of the eternal hilarity in the world: for if it is filled with Gods, it celebrates a perpetual festival. But *the contests of rhapsody,* are analogous to the contests which souls sustain, weaving their own life together with the universe. And *the rhapsody itself,* resembles the above-mentioned woven life of the universe. For this has an imitation of intellectual forms, in the same manner as the contests of rhapsody have of heroic actions and manners, possessing together with an harmonious conjunction, a connected series. The *many poems of many poets,* adumbrate the many natures, and many circum-mundane productive powers,[67] and, in short, the division of physical imitations. But *the new poems,* are images of forms which are perpetually flourishing, always perfect and prolific, and able to operate efficaciously on other things. And thus much concerning these particulars. Mention, however, is made of the poems of Solon, not as of a poet in the popular sense of the word, but as of one who mingled philosophy with poetry. For of mundane works likewise, and whole productions, a royal intellect is the leader. And the praise is related as being mentioned to another person, *i.e.* to Amynander, because, as we learn in the Phædrus, that which judges differs from that which makes and generates. Referring, however, all that has been said, to the universe, we may infer as from images, that partial souls, partial natures, and partible forms, and of these, those especially that are always new and efficacious, contribute to the mundane war. But all these are connected together by the Gods, who are the inspective

guardians of fabrication, and are co-arranged with one world, one harmony, and one kindred life.

"But then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him to be most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry, the most ingenuous and free of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted; and said, laughing, If Solon, O Amynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair, but had made it as others do a serious employment; and if through seditions and other fluctuations of the state in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown."

Here again, the lovers of diction may indicate to their admirers, that Plato cautiously praises the poetry of Solon, since he represents the praise as bestowed by a private individual, and for the sake of others, and not as given by one who spoke conformably to intellect and reason. For Plato, if any one, was a most excellent judge of poets, as Longinus also admits. Heraclides Ponticus therefore says, that Choerilus and Antimachus being at that time most renowned, Plato preferred the poems of the latter to those of the former, and that he persuaded Heraclides at Colophon, to collect the poems of Antimachus. In vain, therefore, is it futilely observed by Callimachus and Duris, that Plato was not a sufficient judge of poets. Hence, what is here said manifests the judgement of the philosopher, and it may be considered in a more historical point of view. The investigator, however, of things, will think it requisite to show how all the causes of the orderly distribution of the universe, and also the causes that are connective of contrariety, are extended to one principle, and how the last adhere through media to the first of things. For thus those who receive the narration of the ancient Critias, are extended to him, but he looks to Solon. And he, indeed, admires the poetic power of Solon; but they, through Critias as a medium, are referred to the poetry of Solon. For gratifying the former [*i.e.* Critias], they praise the poetry of the latter. But what is it that Critias says respecting Solon? That he was subordinate to divinely-inspired poets, from these two causes; because he engaged in poetry as a casual affair; and because when he came from Egypt, he found the city of the Athenians in a state of sedition, and that he was not able, his country being involved in difficulties, to complete the history, which he brought from thence hither. What the history therefore was, he informs us as he proceeds.

From these things, however, as images, Plato manifests, that what is primarily demiurgic, and every thing effective, have other primary energies; but that their secondary energy is the production of secondary things. Likewise, that the confused, disorderly, and unstable nature of matter, frequently does not receive ornament from more divine causes, but subsists without symmetry[68] to the gift which proceeds from them. Hence, second and third powers are unfolded into light, which proximately adorn its formless nature. Solon, therefore, being most ingenuous, and imitating exempt causes, did not deliver through poetry the Atlantic war. But Critias, and those posterior to him, transmit the account of this war to others, imitating second and third causes, who produce the variety of effective principles, and the orderly distribution of things, which is harmonized from contraries into a visible subsistence.

Moreover, the assertion that Solon was the *wisest* of the seven wise men, exhibits his analogy to the first principles. And his being *most free,* adumbrates the power

which is exempt, and established in itself, and which fills all things in a liberated manner. A thing of this kind likewise concurs with the wise man, as being immaterial, without a master, and of itself. The ancient Critias, also, being said to be *old,* indicates a cause which is intellectual, and remote from generation. For "*wisdom*," says Plato, "*and true opinions are most desirable things to him who has arrived at old age*." Again, the assertion of Critias, that *he very well remembers,* exhibits to our view the salvation of eternal productive powers, and the stable energy of secondary causes, about such as an first. But *Solon engaging in poetry as a casual affair,* represents to us *that productions into secondary natures, have only a secondary rank among first, causes. For their first energies are intellectual, according to which they are united to the beings prior to themselves.*

If, however, some one omitting the survey of things, should consider through what cause Plato introduced[69] these particulars, according to their apparent meaning, he will very properly find that they contributed to the thing proposed. For the design of Plato was to narrate the Atlantic war. But it was requisite that the messenger of this history should neither deceive nor be deceived. Hence also, Solon is said to have been most wise, and intimately acquainted with those about Critias. For as a wise man, he was not deceived, and as being an intimate acquaintance, he would not deceive. It was likewise requisite, that the receiver of this history should neither have been aged, in order that the narration may appear to be ancient, nor yet so young, as to be forgetful. Hence, Critias is supposed to have been a youth, but sufficiently able to remember, and in consequence of this, to have contended with others in rhapsody, in which much memory is necessary.

Farther still, it was requisite, that the ancient Critias should not commit suchlike narrations to very young men, lest they should appear to them to be contemptible. Hence, it is very properly said, that some one of the tribes, by enquiry of Solon, heard the history. But it was requisite that he also should, in a certain respect, have been familiar with Solon, in order that the old man might opportunely relate all the history to him. Hence, likewise, the praises of the poetry of Solon precede the history; the praise being given by Amynander in order to gratify Critias. And thus much concerning the disposition of what is said in the text.

That Solon, however, went to Egypt, not only for the purpose of obtaining the Atlantic history, but likewise that the Athenians, during his absence, obeyed his laws, which he had bound them by an oath not to violate, is evident. For during this time, also, he associated with Crœsus, and sailed to Egypt; but on his return, he became master of the city, which was in a tumultuous condition through the Pisistratidæ. And thus much we have derived from history. Origen, however, doubts how Plato calls Solon *most free:* for this is not an encomium adapted to a poet. And he dissolves the doubt by saying, that he is so called, either because he spent his money *liberally,* or because he used the greatest freedom of speech; and that on this account he was free, without any timidity in his poetical compositions. Or he was so denominated, as being in his poetry remiss and uncompelled. But Iamblichus says, that no one of these solutions is true, but that through this appellation, the *liberated* condition of the intellect of Solon, the *unservile* nature of his virtue, and that which was venerable in his character, and which transcended all other things, are signified. The same interpreter also says, that the *laughter* of Critias manifests a generative progression from causes, perfect, and rejoicing in its progeny. But the *remembering well,* indicates the salvation of effective principles in the world. Why, therefore, was Solon anxious to deliver the Atlantic war in verse? Because, says he, all natural works and the mundane contrariety subsist through imitation. For this is analogous to its effective

and primary causes; just as Critias is analogous to proximate and secondary causes. But why was he prevented by sedition? Because material motions and material tumult become an impediment, as we have before observed, to the productive powers of mundane causes.

"In consequence of this, Amynander enquired of Critias what that history was. To which he answered, that it was concerning an affair, which ought most justly to be the greatest and most renowned which this city ever accomplished; though through length of time, and the destruction of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the present age."

Longinus says, that something is wanting here to render the sense complete. For the word *considered* is wanting to the words *most justly to be,* because these are required in what follows, but not the word ουσης, *being.* Porphyry, however, says, that Longinus did not perceive, that, in consequence of the undertaking being the greatest, but not yet celebrated, Plato adds, "*ought most justly to be most renowned*." But we, directing our attention to things, say, that Plato calls it *the greatest undertaking,* as bringing with it an image of all contrariety, extending itself every where. And that he denominates it *most renowned,* as contributing to the visible fabrication of things. For thus, also, the works of nature are called by Orpheus *renowned.*

Boundless eternity, and nature's works
Renown'd, remain.

"Relate this affair, O Critias, says Amynander, from the beginning, and I inform us what that transaction was, how it was accomplished, and from whom Solon having heard it, narrated it as a fact."

i.e. Relate what this admirable deed was, how, or after what manner it was performed, how it became known to, and by whom being preserved, it reached the hearing of Solon. Plato appears, through this, to investigate the whole form of contrariety, how it was effected, or may be known, and from what causes, to us invisible, it is suspended. Before, therefore, he recurred through relatives to the narration of Solon; but now he investigates the superior histories of it, or, that I may speak clearer, the principles of the fabrication of this contrariety. And by directing your attention to this narration, you may survey, as in images, through certain symbols, all the principles of this fabrication, as far as to the first causes of it.

"There is, then, says he, a certain region of Egypt, called Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, and in which there is a province called Saitical."

In the first place, it is worth while to observe how the narration always delivers things comprehended, proceeding from such as are more comprehensive; from Egypt, indeed, the river, from this Delta, from this the Saïtic province, and from this Saïs is sacred to Minerva. In the next place, having observed this, it will be proper to ascend through the analogy of these things, to the first and most comprehensive causes of fabrication. For you may perceive this supernally comprehended by more total causes, and proceeding as far as to the last of things; comprehending causes every where preceding such as are comprehended, the more total, such as are more partial; and the impartible fabrication, that which is partible, and is denominated recent; to which also

the present words refer the father of the narration. And this fabrication, indeed, is filled from these causes, and particularly participates of the undefiled power of Minerva. For, in short, since we refer this war, for the sake of which the whole narration is excited, to the mundane contrariety, it will be well, proceeding in the same way, to assimilate all the knowledge of the Egyptian priests to the former [or impartible] fabrication, which stably comprehends the productive powers contained in the universe; but the history of Solon, which is always recent, and placed in mutations, to the more novel fabrication, and which administers the all-various circulations of mundane natures. We shall also be benefited by perceiving how, in images, the difference between human and divine fabrications becomes apparent; and how, in these, Solon, indeed, calls on the priest to the development of ancient transactions, but the priest knows both such events as are reckoned ancient by the Greeks, and prior to these, such as are truly ancient. For thus also, in divine fabrications, that which is *recent* or *junior,* is converted to that which is more ancient, and is perfected by it; but the latter antecedently comprehends the causes of the former, and is established above it, by still greater and more perfect intellectual perceptions and powers. And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

It is necessary, however, to discuss every particular. With respect to Egypt, therefore, some call it an image of matter; others of the whole earth, as being divided analogously to it; and others of the intelligible, and the intelligible essence. But we say, that in what is here asserted, it is assimilated to the whole invisible order, which is the principle of visible natures. With respect to Delta also, it is produced from the Nile, being divided about the Saïtic province, so as to make its egress from one right line to the right and left, and to the sea, the sea forming the hypotenuse of the triangle, which Plato calls the Saïtic province; indicating, in what he here says, that it is that about which the stream of the Nile is divided. It is, however, analogous to the one vivific fountain of all divine life, and, in visible natures, to *the celestial triangle which is connective of all generation,* being proximate to the ram, which the Egyptians particularly honour, on account of Ammon having the face of a ram, and also because *the ram is the principle of generation, and is moved with the greatest celerity,* as being among the constellations established about the equinoctial. The mention, therefore, of Delta is here very appropriate; since the triangle, as we shall learn in what follows, is the principle of the hypostasis of the mundane elements. But the Nile is to be arranged analogous to the zodiac, as being situated under it, having an inclination similar to it, and imitating, through its divisions, the obliquity of it, and its division about the equinoctial points. *The Nile also is a symbol of the life which is poured on the whole world.* Moreover, the two sides of the Nile, which run into the sea from the summit [of Delta], may be, in a certain respect, assimilated to the two co-ordinations, which proceed from one root as far as to generation, and of which generation is the recipient. So that a triangle is produced from them and their common receptacle, into which they conjointly flow. But the Saïtic province, which forms a great part of Delta, participates also of a great portion of the celestial regions. Saïs, therefore, must be sacerdotally referred to the constellation called the Bear, not because it is situated under it, nor on account of its coldness, but as participating of a certain peculiar efflux of the God [who preside, over that constellation]. Hence likewise Saïs is not shaken by earthquakes, in consequence of receiving a firm establishment on account of the place about the pole.

"Of this province, the greatest city is Saïs, from which also king Amasis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is, in the Egyptian tongue,

Neith, but in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. The inhabitants of this city were very friendly to the Athenians, to whom also they said they were after a certain manner allied."

The word νομος or *province,* derived its appellation from the distribution of land. For thus the Egyptians called divisions of the great parts of Egypt. But from the city the whole province was denominated Saïtic, just as Sebennytic is denominated from Sebennetus, and Canobic from Canobus. Amasis, however, is now assumed analogous to Solon. For he paid attention to wisdom and justice beyond all the [other Egyptian] kings. He is therefore conjoined with Solon, and has the same relation to him, which the city has to Athens; in order that we may survey the cities and the men adorned by the Goddess [Minerva] as from one monad, and secondary natures always perfected from such as are more perfect. Callisthenes, however, and Phanodemus relate, that the Athenians were the fathers of Saitæ. But Theopompus, on the contrary, says, that they were a colony of them. The Platonic Atticus says, that Theopompus altered the history through envy. For, according to him, some of the inhabitants of Saïs came to renew their alliance with the Athenians. But Plato only says thus much concerning them, "*that the Saïtæ were very friendly to the Athenians, and after a certain manner allied to them*." It is possible, however, that he might say this on account of the tutelar Goddess of the city being the same with the Minerva of the Athenians.

With respect, however, to this Goddess the guardian of the two cities, it is requisite to know, that proceeding from intelligible and intellectual causes through the supercelestial orders, to certain parts of the celestial regions and terrene distributions, she is allotted places adapted to herself; not imparting an adventitious government of herself, but antecedently comprehending the essence and form of it, and thus possessing this allotment in a manner adapted to herself. That the government, however, of this Goddess extends supernally as far as to the last of things, the Greeks manifest by asserting that she was generated from the head of Jupiter. But the Egyptians relate, that in the adytum of the Goddess there was this inscription, *I am the things that are, that will be, and that have been. No one has ever laid open the garment by which I am concealed. The fruit which I brought forth was the sun.*[70] The Goddess, therefore, being demiurgic, and at the same time apparent and unapparent, has an allotment in the heavens, and illuminates generation with forms. *For of the signs of the zodiac, the ram is ascribed to the Goddess, and the equinoctial circle itself, where especially a power motive of the universe is established.* She is very properly, therefore, called by Plato a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war, and he now denominates her the leader of these allotments in the earth. In the first place, likewise, he honours the Goddess in the language of his country. For the Athenians denominate the tutelar Goddess of the city *Archegetes,* or the leader, celebrating her surname, and her presiding power. In the next place, he indicates the uniform pre-established comprehension in herself, of the allotments which are governed by her. And besides this he clearly represents to us, that it is possible for the same things to be signified through many words, since words are images of the things signified by them. For many statues may be formed of one thing from different materials; so that the Egyptians preserve the analogous,[71] because they call the Goddess by a name which has the same signification with that of the Greeks. Nor is it at all wonderful that both should denominate her rightly, in consequence of establishing the name according to one science. If, therefore, there is one tutelar Goddess of the two cities Saïs and Athens, the inhabitants of Saïs are very properly said to be lovers of the Athenians, as being in a certain respect allied to them: for the affinity is not wholly perfect. For

some may participate more and others less of the same providence. And some may participate of one, but others of another power contained in the Goddess. *For again, it is likewise necessary to know this, that a variation is produced in different nations from the places which they severally inhabit, from the temperature of the air, from habitude to the heavens, and still more partially from spermatic productive powers. But you may say, that they especially differ according to the gregal government of the Gods, and the diversities of the tutelar powers, from which you will find a difference in colour, figure, voice, and motion, in different places. So that those who migrate into other countries frequently change, by dwelling in those countries, their colour and voice;* just as plants are changed together with the quality of the region, when they are transplanted in a foreign land.

"In this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himself relates, very honourably received. And on his inquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge of such particulars superior to others, he perceived that neither himself, nor any one of the Greeks (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of things of this kind." {21e-22a}

Solon, on account of his political wisdom, and on account of the dignity and worth of his city, justly appeared to be deserving of honour to the priests of Saïs. But he found, with respect to memory and history, among the Greeks, that neither himself, nor any other Grecian, had any knowledge of very ancient transactions. The remembrance, however, of such transactions, contributes indeed to political virtue, and also contributes to the theory of the mundane periods, which Solon being desirous to know, and interrogating for this purpose the priests, found that he was perfectly deficient in knowledge of this kind. These things, likewise, are symbols of divine concerns. For a certain fabrication or workmanship, is called by theologists *recent.* But this is particularly honoured [as being suspended][72] from the father of wholes, and from the intelligible Gods, with whom there are intellectual perceptions exempt from other things, and which have more eternal natures for their objects. But those intellectual perceptions are more partial and less excellent, which are in secondary natures. And farther still, there is such a difference in demiurgic principles, that some of them are comprehensive of more total, but others of more partial forms. And some of them precede in dignity and power, but others are recent as with reference to them, and possess a subordinate power.

"Hence, when he once desired to excite them to the relation of pristine transactions, he for this purpose began to discourse about those most ancient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the traditions concerning the first Phoroneus and Niobe; and after the deluge, of Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with their posterity; at the same time paying a proper attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have taken place."

Of such a nature as this are all divine causes: for they call forth more divine powers, and through this evocation, are filled from them with more divine and total intellections; such as is now effected by Solon. For extending to the Egyptian priests the most ancient transactions of the Greeks, he in a certain respect leads them to the narration of their antiquities; *of which the Egyptians participate in a remarkable degree, as they survey without impediment the celestial bodies, through the purity of the air, and preserve ancient memorials, in consequence of not being destroyed either by water or fire. But the Assyrians, says Iamblichus, have not only preserved the*

memorials of seven and twenty myriads of years, as Hipparchus says they have, but likewise of the apocatastases and periods of the seven rulers of the world. So that this being admitted, there is still less reason to compare with these memorials the much-celebrated archæology of the Greeks: from which likewise it is evident, that the present narration does not look to that which is small, but to the whole and the universe.

Farther still, the archæology of the Greeks is different with different [Grecian cities]. For with the Athenians it proceeds as far as to Erichthonius, who was a native of Athens: but with the Argives, as far as to Phoroneus and Niobe. For these two are with the Greeks the most ancient. For Argos descended from Niobe; but from him Iasos and Pelasgos, from whom Argos was denominated Pelasgic. The particulars, however, respecting Deucalion and Pyrrha, that a deluge taking place, they were preserved in Parnassus, and how migrating from thence, they restored the human race, are manifest, and also that antiquity with the Thessalians is as far as to these. But according to some, the Argolic race begins from Inachus, but that of the Athenians from Cecrops, each of whom was prior to Deucalion. Solon, therefore, relating these and suchlike particulars, causes the Egyptian priests to narrate their antiquities. We shall however see, what one of the ancient priests said respecting the narration of Solon. And these things, indeed, will be evident through what follows. Solon, however, met at Saïs with a priest called Pateneit; but at Heliopolis, with a priest called Ochlapi; and at Sebennytus, with one whose name was Ethimon, as we learn from the histories of the Egyptians. And perhaps it was the priest of Saïs, who says as follows to Solon:

> "But upon this, one of those more ancient priests exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there an aged Greek among you."

The Egyptian priest is ancient, in order that while he reproves he may not be intolerable, and may have a probable reason for teaching about archæology. But he employs a repetition of the name Solon, not only as striving beyond measure in what he is about to say, but also for the purpose of indicating the circulation of things from the same to the same, which the more total causes of things generated in the universe, comprehend stably and intellectually, through indelible knowledge; to which causes the priest is analogous. He accuses, however, the Greeks as being always children, because they have not acquired the all-various wisdom of the Egyptians, but bear servile hairs in their soul. *Juvenility,* therefore, indicates their want of wisdom. Or this privation of wisdom arises from the frequent destructions of them, so that before they become truly ancient, they become again juvenile through destruction. Or it is because ancient deeds are not preserved by them; but their knowledge is always confined to present events, and such as sense apprehends. But with the Egyptians, past transactions are always present through memory, as if they were recent. And the remembrance is through history. But the history is from pillars, in which things paradoxical and worthy of admiration, whether in actions or inventions, are inscribed. Why, however, it may be said, does this priest accuse the Greeks with such severity? For what is there admirable in his narration, since, as the noble Heraclitus says, *a very learned knowledge of past transactions does not produce intellect*? But if that which Eudoxus says is true, that the Egyptians call a month a year, the enumerations of many of these years, will not be attended with any thing wonderful. It was idle, therefore, in the Egyptian priest to think highly of himself for the knowledge of transactions in these. Or, *though, as Aristotle says, it is impossible that memory and*

sense should be effective of science, yet at the same time it must be admitted, that they contribute to the reminiscence of wholes. For by relating in many things many similar circumstances, we produce one form of them, and finding frequently from history concordant apocatastases of many things, we recur to the one cause of them. For thus the observations of the affections of the air were framed by Calippus, and the knowledge from astrology of the celestial motions. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

Again, however, let us recur to the theory of wholes, and there survey *the junior fabrication,* held together by Minerva, and filled from more ancient and primogenial causes. For from thence this fabrication possessing stability proceeds,[73] on account of an exempt cause, and contributes to the mundane contrariety. For every thing in the demiurgic progression which is distributed into parts and multiplied, proceeds on account of that principle. As, therefore, there are causes in the world, some of which are effective of the regeneration of things, but others are guardians of the coherence of productive powers, the priest, indeed, must be assumed as analogous to these latter causes, but Solon to the former. Hence, the one exhibits a transcendent remembrance of antiquity, but the other is said to have related various mutations, generations, and corruptions. It likewise appears to me, that the arrangement of the elder prior to the younger person, is assumed in a way adapted to the orderly distribution of the universe. For in the fabrication of Jupiter, they have this order with reference to each other; just as the Elean guest [in Plato] says, that those who live in the Saturnian period, proceed from being older to being younger; but those that live in the period of Jupiter, proceed in a contrary direction. And in this dialogue, Timæus says, respecting the soul, that the Demiurgus produced it more ancient than the body, and on this account constituted it of a more principal nature. Now, therefore, the priest, who is the guardian of divine institutions, excels through antiquity, though that which is junior proceeds from a higher order; just as Solon comes from a city, which pertains in a greater degree to Minerva. In mundane works, however, that which is more ancient possesses a great dignity.

"To whom the priest: — Because all your souls are juvenile; neither containing any ancient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any discipline hoary from its existence in former periods of time."

Juvenility of soul, in what is here said, is analogous to renovation of life, and to more partial causes; but *remote tradition,* to stable intelligence, and to more ancient principles. And *hoary discipline* is analogous to the comprehension, which is united and always the same, of the nature and composition of all that the world contains; through which, indeed, the first and most divine of mundane natures comprehend totally and exemptly the causes of all generated beings, and eternally and antecedently contain in themselves temporal natures; but comprehend things more proximate to the universe partially and subordinately, as falling short of the unical intelligence of wholes. Hence to some of the Gods *hoariness* is adapted, but to others *juvenility.* For hoariness is a symbol of intelligence and an undefiled life, and which is remote from generation; but juvenility of more partial knowledge, and which now comes into contact with generated natures.

"But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be: the greatest of these, indeed, arising from fire and water; but the lesser from ten thousand other contingencies."

In what is here said, an inquiry is made, why the Greeks are always children, but there is no discipline with them hoary from its existence in former periods of time? Or, if you wish to survey the paradigms of these things, the enquiry is, through what cause the junior fabrication presides over variety, generated natures always rising into existence, and such as are ancient becoming renovated? Before, however, he discovers the cause of suchlike doubts, he first discusses the periods in the universe, and points out the variety of them; of which the first principles of the Gods, indeed, have an antecedent knowledge, stably and unitedly; but the second principles partially, and in such a way as to come into contact with the nature of the things which they govern; for this it is always to know what is present. But to retain in the memory things that are absent, is analogous to the perception of wholes separately and stably. There are, therefore, certain various periods of things in the world; but it must be admitted, that there is always generation and always corruption in the universe. For that which is sensible is rising into existence, and tending to corruption, but never *truly* is. This generation, however, and destruction, must be surveyed in one way in the heavens, and in another in material natures. For, in the former, a mutation of figures, and the motion of perpetually generated bodies, pre-exist. But generation, being governed through the mutations of these bodies, evolves its own circle. In this circle, however, different elements have dominion at different times. And wholes, indeed, always preserve the same and a similar order according to nature; but the different parts of these wholes subsist at different times, either conformably to nature, or preternaturally, in a becoming manner. For[74] either the wholes and the parts always subsist according to nature; or both, on a certain time, have a preternatural subsistence; or the one has a preternatural, but the other a natural subsistence, and this in a twofold respect. If, therefore, all things [perpetually] existed according to nature, the variety of generation would be dissipated, perpetual natures would be the extremities of beings, and the first essences would be the last of all things. But if all things were disposed preternaturally, there would be nothing stable; from which an invariable sameness of subsistence might be present with mutable natures; nor would the circle of generation be preserved. And it is impossible that wholes should have a preternatural, but parts a natural, subsistence; for parts follow wholes, and wholes are comprehensive of parts. Hence it is impossible that the former should, at a certain time, exist preternaturally, but the latter remain in a condition conformable to nature. For neither is it possible, when the whole of our animal nature is moved, and its order destroyed, that any one of its parts should still exist according to nature. It remains, therefore, that wholes being established in a natural subsistence, the parts at one time following the wholes, are disposed conformably to nature, but at another time have a preternatural tendency. But as of partial animals, each is indeed always generated and corrupted, on account of the efflux of them in the universe; but one is more generated, and another is more corrupted than another, and one is more adapted to existence, but another to corruption; thus also the several parts of the earth, receiving both a natural and preternatural subsistence, some of the parts are more able to subsist conformably to nature, but others are more adapted to sustain deviations into a preternatural condition of being; this, indeed, on account of a different temperament, but afterwards on account of the position being different of different parts, and in the next place, on account of habitude to the heavens. For different parts of the earth are adapted to different parts of the heavens, though they are preserved by other figures [or configurations]. And in addition to all that has been said, on account of the power of the inspective Gods, and of the divinities who preside over climates, and who are allotted different peculiarities; some rejoicing more in motion, but others in

permanency, some in sameness, but other in difference; abundant corruptions likewise of partial natures being produced in different places; the forms or species of the universe have a never-failing subsistence. For man is always, the earth is always, and each of the elements always is. For since corruption and generation proceed from the celestial figures; but these are imitations of divine intellections, and the intellections are suspended from intellectual forms, but from these stability is derived; this being the case, continuity is produced in mundane forms, and the visible figures are preservative of species, but corruptive of parts, so as to cause things which are generated in time, to be also dissolved in time, according to a circular progression. For the universe does not envy salvation to such things as are able to exist in conjunction with it; but that which is incapable of being administered together with the universe, is not able to abide in it. The law of Jupiter, however, expels[75] from essence every thing of this kind as disgraceful. For it is perfectly impossible that what is disgraceful should remain in the universe. But that which is deprived of order in the universe is disgraceful. We have shown therefore why[76] abundant and partial corruptions are produced in different places of the earth.

In the next place it must be shown why the greatest of destructions are through the predominance of fire and water, and not through that of the other elements. Fire, therefore, has an efficacious and productive order in the elements, is sufficiently able to proceed through all other things, and is naturally adapted to divide them. But water, is indeed moved with greater facility than earth, yet is more difficultly passive than air. And by its facility of motion, indeed, it is able to operate; but through being passive with difficulty, it is not affected by violence, nor becomes imbecile when dissipated, like air; so that it reasonably follows, that violent, and the greatest destructions are effected by deluges and conflagrations. You may also say, that the. remaining two elements are more adapted to us. For we are pedestrious, and allied to earth; and as we are on all sides comprehended by air, in which we live, and which we respire, it is evident that our bodies are of a kindred nature with it. Hence these elements, as being more allied to, are less destructive of us; but the others, which are contrary to these, bring with them more violent destructions. Farther still, according to another mode of survey also, these elements earth and air, together with suffering themselves, and suffering prior to us, appear to operate on us. For air when it becomes putrid, produces pestilence; and earth when divulsed, abundant absorptions. But pestilence is a passion of air, and chasms and earthquakes are passions of earth. Fire, however, and water are able to operate on us, without being previously affected themselves; the former by permeating, but the latter by external impulsion. Hence they are capable of producing more extended destructions, as being more vigorous and powerful than the other elements, in consequence of not corrupting through being themselves distempered. Deluges, therefore, and conflagrations are the greatest destructions. But famine and pestilence, earthquakes and wars, and other suchlike partial calamities, may be produced from other causes. And of all these, the effective cause indeed is the order of the universe, and prior to this, the junior fabrication, which always makes new effects, and at different times produces the generation of different things. *For this is asserted by the fables of the Greeks, and is indicated by the tradition of the Egyptians, which mystically says of the sun, that he assumes different forms in the signs of the zodiac.*[77] It is not, therefore, at all wonderful, if though there are many destructions, and in many places, yet man and every form always exist, through the immutable progression of divine forms. For through these, the productive principles in the universe possess an invariable sameness of

subsistence, because every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, is always suspended from its cause.

> "For the relation subsisting among you, that Phæton the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and perished himself blasted by thunder, is indeed said to have the form of a fable."

That the first principles of beings comprehend[78] indeed things which are moved, stably, things multiplied, unitedly, partial natures, totally, and such as are divided according to time, eternally, is evident. And it is likewise well known, that theologists refer the causes of periods, and of the psychical ascents and descents, and of all multiplied and divided life, to the principles that are proximately established above the world. Hence it appears to me, that what is now said, refers the mythology about Phæton to the Greeks, and the knowledge of Solon. For all suchlike corruptions and generations derive their completion from the junior fabrication, [or the fabrication of the junior, or mundane Gods,] from which also the circulation of forms, and the variety of corporeal and psychical periods, is perfected. As, however, in divine natures, things secondary remaining, perfection is imparted to them from such as are first; thus also, the Egyptian preserving what is related by the Greeks, teaches Solon from this concerning things of which he had a knowledge prior to Solon. What therefore does this narration obscurely signify? That psychical lives, and the nature of bodies, have still multiform mutations. And over these, indeed, the supermundane powers preside; but they are connectedly comprehended by the intelligible orders of the Gods. And of the former, indeed, the apparent meaning of the narration being historically delivered by the Greeks, is a symbol; but of the latter, the priest investigating the real meaning of the history, and unfolding it into light, to Solon. And thus much has been said by us for the sake of the whole theory, and in order to show that the narration is not discordant with the things proposed to be discussed.

The fable respecting Phæton, however, requires a manifold discussion. For in the first place, it is necessary to consider it historically; in the second place, physically; and in the third place, philosophically. History therefore says, that Phæton was the offspring of the Sun, and of Clymene the daughter of Ocean, and that driving the chariot of his father, he deviated from the proper track. That Jupiter also fearing for the safety of the universe, destroyed him by thunder; but he being blasted by thunder, fell about Eridanus. The fire likewise proceeding from him burnt every thing that was nourished by the earth: and his sisters, the Heliades, lamented his fall. And such is the historical account of the fable. It is, however, necessary to admit that a conflagration took place; for the whole narration is introduced for the sake of this; and, also, that the cause of it is neither an impossibility, nor a certain thing which may easily happen. But it will be impossible if some one fancies that the Sun at one time drives his own chariot, and at another time being changed ceases to drive it, and commits his proper employment to another. And it will be among the number of things which may be easily accomplished, if it is supposed that this Phæton was a comet, which being dissolved produced an intolerable dryness from vehement heat. For this supposition is generally adopted. *Porphyry therefore says, that certain signs may be assumed from the motion of comets. For when this motion is towards the southern parts, it is indicative of tempests, towards the north, of dryness from excessive heat, towards the east, of pestilence, and towards the west, of fertility.* The disappearance likewise of the comet, is said to be the destruction by thunder.

If, however, it be requisite to dissolve the fable in a more physical way, it is better to adopt the explanation of our associate Domninus, that sometimes so great a quantity of dry exhalation is collected together, as to be easily enkindled by the solar heat. But this being enkindled, it is not at all wonderful, that it should burn all that part of the earth which is situated under it, and produce such a conflagration as that of which the fable speaks. In consequence, therefore, of the inflammation being produced by the Sun, the authors of fables well induced to call Phæton the offspring of the Sun; denominating this offspring a male, on account of the efficacy of the power of fire, and because likewise it is usual to call fire a male, in the same manner as earth a female; and to denominate the one matter, but the other form. But because this exhalation did not proceed in a path parallel to that of the Sun, Mythologists assert, that Phæton did not drive the chariot conformably to the track of his father. The dissolution of the cloud about the earth, was called by them, the fall of Phæton; and the extinction of this cloud, the thundering of Jupiter. But the abundance of rain after the extinction of the cloud, (for this takes place after great conflagrations) is the lamentation of the sisters, or the wet exhalations, in as much as those that weep, pour forth moisture. And the exhalations, both the dry and the wet, have one cause, the Sun. But to the latter the female pertains, and to the former the male. These explanations, therefore, are more physical.

It is however possible, that the fable may indicate something more sublime; that partial souls proceed indeed from the father of wholes, but are disseminated about the mundane Gods, in order that they may not only be intellectual, come into contact with intelligibles, and recede from bodies, but also that they may have a mundane hypostasis. As, therefore, divine and dæmoniacal souls are arranged under secondary leaders; some indeed under the divinity of the Earth, others under the Moon, and others under the Sun; some, under the government of Jupiter, but others under that of Mars; that which is disseminated being of divine origin, every where receives something from the nature of that in which it is sown: just as things sown in the earth, receive something from the earth; but those sown in an animal, receive something from the nature of the animal: so that of offspring, some express the peculiarity of places, but others the similitude of the mother. Hence also, souls that are disseminated about their kindred stars, receive a certain peculiarity of life, from their leaders; so that each is not only soul, but a soul of a certain kind, such for instance as Martial, or Jovian, or Lunar. For whether the God is of an immutable characteristic, or is demiurgic, or vivific, a certain representation of the peculiarity of the allotted deity accedes to[79] the souls that are arranged under it. And why is this wonderful, since the peculiarity of presiding Gods extends as far as to herbs and stones? And there is a stone, and also a herb suspended from the solar power, whether you are willing to call them heliotropes, or by any other name. A similar reasoning likewise must be extended to the other Gods.

Of these souls therefore, those indeed that are undefiled, remain always suspended from the Gods to whom they are allied, and govern the universe in conjunction with them. But others descend, yet are not filled with genesiurgic vice [or the depravity which is offspring of the realms of generation]. And others receive a certain defilement from the subjects of their government. For this is the last form of life. The first of these souls, therefore, are truly sons of the Gods, as not proceeding out of their fathers, being, as it were, fashioned by and remaining within them, running before the Gods, and having the order of guards or attendants. The souls that have the middle rank, are indeed called sons of the Gods, but receive also a secondary life, and become the sons of Gods and men. And souls of the third rank, are also sons of the

Gods, but are not called genuine sons, as not preserving the form of their proper God, but verge to matter, and become oblivious of their genuine fathers. Whether, therefore, the authors of fables call Tityus the son of Earth, or Phæton the offspring of the Sun, or Musæus the son of the Moon, they thus denominate them after this manner, and others differently conformably to the before-mentioned causes. With respect to other sons of the Gods, however, we shall elsewhere speak.

But again, Phæton is indeed the offspring of the Sun, as being of the solar series. Hence also he has a solar name. Since however, abiding on high, he revolved and governed the universe in conjunction with his father, he is said to have driven the chariot of his father. For the vehicle of Phæton belongs to the solar chariots; since that also is entirely solar form. But when he fell into generation, for he did not rank among the first of souls, he is said to have been destroyed by the thunder of Jupiter. For thunder [*i.e.* lightning] is a symbol of fabrication, proceeding through all things without contact,[80] and vivifying all things; but is not the cause of the dissolution of the spirit in which the soul is carried. But there are many transpositions of souls into different polities, and from one element into another; some being transferred from earth to the sphere of fire; but others from the sphere of fire to earth; and some in order; but others heaped together, and accompanied with much tumult and disorderly motion, such as Phæton is said to have suffered. For being borne along on high collectively, and attracting empyrean vestments, he was moved through these in a disorderly manner, when he proceeded to earth, and produced in certain parts of it a conflagration. For souls in descending become invested with many garments ærial or aquatic; and some have empyrean vestments. Of these also, some have the vigorous,[81] but others the vehement and the percussive, from fire. And some indeed, when they become situated in air, lay aside these garments, and assume others that are more gross, but others preserve them even as far as to the earth. I know, therefore, that the Chæronean Plutarch relates, that in one of the islands of Britain, which appears to be sacred, and on this account is considered by the rulers of it as an asylum, the inhabitants frequently assert, when prodigious rains or thunder and lightning take place, that some one of the more excellent natures fails, they being accustomed to passions of this kind. But they denominate souls that are transferred into bodies, and that relinquish a certain generation, more excellent natures.[82] It must not, however, be denied that such-like circumstances befall souls descending into bodies, and especially those that are magnificent, and are allotted a more dæmoniacal essence, such as the fable obscurely signifies the soul of Phæton to have been. But it is not at all wonderful, that descending souls should be in a greater degree co-passive with those elements which are analogous to their presiding Gods, and should attract and become invested with a greater number of suchlike elementary garments; so that Saturnian souls should in a greater degree rejoice in humid and aqueous vestments, and solar souls in such as are empyrean, each being desirous of obtaining a material and ponderous body, instead of immaterial garments; the Gods also employing these as organs, in the same manner as they use material dæmons, in their productions about the earth. Through these souls likewise the Gods produce conflagrations, or pestilence, or inflict certain other calamities on those who deserve to suffer them, and employing souls that are allied to them as ministrant to the causes of the effects that take place in the heavens, they accomplish that which they effect. For it is nothing wonderful, that there should be many causes of the same things, some producing in one, and others in another way. Phæton therefore, being borne along about the earth, and after a certain dæmoniacal manner, burning those places to which he approached, through the stream of fire (for partial souls effect many things out of the body, being

then the instruments of avenging or purifying dæmons); he was lamented by the *Heliades,* who were certain *solar* souls, whence also they were said to be the sisters of Phæton. But they lamented him, not as alone commiserating him on account of his descent into generation, but providentially inspecting him, in order that they might in an undefiled manner pay attention to things which are generated and corrupted. For the river Eridanus, and the falling into it, indicate the lapse of the soul into the river of generation; in which being situated, she requires the providential care of the genera allied to herself, and the aid of souls that are in a permanent condition. Theologists also signify the extension of the solar providence to mortal natures through tears.

The much-enduring race of men thy tears
Excite.

So that the fable very properly manifests through tears, in a symbolical manner, the providential attention to Phæton of souls that are of the solar order. Again, therefore, this corollary may be assumed from the fable, that the descents of souls are effected through impotency. And that not only souls, but likewise their vehicles participate of the peculiarity of their leading Gods; so that from these divinities, some of them are denominated Solar, others Martial, and others receive an appellation from some other God. It may also be inferred that destructions are effected by the providence of the Gods. For Jupiter was the cause of the conflagration, by hurling the thunder at Phæton. And likewise, that the descents of souls are suspended from the one fabrication of things. Hence Timæus teaches us not only about the essence, but also about the ascents and descents, the lives and all-various elections of souls.

"But the truth is, that it indicates the mutation of the bodies revolving in the heavens about the earth; and signifies that through long periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the devastations of fire."

The Egyptian priest only unfolds thus much of the fable that contributes to the proposed discussion, that abundant destructions of terrestrial natures are produced through fire, in consequence of the mutation of the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth. But through mutation he signifies either the incommensuration of things in the earth to celestial natures: for all things while they subsist commensurately to the celestial effluxions, are able to remain, but when they are incommensurate to them, are corrupted. For things which are able to sustain the dividing power of Mars, are preserved; but such as are too imbecile to endure his effective energy, are easily dissolved; just as if your eye not being able to endure the solar light, should be blinded by its effulgence, though some other eye may be capable of looking directly to it without pain. And a similar reasoning must be adopted with respect to the other Gods and their configurations. For the universe is one animal, and its parts sympathizing with each other, it preserves different things by different parts; nor is any thing which is generated in it preternatural to the whole. For the natures which are generated in it, are generated through it; and it is the world itself which operates, and operates on itself. Or it may be said that this mutation is just as if a good father, who is always benevolently disposed towards his son, should on a time chastise him for the sake of his good; for in so doing he will appear to have changed his accustomed mode of treatment. Or this mutation may be the various configuration of the celestial bodies. For these are the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth, and at different times exhibit different figures, through the various intellectual perceptions of their informing souls. *For the configurations are the letters of these*

souls, and certain efficacious impressions produced through them. Again, however, both these are true. For the mutation of these bodies, and the incommensuration of earthly natures, are the leading causes of suchlike destructions. But if it is necessary to call the fall of Phæton from the heavens to the earth, a certain mutation of some one of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, it is not at all wonderful. For the mutation of the celestial Gods is one thing, since this is an impassive transfiguration; but another, that of the souls that revolve together with them, this being a habitude to terrestrial natures, from a life without habitude: and that of places about the earth, is different from either of the former, since it is a certain corruptive mutation; according to which neither souls are changed, nor much less the Gods, the leaders of souls. Suchlike corruptions, therefore, of terrestrial natures are effected through partial souls; but are also effected through dæmons alone. And as through these, destructions adapted to their series are produced, the like also takes place through souls. For the souls that when on high are delighted to illuminate immaterially, betake themselves to sublunary conflagrations.

Why, however, do copious destructions of the human race happen through long periods of time; is it because a concurrence of many things is necessary in order that such a destruction may take place? For it is requisite that there should be both the peculiar and common habit of the things that suffer, and a conspiration of the agents. For what if that which is corruptive of one thing, should be preservative of another? It is also necessary that there should be an aptitude of matter, and a preparation of instruments and times. For these also take place in partial destructions, but more rarely in such as are common; and this reasonably. For it is necessary that the progression from an incorruptible nature to one that is easily corruptible, should be through things which are corrupted with difficulty. If, therefore, wholes are always incorruptible, but more partial natures are easily corrupted, the media between these may be very properly arranged among things which are corrupted with difficulty, and which become destroyed in long periods of time. For wholes which remain during the mundane period, are incorruptible and indestructible. For no configuration of the stars is destructive of them, since all things are evolved in the whole period of the universe. But partial natures and individuals receive an easy dissolution. Copious destructions, however, of partial natures are effected through long periods of time; but such natures are nevertheless dissolved. For there is a life of a certain genus, as there is of one man, and of a city, and a nation. And as Aristotle says, there are periods of these, of some, more, but of others, less extended.

> "Hence those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers or the sea."

This is likely to happen in the visible destructions through fire: for those who dwell near water, are defended from the devastation of fire. The philosopher Porphyry, however, transfers what is here said, from the phænomena to souls; and says, that in these the irascible part is at one time effervescent, and this inflammation is the destruction of the man within us. Thus Homer represents the eyes of Agamemnon when he was enraged with Achilles, as "shining like fire." But at another time, the epithymetic part, being deluged by genesiurgic moisture, is enervated, and merged in the streams of matter. For, as Heraclitus says, "another death of intellectual souls is occasioned by moisture." But if these things are rightly asserted, those will be inexperienced in the perturbations arising from anger, who have the irascible part in a relaxed condition, and commensurate to a proper attention to secondary concerns. For

this is signified by *hollow places, and such as are near to water.* But those are inexperienced in the perturbations of desire, who have the epithymetic part in a more strenuous condition, and excited from the somnolency of matter. For this is indicated by *lofty places.* For in a certain respect, the irascible part is adapted to be easily moved and to be efficacious; but desire is languid and imbecile. A musician, therefore, will be requisite, in order to relax the strenuous nature of anger, and give intention to the inertness of desire. The philosopher Iamblichus, however, thinks fit to survey these things physically, and not ethically. He says, therefore, that when a conflagration takes place, those perish more abundantly that dwell on lofty mountains, as being more remote from the exhalations arising from water; for these exhalations are not much elevated on account of the weight of the moist substance. Hence the air that surrounds them is not wet but dry, and becomes fuel to fire, which naturally tends upward. But the contrary takes place in deluges. For those that dwell in hollow situations, are more abundantly destroyed, since all heavy substances naturally tend downward.

"To us, indeed, the Nile is a saviour in other respects, and also because it liberates us from this destruction."

According to the apparent signification of what is here said, the Nile is the cause to the Egyptians of many and all-various goods, *viz.* of geometry, of the generation of fruits, and likewise of avoiding conflagrations. Its water also preserves their bodies, and the divinity that connectedly contains this body, elevates their souls. But from these things you may assume, that first causes, being full of life and prolific power, connect themselves, and remain eternally, and also think fit to impart connexion from themselves to other things, which are in a flowing and dissipated condition; so that the name of *saviour,* adumbrates divine and exempt providence; from which also the light that is in the intelligible[83] Gods, illuminates all the intellectual and demiurgic causes.

"But when the Gods, purifying the earth by water, deluge its surface, then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the mountains are preserved, while those that dwell in your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the impetuous inundation of the rivers."

In what is here said, the efficient cause is clearly ascribed to the Gods. And this also may be asserted of conflagrations. For purification is at one time effected through water, and at another through fire. But every where purification to secondary is from primary natures. Hence likewise in Orpheus, Jupiter is exhorted to bring purifications from Crete. *For it is usual with theologists to arrange Crete for the intelligible.* But the material cause of purification is here ascribed to the incursion of water. For each of these [*i.e.* fire and water] produces without deliberation and involuntarily, being borne along according to its own natural tendency. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be a pre-existent cause which employs them to beneficial purposes, and operates for the sake of good; which cause is beautifully ascribed to the Gods. But if there are certain purifications in wholes, there are also powers that preside over these purifications, operating as purifiers on wholes prior to partial natures. There are likewise divine mysteries, some powers initiating, and others being initiated; nor will these ever desert the universe. The Egyptian priest likewise knowing this to be the case, calls the destructions through water and fire by a sacerdotal name, purifications, but not corruptions, as he would have done if he alone physiologized.

"On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the water descending from on high pour with desolation on the plains; but, the whole of it is capable of returning from the bosom of the earth. And hence, and through these causes, the traditions which are preserved here, are said to be most ancient."

Though rain may sometimes happen in Egypt, yet it does not happen in the whole of it, but usually takes place about the lower parts. This, however, says Aristotle, is evidently the work of the river. But the upper parts do not receive an afflux of this kind. Whence, therefore, does the Nile return? Porphyry indeed says, it was an ancient opinion of the Egyptians, that the water issued upward from beneath, by the ascent of the Nile; on which account also they called the Nile, the waterer of the earth; and that it returned from beneath; manifesting by this, that what is dissolved in Egypt preserves the Nile. Not that the snow being dissolved produces the quantity of its water; but that it is loosened from its own fountains, and proceeds so as to become visible, being prior to this impeded and detained. We however understand the term *dissolved,* with reference to doubt: for speaking Attically, the Nile is dissolved, because it liberates us from doubt. For it is not true that from snow being dissolved the Nile is increased. For where in southern places, such as those through which the Nile flows, is there a collection of snow? Nor does this river emerge from rarefied earth. For the rarity of the earth, does not give to the water a motion upward. But it is entirely necessary that there should be something else, which impels it from cavities to lofty places. And thus much with respect to the Egyptian opinion.

Others, however, say, that the Nile is increased from certain rains that are poured into it, as is clearly asserted by Eratosthenes. Hence to *return* does not now signify to spring from beneath, but for the water, being elsewhere increased, to proceed above the earth; streams of water poured into the Nile from other places. But Iamblichus says, it is not requisite to investigate a thing of this kind, but to understand in a more simple way the return of the water from beneath, as equivalent to what is usually called the *ascent* of water; and he assigns a twofold cause, through which the Egyptians avoid dryness, from excessive heat, and deluges. And this is manifest from what he says when examining the increase from rains. For he says, that the first cause of the salvation of the Egyptians, is the will of their presiding Gods, and the boundary from the first of fabrication. But the second cause is the temperature of the air. For the seasons there are contrary to those in the antarctic[84] regions, from which the Nile flows to these places; and in them the generation of dryness from violent heat, and of great rains, reciprocates. If, however, some one should blame this explanation, because the rains being increased the increase is not regular, it must be said, that rain frequently happens when there is no descent [or disappearance] of the Nile. At the same time, the uninterrupted succession of rain, and the magnitude of the mountains in which the fountains of the Nile are contained, are the causes of the unceasing increase of the water. For these mountains, receiving in all their sides the rain impelled against them from the annual clouds, pour it incessantly into the fountains of the Nile. But these fountains becoming exuberant increase the river. For this, says Theophrastus, is one cause of rain, *viz.* the pressure of clouds against a mountain. Moreover, it is not at all wonderful, if clouds are not seen about the cataracts. For the stream of the Nile is not first poured from these, but from the Lunar mountains, which are thus denominated from their altitude. And the clouds when present being collected about the mountains, impede the cataracts by their superior magnitude. And thus much against the Egyptian oration of Aristides.

Eratosthenes, however, says, it is no longer requisite to investigate the cause of the increase of the Nile, when we direct our attention to certain waters and rains that run into it, so as to corroborate what is said by Aristotle. These things, therefore, we have concisely indicated on this subject. But from these particulars the Egyptians infer, that their land will never experience either a deluge or a conflagration. That it should however fail from other causes, is not at all wonderful; since, as Aristotle rightly observes, every part of the earth becomes sea in the infinity of time, and the same place is at one time continent, and at another, sea. And looking to the infinity of time, it must not be denied that the water of the Nile may fail. For what if the annual winds, blowing less vehemently, should not impel the clouds against the mountains? What also, if the mountains should fall, in which there is a collection of clouds; the wind from subterranean places bursting them, *through which, likewise, the oracles say that succeeding cities shall be destroyed?* And the clouds not being collected, the stream always becoming less and less, will be absorbed by the earth which is dry.

"But the truth is, that in all places, where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous."

The priest has spoken concerning the mundane periods, and the different mutations [in them], and has observed that the safety of the Egyptians is derived from the position of the region, and the providence of the Nile. Now, therefore, he infers in common respecting places of the earth, that every place which is free from deluges and conflagrations, has always the race of men remaining, more or less numerous. For the greatest destructions are through fire and water, as was before asserted. Some one, however, may say, that the race of men fail in a different way. *For at present there are none who inhabit these very places of the Attic land* [which were formerly so populous], *though neither a deluge nor a conflagration has happened, but a certain dire impiety, which has entirely obliterated the race of men.*[85] Or it may be said that Plato now calls *climates, places.* He says, therefore, that every climate has men, though there should not have been a deluge or a conflagration, at one time more, and at another less numerous. Some however will also be saved in a deluge, as Deucalion, who was preserved, when the climate of Greece was deluged. After this manner, therefore, some unfold the meaning of the passage.

But according to our associate [Domninus], Plato means, that every place has always a greater or less number of men, which is not excessively cold, or immoderately dry through heat. For mathematicians say, that there are certain places which are uninhabitable through excess of heat or cold. Every place, therefore, which is adapted to the habitation of men, and every climate, has a greater or less number of men. And this interpretation is reasonable, and conformable to the words of the text. For the words, "whether neither intense cold, nor immoderate heat prevails," appear to signify, *where neither of the contraries being excessive, impedes habitation.* And, in short, since Plato had before observed, that the transactions of the Egyptians were said to be most ancient, he very properly adds, that in reality, every climate which is commensurate to the habitation of men, has always men more or less numerous. For not only mathematicians assert that not every climate of the earth has men, but Orpheus also, who says:

The Demiurgus for th' abode of men,
A seat apart from the immortals gave,

Where turns the Sun's mid axis stretching wide;
Between excessive cold and heat a mean.

And this likewise Plato now asserts, when he says, "*where neither intense cold, nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous*." With other nations, however, there is an oblivion of ancient transactions, not through the failure of men, but in consequence of frequent destructions taking place, certain illiterate and rustic persons alone remain. But with us [says the priest] many most ancient transactions are said to be preserved, in consequence of every thing being committed to writing in our temples.

"But whatever has been transacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of which we have heard the report, every thing of this kind is to be found described in our temples, and preserved to the present day."

As the situation of the country and its guardian Goddess impart safety to the Egyptians, thus also the preservation of past transactions is effected by their own care and attention, through which they apply a remedy to the oblivion produced by time. But they are assisted in this by their temples, in which all great and wonderful actions are recorded, both of their own people and of others, and also paradoxical events of things. For this is the meaning of the words, "*or containing any thing uncommon*." The history, however, of these things contributes to their knowledge of similar events; from which the reminiscence of wholes is produced, and also to the knowledge of futurity. *For through observations of this kind, they discover the effective powers of the celestial configurations.* For assuming that certain things happen from certain things existing, they are able syllogistically to collect, from the same signs, the causes of future events. It appears also to me, that the doctrine of the Pythagoreans which prepares souls to remember their former lives, imitates such a history as this of the Egyptians. For as it is fit to assume different lives of one man, or rather of one soul, thus also different periods must be assumed of one nation. Hence, as in the one, the recollections of the transactions of a former life are perfective of souls, so in the other, the histories of former periods afford the greatest assistance to the acquisition of wisdom. Farther still, such observations are assimilated to the orderly distribution of the universe. For they imitate the stable productive powers of nature, through which remaining immoveable, order is ingenerated in things that are mutable. If, therefore, the world is a most sacred temple, in which the productive powers that connect the universe eternally remain, the recording of ancient deeds in temples will be an image of the subsistence of these powers. And what is asserted by the Egyptians may signify, that whatever in sensibles is stable, of a firm consistence, and always subsisting after the same manner, proceeds from the intelligible Gods; but that whatever is moved, and at different times is generated and corrupted in a different manner, is derived from the junior fabrication. For the sacerdotal genus by which mention is made of ancient transactions, conveys an image of the divine order, which is connective of wholes and of stability, and which guards all things by divine memory, and from which the junior fabrication being filled, imparts by illumination to things of a very mutable nature, sameness, connexion, and permanency.

"While on the contrary, you and other nations, commit only recent transactions to writing, and to other contrivances which cities have employed for transmitting information to posterity."

Contrivance is a symbol of the cause which always fabricates new things, produces things which are not yet in existence, and co-adapts all things to the one perfection of the world. For in our domestic concerns, we call the preparation of every thing necessary, *contrivance.* And such also in cities, are literature and arts, forums and baths, and the like. But in the universe, *contrivances* are such things as receive a temporal and partial composition. As, therefore, temples signify the receptacles of perpetual productive powers, and also of such as are of a connective and guardian nature; thus likewise cities manifest hypostases consisting of many, dissimilar, and mortal powers. But *recent transactions only* being committed to writing, evinces that the existence of such writings and arts, is of a more recent nature.

"And so again in accustomed years, a celestial effluxion rushes on them like a disease."

This also is evident in men. For deluges destroy their race, being excited indeed from the celestial periods, but having water for their matter. Hence the whole of this is called a celestial effluxion, and, as it were, a disease, because it is corruptive of other things. That, however, which is corruptive, is indeed to a partial nature evil, but to the whole of things good. But Plato says, "*in accustomed years*," because such like destructions are accomplished conformably to certain circulations, which also have themselves a certain consecutive order with reference to the whole period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circulating] nature.

This also seems to be manifested through these particulars, that such things as are alone generated from wholes are necessarily consummated according to mundane periods, which are defined by the same number but that such things as happen from certain partial causes, will not entirely happen to be the same, though the configurations of the period are the same. In the universe, however, you may survey the same thing, by understanding that all generated natures are corrupted, and yield to the mundane periods, and to the circulations of the whole life [of the world]; and that the periods are conjoined to each other, and accomplish one continued life.

"Hence those among you who survive, are illiterate and unacquainted with the Muses. And thus it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the transactions of ancient times, as well of those among us, as of those in the regions which you inhabit."

For from a deluge, Plato says, that herdsman and shepherds are left, but that the inhabitants of cities are destroyed. Hence those that remain are illiterate and without the Muses. And on account of the former, indeed, they are unable through writing to transmit memorials of the pre-existent period; but on account of the latter, they are not sufficiently capable of preserving in verse or melody the events that happened prior to the deluge. Hence they become oblivious of all things. But through oblivion they return to the life of children. For an ignorant old man, says Aristotle, does not at all differ from a child in understanding. A thing of this kind, however, happens to souls that have recently descended into generation. For having exchanged for the former period, which was intellectual,[86] a certain, secondary and genesiurgic condition of being, they become oblivious of intelligibles, through the deluge arising from matter.

Such representations also of intelligibles, through the deluge arising from matter. Such representations also of intelligibles, as they once had from the vision of them they lose in the progressions of time. Thus, therefore, every thing in the world returns to juvenility from juvenility through regeneration being borne along differently at different times, in consequence of the form of it naturally subsisting in motion. Moreover, the assertion that mutations taking place, those that remain, are illiterate and unacquainted with the Muses, indicates to those who consider it physically, that the analysis of bodies takes place as far as to that which is formless and without morphe; and also that in this mutation, the destruction of the elements happens, which is manifested through the word *illiterate,* and the dissolution of harmony, which again the Gods who are the inspective guardians of renovation, easily remedy, and restore to a condition according to nature.

"The transactions therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, differ very little from puerile fables."

The Egyptian priest compares the venerable and very ancient narrations of Solon to the fables of children. For the fables of the wise are about things of an eternal nature; but those of children about temporal things and which are of small consequence. And the former, indeed, contain intellectual concealed truth; but the latter, truth of a grovelling nature, and which indicates nothing elevated. To the latter fables therefore, the histories of Solon are analogous; but to the former, the histories of the Egyptians. For the one look to that which is small, but the other have a most extended survey. And the one are only histories, but the other contribute to science. From these things, therefore, the paradigms also of them are to be surveyed. The effects, indeed, of the junior fabrication, are called the sports of the Gods, and resemble fables. For they are the images of beings, and participate of forms in an ultimate degree. But the things which primarily derive their subsistence from intelligibles, are intellectual, eternal, and stable, and have the essence of themselves concealed.

"For, in the first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, though in former times there have been many."

For the deluge of Deucalion is much celebrated by the Greeks, though as the Egyptian says, there were many others prior to it. Thus also in wholes, the junior fabrication gives completion to wholes partially, and multitudinously, and renders that which is present in a good condition through regeneration. But in intelligibles, the causes of the first subsistence and of the circulation of forms, are antecedently comprehended unically [or according to the nature of *the one*].

"And, in the next place, you are ignorant of a most beautiful and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country; from whence you and the whole of your city descended, though a small seed only of this admirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this affair is owing to the posterity of this people, who for many ages were destitute of literature, and became as it were dumb." {23b-23c}

The Egyptian wishes to conjoin the second to the former period, and to show that there is one connexion and life of the first Athenians, and of those that now exist, through a small seed, as he says, remaining. For thus also in the world the seeds of a former period conjoin that which succeeds it to its principles, through the essence of causes, the unceasing motion of the universe, and as some one says, its immutable

mutation. We must not, however, wonder if the priest now indeed says, that Solon is the offspring of those excellent men. For we must again direct our attention to the cause of all mundane contrariety. For Solon, so far as he is an animal, possesses from them the genus; but so far as he is a partial intellect, receiving the narration of a war, he is analogous to the divinity, who transports the productive principle of mundane contrariety, supernally from intelligibles to the sensible region. Nor is it proper to be disturbed by such like objections, but to know the nature of analogies; and that the same things through analogy, become first, middle, and last.

"For prior to that greatest destruction by water, there was a most excellent city of Athenians, which surpassed all others in war, and was in every respect governed by the most equitable laws, and whose deeds and polities are said to have been the most beautiful of all that we have received the knowledge of by the hearing, under the heavens."

Plato does not perhaps mean by *the greatest destruction,* the deluge of Deucalion, but some one of the deluges prior to it. But he calls the city of the Athenians most warlike, and governed by the most equitable laws, as being an imitation of its guardian Goddess, whom he afterwards says, is both philosophic and philopolemic. For the Athenians partake of the warlike from the philopolemic, and of equitable legislation from the philosophic. By *the most beautiful deeds* he means the victory over the Atlantics. But by *the most beautiful polities* he does not intend to signify that they changed many of them, but he thus speaks, because one polity may be called the number of many polities; just as one world is connective of many worlds. For if the life of each individual is a certain polity, but the common life is the communion of many partial lives, the one polity will consist of many polities, the beauty of it depending on its union. He also adds, *the most beautiful of all that we know under the heavens,* because it is the first imitation of the polity of the world; so that you may say, it is the best of those under the heavens; for the paradigm of it is in the heavens. And thus much for particulars.

Again, however, we should remind ourselves respecting the whole deed of the Athenians, that it is neither called a fable, nor a mere history; some indeed receiving what is narrated as a history, but others, as a fable. And some asserting, that, in the first place, the development of these, and such like narrations, appeared to Plato himself to be the province of a certain laborious and not very fortunate man;[87] and in the second place, that what is delivered by Plato is not a thing of such an enigmatical nature, as the doctrine of Pherecydes, but that he teaches with perspicuity concerning most of his dogmas. Neither, therefore, say they, should we force him to analyse, since the man proposes to instruct us without ambiguity. They also add, in the third place, that neither is a development in the present instance necessary. For the cause of the insertion of this narration is known to be the delight and allurement of the reader. And in the fourth place, that if we analyse all things, we shall suffer the same as those who in a slippery manner are conversant with Homer. Others again think that the development of this history should be referred to physical harmony, from what Plato says of the narration about Phæton, that it has indeed the form of a fable, but that it manifests a certain natural event; *since the Egyptians also, who, as Plato says, were the fathers of this relation, obscurely signified the arcana of nature through fable.* So that the development of this narration will be adapted to him, who speaks in the person of the Egyptians. For as Timæus himself, conformably to the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, makes his discussion from numbers and figures, as interpreting nature

through images; thus, also, the Egyptian priest will teach the truth of things through symbols adapted to himself. To which may be added, that Plato himself elsewhere accuses those who speak every thing from what is at hand, in order, says he, that they may render their wisdom manifest, even to shoemakers. So that he who delivers true assertions through enigmas, is not foreign from the mind of Plato. And such are the arguments of each.

We however, say, that all these particulars are a history, and also an indication of the mundane contrariety, and the whole order of things; the history, indeed, narrating the past transactions of men, but symbolically comprehending in itself those things which are comprehended in the universe, and the mundane contrariety. For the progression according to opposition, commencing from the first intelligibles, divides the world by powers that are oppositely arranged. And if you are willing, we will divide the universe according to the divine orders, which are in uninterrupted succession, and survey, conformably to the Pythagoreans, the co-ordinations that it contains. From the two principles, therefore, it is divided into bound and infinity, or rather into things allied to bound and the infinite. For of things that are mixed, some pertain to the former, but others to the latter principle. But from that which is unfolded into light as the third after these principles, the universe is divided into the united and the multiplied.[88] For there multitude first subsists unitedly. From the triad that is next to this, it is divided into things perpetual, and things corruptible.[89] For the measure of existence to all things is derived from thence. From the third triad it is divided into the male and female:[90] for in this each of these primarily subsists. But from the first triad of the next order, it is divided according to the even and the odd; for number characterized by unity there.[91] From the second triad, it is divided into the partial and the total.[92] And from the third,[93] into the straight and the circular. Again, of the intellectual triads, it is divided, according to the first, into things that are in themselves, and things that are in others. According to the second, into things animated and things inanimate, into things stable and things which are moved. But according to the third, into things that are the same and things that are different.[94] And from the order of Rulers,[95] indeed, it is divided into things which rejoice in similitude, and things allied to dissimilitude. But from the liberated[96] order, it receives a division into the separate and the inseparable. These things, therefore, which have an arrangement elsewhere, have now also been as it were explored by us. For according to each division, the goodness of better natures, desiring to fill things subordinate, and to take away depravity, produces war. But the desire of less excellent natures, to divulse a certain portion of beings, of a more excellent condition, excites the apparent opposition of things; since in war, also, those that contend against each other, wish to reduce into their own power the property of their opponents, and entirely destroy them. These things, therefore, are evident.

We may, however, understand the opposition of powers in the universe, by making a division after the following manner, into the adorning and adorned. And, in the first place, indeed, into things superessential and essences. For the genus of the Gods is superessential. In the next place, by dividing essences into eternal lives, and those which energize according to time. Likewise, those which energize according to time, into souls and bodies. And bodies, into such as are celestial, and such as subsist in generation. These, likewise, we must divide into wholes and parts. For the division extends as far as to these extremes. And, again, we must divide superessential natures into the divine peculiarities, such as the male and the female, the odd and the even, that which unites, and that which separates, the stable and the motive. But eternal natures must be divided into total and partial essences. And such as are total, into the

divine and angelic. Souls are to be divided into the divine, and the attendants on the divine. And divine souls, into the celestial, and those that pay a providential attention to generation. Souls, likewise, that follow the Gods, must be divided into those that follow them perpetually, and those that are frequently separated from them. And the division of those that are separated from them, is into those that preside over generation with undefiled purity, and those that become defiled with vice. For the descent is as far as to these. Moreover, the celestial bodies must be divided into the inerratic and erratic. And these, into such as are moved with a simple, and such as are moved with a various motion. The latter, also, must be divided into the peculiarities of powers. And universally the division in all the above mentioned orders, is into that which adorns, and that which is adorned, that which fills, and that which is filled.

If however, it be requisite, not to look to a part, but to adhere to the intellectual conception of wholes, it must be admitted that this opposition subsists every where. For it is in Gods, and in intellects, in souls, and in bodies. For in the first of these, there is bound and infinity; in intellects, sameness and difference; in souls, the circle of the same, and the circle of the different; and in bodies, heaven and generation. But secondary natures are always arranged with reference to[97] such as are excellent. Hence, also, we say that this narration is useful to the whole theory of nature, as indicating to us the mundane contrariety from energies and motions. For all the teachers of physiology begin from contraries, and make these to be principles; which Plato also knowing, delivers to us, through symbols and enigmas, what the contrariety is of the genera in the universe, and how less are subjugated to more excellent natures, through the intellectual energy of Minerva. Farther still, Plato very properly calls the polity the work of the Athenians, because it is requisite that such an analogy as this which the junior fabrication connects, should proceed through all things; but that total powers should by a much greater priority effect this, from which also the junior fabrication being filled, gives subsistence to mundane intellects, to souls and bodies, conformably to the peculiarity of itself.

"Solon, therefore, on hearing this, said that he was astonished, and burning with the most ardent desire, entreated the priests to narrate every thing pertaining to his ancient fellow citizens."

This, likewise, is the peculiarity of divine natures, *viz.* for such as are secondary, genuinely to adhere to such as are first, and to be established in their undefiled intellectual perceptions; but for such as are first, to impart by illumination their own plenitude to such as are secondary, through[98] unenvying exuberant power and goodness. *Wonder,* therefore, precedes, because in us, also, this is the beginning of the knowledge of wholes. But in divine natures, it conjoins that which wonders with the object of wonder. Hence, likewise, those who are wise in divine concerns celebrate *Thaumas,* [whose name is derived from *thauma,* wonder,] as one of the greatest of the Gods, who through wonder inclines secondary to primary natures. But *ardent request* follows, rendering that which ought to partake of more perfect goods, adapted to the participation of them.

"That afterwards, one of the priests said: Nothing of envy, O Solon, prevents us from complying with your request. But for your sake and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and especially on account of the Goddess."

Solon being an Athenian, has a resemblance to the Tutelar Goddess Minerva, so far as he adheres to more perfect intellectual perceptions. And the priest resembles one

speaking, as it were, from a certain adytum. For he teaches what was committed to writing in the temples; and presents to us an imitation of the middle orders of the junior fabrication, and of the whole paternal cause; which orders transmitting the gifts of a more elevated to a subordinate cause, fill from that as from a certain fountain the divine order. All things, likewise, are elegantly effected by the speaker. For Solon is perfected, the city is praised, and the Goddess is celebrated. The ascent also is from Solon to the Goddess through the city as a medium; imitating the convertive power of the Goddess. And this, likewise, is indeed beneficent; *viz.* to energize for the sake of the perfection of secondary natures: for it imitates[99] providence, and the super-plenary power of divine beings. But it is in a still greater degree beneficent, to energize for the sake of the city: for the energy is more ample, and embraces a greater power. Besides this, it is still more divine to extend all the narration to the Goddess, and to terminate the whole energy in her; all which, the unenvying communication of the priest genuinely represents to us, not only indicating the privation of envy, but the divine and prompt generation of good.

Again, however, we must not be ignorantly disturbed, if now indeed the priest as being the dispensator of the narration, is said to adumbrate a greater and more divine cause; but at another time, the Athenians being the ancestors of Solon, are more ancient than the inhabitants of Saïs; the Athenians being arranged according to the mundane causes of the whole contrariety of things. For so far as pertains to the narration, they have this order; but so far as pertains to physical progression, they bring with them an image of certain more elevated and divine orders. And if you are willing so to speak, since all fabrication, and the mundane contrariety, are antecedently comprehended in the father of wholes, together with adorning causes, and things which are adorned, you may there also assume according to analogy, the paradigmatic cause of the Athenians in intellectual lives. For again, the veil [of Minerva] is the last image of the whole contrariety of things. But in the universe, the true works of the Gods have a precedency, and likewise in the productive and primary causes of them; where also it is said, Minerva became apparent, invested with armour. Or rather, the veil is the last work of the weaving art, containing in itself an image of the mundane war, and of the demiurgic order proceeding from the Goddess into the universe; which veil she wove in conjunction with her father. A better image however of this, is that which in the narration of Plato, and in enigmas, represents to us the whole contrariety of things, and of the works of Minerva; which narration contributes to the whole [descriptive] fabrication of the world, in the same manner as the veil to the splendid procession of the Goddess, and the whole of the solemnity. *For the Panathenæa is an image of the Minerval fabrication in the universe.* The veil, however, is superior to both these, which is woven in the universe, in the intellectual light of Minerva. For contrariety is spread under the one life of the world, and the war is a part of the fabrication of things, which the ruling art of Minerva arranges in a becoming manner. And prior to all these, is the veil, which is pre-established in paradigmatic causes and the intelligible, and is comprehended in the one intellectual perception of Minerva. For,

In weaving, all th' immortals she excels,

says Orpheus. Hence, the weaving art is there primarily, and the veil of the essence of this Goddess, which essence is all things intellectually, that the universe is according to a mundane characteristic. For in ruling over the war of the universe, she does not look any where else than into herself.

That we may however recur to the thing proposed to be considered, the Egyptian priest directly imitates the unenvying providence of the Demiurgus, about which Plato

a little farther on says, "*He was good, but envy never subsists in him who is good, about any thing*." For the orders which exist proximately with him, have from him, and on account of him, an unenvying participation of good. And through this privation of envy, the priest fills indeed the mind of Solon, but praises the city, and celebrates the tutelar Goddess; conjoining partial and total[100] natures, uniting things contained to the things that contain them, and suspending all things from the Goddess, according to one bond and one series.

"Who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been nourished and educated."

The Egyptian, after a certain admirable manner, converts all things to the Goddess, and produces them from, and again converts them to her. For recurring from a citizen through the city to the power who presides over it, he makes this conversion. But again proceeding from the Goddess to the natures that primarily, and also to those that secondarily participate of her, he imitates the progression of things from her divinity. Again also asserting that the participants are nourished and disciplined by the Goddess, he likewise converts these to her. How is it possible, therefore, that these particulars should not in an admirable manner imitate demiurgic powers, which are established in natures prior to themselves, and generate those posterior to, and convert them to the causes of themselves? And thus much concerning these particulars.

What, however, is the meaning of this *allotment?* And how are the Gods said to be distributed into the universe? Of allotments therefore, some are those of partial souls, and others, of the undefiled genera. Some are dæmoniacal, others angelic, and others, of the Gods themselves. For if the father of the universe was one alone, and there was only one providence and one law, there would be no need of allotments, nor of divine distribution. Since, however, after the one father there is a triad, after the uniform a multiform providence, and after one law a multitude of fatal laws, it is also necessary that there should be a division of the subjects of government, and another providence and order about other things. *Through this cause therefore the universe is divided by demiurgic numbers, viz. by the duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, hebdomad, and dodecad.* For after the one fabrication, the section of the universe into two, heaven and generation, constitutes twofold allotments, the celestial and genesiurgic. After this, the triad divides the universe, about which Neptune in Homer[101] says,

To me by lot belongs the hoary deep,
The spacious heaven to Jove, to Pluto, Hades dark.

The tetradic distribution follows the triple order; giving a fourfold arrangement to the elements in the universe, as the Pythagoreans say, celestially and ethereally, above the earth, and under the earth. Next to this is the fivefold division. For the world is one, consists of five parts, and is appropriately divided by celestial, empyreal, ærial, aquatic, and terrestrial figures, and presiding Gods. After this allotment, the division into seven parts follows. For the heptad beginning supernally from the inerratic sphere, proceeds through all the elements. And after all these, is the allotment of the universe defined in the dodecad. From the divine allotments, however, the allotments of angels and dæmons are suspended and have more various distributions. For one divine allotment is comprehensive of many angelical, and of a still greater number of dæmoniacal allotments. For every angel rules over a multitude of dæmons, and every angelical allotment has about itself many dæmoniacal allotments. For what a monad is in the Gods, that a tribe is to each allotment in dæmons. Instead of a triad, therefore,

we must assume three companies, and instead of the tetrad or dodecad, four numbers and twelve choirs, following their respective leaders. And thus we shall always preserve the higher allotments. For as in essences, as in powers, as in energies, progressions generate multitude, thus also in allotments, those that rank as the first, have a precedency in power, but are diminished in quantity; as being more proximate to the one father, and to the total and one providence. But those that are the second in rank, are allotted a diminished power, and an increased multitude. These things therefore are to be considered in common about allotments.

Since, however, we have divided allotments according to a section into two, into the celestial and sublunary, concerning the former indeed there can be no doubt respecting the nature of them, and whether they always remain invariably the same. But the sublunary allotments are deservedly subjects of admiration, whether they are said to be perpetual, or not. For if they are perpetual, how is this possible? For how, since every thing in generation is mutable and flowing, can the energies of the powers that providentially inspect it, be perpetual? For the things that are in generation, are not perpetual. And if these energies are not perpetual, how is it that divine inspection subsists differently at different times? For an allotment is neither a certain separate energy of Gods, in order that things in generation being changed into another condition, this energy may remain exempt and immutable; nor is it alone that which is governed, in order that no absurdity may follow from the allotment flowing, and sustaining all-various mutations; but it is an assigned state, providence, and unrestrained government of divinity, about these sublunary concerns. And on account indeed of the subject of government, the definition of perpetuity cannot be applied to it; but on account of its being [always] present, it is destitute of corruption, in order that we may not ascribe to the Gods the passion of partial souls, by assigning them different allotments at different times. Hence it remains for us to show, how allotment is to be explained, so as to preserve the immutable in the Gods, and mutability to things in generation.

Perhaps therefore the discussion of this affair will be easy, by having recourse to that theory, which we have frequently elsewhere employed, *viz.* that every thing in generation, and generation itself, must not be considered as alone consisting of mutable and flowing things, but there is also in these something immutable, and naturally adapted to remain always the same. For the interval, which receives all the parts of the world, comprehends them in itself, and is extended through all bodies, is immovable, lest, if it belonged to things which are moved, it should also itself require another receptacle, and this should be the case *ad infinitum.* The ethereal vehicles likewise of divine souls, with which these souls are circularly invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have a perpetual essence, and are eternally suspended from divine souls, being full of prolific power, and performing a circular motion,[102] according to a certain secondary circle of the celestial orbs. And in the third place, the wholeness of the elements remains always the same, though the parts sustain an all-various corruption. For it is necessary that each form of the universe should be never-failing, in order that the universe may be perfect, and that being generated from an immoveable cause it may be immoveable according to essence. *But every wholeness is a form, or rather it is that which it is said to be, through the participation of one entire form.*

And here you may see, how the nature of bodies proceeds in [a becoming] order. For one thing [*i.e.* the interval of the universe] is immoveable according to every motion; but another thing, [*i.e.* the vehicle of divine souls] receives motion only according to place. For this is most remote from essential mutation. And another

thing, [*i.e.* the wholeness of the elements] admits of other mutations in its parts, but the whole remains entirely immutable. And the celestial allotments indeed, proximately dividing the interval, divide also together with it the heavens. But with respect to the sublunary allotments, in the first place indeed they are allotted portions in the interval of the universe. In the next place, they make distribution according to the definite vehicles of souls. And in the third[103] place, they remain always invariably the same, according to the *whole* parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods therefore do not change, nor subsist differently at different times. For they have not proximately their hypostasis in that which is changed. How, therefore, do the illuminations of the Gods take place in these? How are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the same place, at different times occupied by different spirits? May we not say, that the Gods possessing perpetual allotments, and dividing the earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the sections of the heavens, these divisions of the earth also are illuminated, so far as they possess aptitude? But the circulation of the celestial orbs produces indeed this aptitude, through certain configurations; divine illumination,[104] at the same time, imparting a power more excellent than the existing nature. Total nature likewise [or nature considered as a whole] produces this aptitude, inserting divine impressions in each of the things illuminated, through which these spontaneously participate of the Gods. For she inserts different images of the divinities in different illuminated parts, in consequence of these parts being suspended from the Gods. Times also effect something, according to which the conditions of other things are governed. The good temperament of the air too cooperates. And, in short, every thing about us contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. When, therefore, according to a concurrence of these many causes, aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of the things naturally disposed to be changed, then divinity is unfolded into light, even in these mutable natures, he being before concealed through the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed eternally his proper allotment, and always extending the participation of himself, but not being always received by these terrestrial places, on account of their inaptitude. But in the same manner as of partial souls, which choose different lives at different times, some choose such as are adapted to their proper Gods, but others such as are foreign, through an oblivion of the divinities to whom they are allied; thus, also, of sacred places, some are adapted to the power that has there his allotment, but others are suspended from another order. And on this account, says the Athenian guest, some are accustomed to be more prosperous, but others more unfortunate. Whether, therefore, the telestic or legislative art dedicates this particular city to the divinity who, according to an eternal allotment from the beginning, received this portion [of the earth], the life [of the inhabitants] is through this in a greater degree assimilated to the tutelar deity, and the works of him [who looks to this divinity in effecting them] are rendered more correctly great and admirable than those of the man who is not impelled to action from a principle of this kind. And he who chooses a life conformable to that of the allotted deity, acts with greater rectitude than he does who transfers himself to another order.

Conformably to this mode therefore, the Egyptian says, that Minerva is allotted the city which is named after her, and also his own city Saïs; inferring this perhaps from the great similitude of the life of the citizens to the Goddess; and perhaps also perceiving that there was an allotment of this kind, from the telestic art, and sacerdotal works. For as of the other Gods, so likewise of Minerva, there is an allotment proceeding supernally from intellectual causes to the place of the earth. Her allotment therefore is first in her father; but in the ruling Gods according to a second order. In

the twelve liberated Gods, it makes a third progression; but after this, it unfolds itself into light in the heavens, with unrestrained authority. In one way indeed, in the inerratic sphere. For there a certain allotment of this Goddess is expanded, whether it be the place about the Ram, or that about the Virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as some say it is the Electra, which is there. But in another way, it is unfolded into light in the Sun. For there, according to theologists, an admirable power, and a Minerval order, govern wholes in conjunction with the Sun. And again, in another way in the Moon: for Minerva is the monad of the triad[105] which is there. But in another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments of the earth to the celestial distributions. And lastly, about the earth differently in different places, according to the peculiarities of providence. It is not therefore at all wonderful, if one divinity should be said to be allotted both Athens and Saïs. For the same thing must not be supposed to take place about the Gods, as about partial souls, which are not adapted to dwell in two bodies at the same time, because they exert a providential energy in conjunction with habitude; but there is indeed a participation of the same power in different places; and in the one power there is also multitude. This power likewise is differently participated by different places. And in some, sameness is more abundantly participated; but in others, difference.

These things therefore are truly asserted, and the allotments of the Gods are perpetually established in the universe. These likewise existing, there are different temporal evolutions of them into light, according to different places. Ancient theology also manifests the perpetual essence of the allotments; as when it is said in Homer,

To me in ocean's hoary deeps to dwell,
Always, by lot belongs.[106]

For the word *always* is significant of perpetuity. And in short, since it is necessary that prior to things which *sometimes,* there should be natures which *always,* participate of the Gods, it is likewise necessary that perpetual allotments should exist prior to such as are temporal. For as dæmons prior to partial souls follow the Gods, thus also there are perpetual allotments suspended from the Gods, prior to partial illuminations. And the mundane Gods comprehend these allotments; the terrestrial Gods, such as are terrestrial; the aquatic, such as are aquatic; and the ærial, such as pertain to the air. These Gods likewise, prior to visible bodies, ride in ethereal vehicles, conformably to the Gods in the heavens. But whether it must be admitted, that there are other sublunary allotments, proceeding from on high in conjunction with divine light, must be elsewhere considered: for what has been said, is sufficient for the present.

"Yours indeed, by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth."

With respect to the fabrication of Vulcan, how may some one decide, so as not perfectly to fail in his conceptions of the power of the God? For the assertions of the multitude concerning him, belong to things which must be entirely rejected. But that which is said by those whose notions are more intellectual[107] is indeed true, but requires no small degree of confirmation. We shall therefore introduce to our discussion from theologists, credibility concerning this divinity. That Vulcan then is of the demiurgic, but not of the vivific, or connective, or any other series, is manifested by theologists, when they represent him as fashioning things from brass, employing the bellows, and, in short, when they call him the artificer. But that he is

the fabricator of sensible, and not of psychical, or intellectual works, is also manifested by them. For the formation of a mirror, the exercise of the brazier's art, lameness, and every thing of this kind, are symbols of his productive energy about a sensible nature. Moreover, that he is the maker of all sensibles, is evident from the same theologists, who say that he was hurled from Olympus as far as to the earth, and who make all the receptacles of the mundane Gods, to have been elaborated by Vulcan. If, therefore, we admit that these things are true, *this God will be the fabricator totally of every corporeal-formed substance; preparing for the Gods their visible seats, rendering all things subservient to the one harmony of the world; filling all fabrications with corporeal life; and adorning and connecting with forms the resisting and gross nature of matter.* On this account also he is said by theologists to fashion things from *brass,* as being the artificer of *resisting solids.* And because the heavens are [said to be] brazen, as being an imitation of the intelligible, the maker of the heavens is likewise [fabled to be] a brazier. But he is lame in both his feet,[108] as being the fabricator of things that are last in the progressions of being; for such are bodies; and also as being no longer able to proceed into another order. Likewise, because he is the maker of the universe, which, as Timæus says, is without legs. And he was hurled from on high to earth, as extending his fabrication through the whole of the sensible essence. Whether, therefore, there are said to be certain physical productive principles in the universe, or whether there are spermatic principles, the cause of all these must be referred to this God. For that which nature effects by verging to bodies, this God fashions divinely and exemptly, exciting nature, and using her as an instrument to her own fabrication. For innate heat is Vulcanian, being generated by Vulcan as subservient to corporeal production. The productive cause therefore of generated natures is referred, in what Plato says, to this God.

Since however matter is necessary to things that are generated; for the Gods in the heavens borrow parts from the universe, as things which will be again returned, for the generation of mortal animals; this also Plato delivers to us, in a very admirable manner, through *earth.* For in seed itself, there are productive powers, and a subject. And the former are derived from the art of Vulcan; but the latter from earth. For by earth, we must now understand every material cause; not that the Athenians sprung from the earth; but because it is usual to call all generation earth, and every thing material, earthly. Fire, therefore, is a Vulcanian instrument; but earth is matter, which is excited and vivified through fire, since it is of itself lifeless. Hence also, in consequence of this being filled, the material order is now assumed in conjunction with Vulcan. And on this account it is said that the seed of Vulcan, together with earth, gave subsistence to the generation of the Athenians. For according to the fable also, Vulcan being in love with Minerva, emitted his seed on the earth, and from thence the race of the Athenians blossomed forth. In short, therefore, Vulcan is always in love with Minerva, imitating her intellectual nature, in the fabrication[109] of sensibles. But Minerval souls, according to this energy of Vulcan, especially receive vehicles from him, and are introduced into bodies from the productive powers of Vulcan, and the hypostasis[110] of earth; the productive powers receiving Minerval impressions. For this God, prior to nature, is the perfecter of bodies, inserting in different bodies, different symbols of the divinities.

What however are the thousand years, according to which the Athenians are prior to the inhabitants of Saïs? This, therefore, may be said historically. But it seems also to signify the temporal priority of the life of the Athenians, and in short, that it is necessary their life should be more elevated than that of the Saïtans. For as in the invisible orders of things, many genera are suspended from the same leader, some

indeed more proximately, but others more subordinately; after the same manner also, of Minerval souls descending into generation, some are assimilated to Minerva, according to the highest degree of excellence; but others subsist proximately after these. A thousand years, therefore, signify this excellence. *For they are the measure of a perfect genesiurgic period, on account of a thousand being a cubic number.* Hence this number is very properly adapted to a life superior according to generation, and which is in a greater degree assimilated to the tutelar Goddess. If also you wish to transfer these things to the universe, you may there behold all the visible fabrication which is Vulcanian, and adorning causes and adorned effects; some of which are more total, but others more partial. And some being analogous to the Athenians, but others to the Saïtans. For nothing hinders, but that the same things may be surveyed analogously, in demiurgic causes, in the universe, and in an historical narration.

The divine Iamblichus however doubts, how the gods are said to be allotted certain places, according to definite times; as for instance, Minerva was first allotted Athens, and afterwards Saïs. For if, their allotment commences from a certain time, it will also at a certain time cease. For whatever is measured by time, is a thing of this kind. Farther still, with respect to the place which they are allotted at a certain time, was it without a ruler, when it fell to their lot, or was it under the dominion of other Gods? For if, indeed, it was without a ruler, how is it possible that any thing belonging to the universe can be perfectly destitute of divinity? How, in short, can any place remain without the guardian protection of more excellent natures? Or how, if it is sufficient to the preservation of itself, can it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? But if it is under the dominion of another leader, it will also fall to the allotment of another God, and thus an absurdity will ensue. For the second God does not divulse the prefecture and allotment of the former divinity. Nor do the Gods alternately receive the places of each other; nor do dæmons change their allotments. Iamblichus having thus doubted, dissolves the doubts by saying, that the allotments of the Gods are perpetually established, but that the participants of them, at one time derive advantage from the guardianship of the rulers, and at another reap no benefit from it. He adds, *that these are the participations which are measured by time, and which sacred institutions frequently call the birthdays of the Gods.* It has however been observed by us, that this resembles that which happens about souls. For every soul has entirely a tutelar God. And certain souls choose lives adapted to other Gods. Thus, therefore, every place is the allotment of a certain God, and there is a time when it becomes the allotment of some other divinity, who renders it adapted through a certain period, or through certain mystic rites established by men. For allotment is twofold, the one being essential, but the other subsisting according to habitude. But let us direct our attention to what follows.

"But an account of the transactions of this our city, during the space of eight thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings."

The priest assigns to the Athenians the number nine thousand, receiving this also from history; but to the Saïtans the number eight thousand; measuring the lives of the citizens by the chiliad, conformably to the writings in the temples. *For by this number,* as the philosopher Porphyry says, *dæmons also measure time.* Farther still, the priest makes this narration from the sacred writings; which manifests, as Iamblichus would say, the stable guard of the mundane divine guardians. These numbers, however, happen to lives according to a probable reason. For eight thousand is a cube on a cube;[111] but nine thousand is a tetragonic superficies on a cube.[112]

Hence the one[113] gives depth to a superficies, and this through the indefinite duad; but the other preserves the superficies itself in itself, in similitude and perfection from the triad.[114] But it is the symbol of a better life, to remain in itself, and to adorn secondary natures. And it is an indication of a more imperfect life, to descend to secondary natures, to be assimilated to them, and to be filled with a certain indefiniteness. Since however even a secondary nature is not entirely deprived of similitude to divinity, the descent is through a cube, in which there is a tetradic similitude.[115] But it is better to imitate more excellent nature through a more simple life, than through a life which is more compounded. And a square is more simple than a cube. If however you should say, that the number nine thousand is adapted to those that have their hypostasis from Earth and Vulcan; for a thousand is terrestrial, as being a cube, but nine pertains to Vulcan,

With them I many artificial forms
For nine years fashion'd —— —

says Vulcan [in Homer,[116]] in thus speaking, you will not wander from the truth. But, in short, a cube is adapted to the terrestrial allotments of Minerva; since the decad is attributed to the heavens, and the last progression of the decad gives subsistence to the solid number one thousand. For the Gods make their progression from the celestial allotments to the terrestrial, as the last. This therefore must be said by us.

The philosopher Porphyry however, in interpreting these things, supposes Vulcan to be the intellect that presides over art, but earth to be the lunar sphere. *For this is called by the Egyptians ethereal earth.* He says therefore that souls which derive their subsistence from divinity, but participate of the artificial [or Vulcanic] intellect, are disseminated in the body of the moon; souls that give themselves to the arts, dwelling there; and that they have bodies which are effluxions of the ethereal bodies. That nine thousand years, also, are adapted to these souls, after the following manner. A myriad of years is, says he, the period of the soul which ascends and descends through the five stars, in order that each may have two chiliads, yet not successive. Time indeed is successive according to conception; for it is not without continuity. Hence all the stars have nine lives; which is obscurely signified through nine thousand years. Ninths also are performed to the dead. And in a similar manner, some give names to those that are born, in the ninth year; employing as symbols the periods of generation and production. The priest, however, does not now assume a myriad of years, but the number of nine thousand, in order that those of whom he is speaking may still be terrene, but approximating to the period of a myriad of years. All this interpretation, however, the divine Iamblichus rejects, and says that the discussion here is not about lives, but about the different measures of Minerval participation. It is absurd, therefore, to make mention of the periods spoken of in the Phædrus. But if it be requisite to narrate what follows from the conception of Porphyry, it must be said, that the soul lives indeed intellectually and Saturnally on high, but descends first to the conception of a political life, which is Jovian. Afterwards, she excites anger, and lives ambitiously. But anger is Martial. In the next place, she proceeds in her descent to desire, and venereal lives; and at last, exerts physical reasons [or productive powers]. But all reasons are Hermaic. And Hermes is the inspective guardian of physical reasons. Through these, however, she is bound to body. And again, receiving a body, she first lives physically, being the supplier of nutriment and increase to the body. Afterwards, she lives epithymetically, exciting genesiurgic powers. In the next place,

she lives under the influence of anger, rising against her former habits, but entering into an ambitious life. Afterwards, she lives politically, moderating the passions. And in the last place, she lives intellectually. If therefore she is restored to her pristine state, her life is intellectual, and the myriad is terminated. But in generation, though she is conversant with it, in the best manner, she lives according to a deficiency by the chiliad. And of this the number nine thousand is a symbol, being adapted to the best polity of the Athenians.

"I will therefore briefly unfold to you the laws, and the most beautiful of the deeds of those citizens that existed nine thousand years ago. For when we are more at leisure, we shall accurately discuss every particular, receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves." {23e-24a}

If you wish to refer what is here said to the whole order of things, the number nine thousand will manifest the total progression as far as to a cube, and terrestrial works, and likewise the life which pervades through all things. But through the word *briefly,* the union of many productive powers, and the comprehension of them according to intellect, are indicated. For the synoptical is an image of intellectual impartibility; but that which departs into multitude, of prolific power; multiplying, producing, and dividing forms into minute parts, through diversity. *The laws* are images of the divided fabrication, which is united according to intellect. But *the most beautiful work* is an adumbration of the orderly distribution of things which is extended to one beautiful end. For beauty subsisting according to the united, proceeds from intelligibles to the visible fabrication. And *the resumption of the sacred writings,* indicates the recurrence to the paradigms of them, from which also the priest being filled, delivers these things to Solon. The narration, therefore, will be concerning the divided and multiplied fabrication, which is connected by intellect, and extends as far as to terrestrial works, as may be inferred from all that has been said.

"In the first place then, consider the laws of these people, and compare them with ours. For you will now find here many paradigms of things which then subsisted in your city."

As Socrates summarily discussed his own polity, thus also the priest briefly discusses the laws of the ancient Athenians, in order that the latter may have diminution with reference[117] to the former, and also a similitude to it. And this very properly. For the one is more universal, but the other more partial. And the one is the work of *dianoia,* but the other of the phantasy. This diminution indeed may be surveyed, so far as Socrates has described a *polity,* but the priest *laws. A polity, however, is the union and common bond of the life of citizens;* but *legislation is order proceeding into multitude and division.* And the former is more analogous to the providential cause, but the latter to fate. But there is a similitude between Socrates and the priest, so far as both assert that they deliver the multitude of their words contractedly.

Again, therefore, these things embrace wholes and divine causes. For the middle is suspended from the first fabrication, and is assimilated to it. And each indeed pertains to the universe; but the latter according to union, and one sameness; and the former according to progression and the difference of the things fabricated. Just as the third[118] fabrication subsists according to conversion.[119] And the first fabrication connects the war in generation celestially; but the second subordinately and according to diminution; just as the third[120] connects the extremities of the universe. Very properly therefore does Socrates summarily deliver the laws, and the whole life of the

Athenians, in the same manner as the priest. And these things may be assumed from what the priest now says. But he calls images paradigms, because the Saïtans participate secondarily of those things, of which the Athenians participate primarily. For though archetypes rank among the first of beings, yet images have the first order with reference to our knowledge. As therefore things secondary by nature are said to be first, thus also they are said to be paradigms to the things that are elevated from them, and which know through them the natures prior to them. Here also, what pertains to the Athenians, indicates a more total, but what pertains to the Saïtans, a more partial order. These things likewise are analogous, both in partial natures and in wholes. So that the polity which is about to be delivered, pertains to the city of the Athenians, or rather to the whole orderly distribution of things; and the laws extend to the whole world from Minerva. For every law is said to be the distribution of intellect, and is rightly said to be so. But the laws of the Athenians, being established conformably to the tutelar Goddess, exhibit the distribution of the Minerval intellect. But of this kind are the laws in the universe which are defined conformably to one demiurgic intellect, and the one providence of Minerva.

"For the race of the priests was separated from the rest of the inhabitants."

That in a certain respect all this order of the polity of the priest is more partial and more divided than that of Socrates, imitating the middle fabrication, may be learnt from the multitude and quality of the genera in the city. For in the polity of Socrates, there were three genera, the guardian, the auxiliary, and the mercenary. For the triad is allied to the demiurgic monad. But here there are the double of these, the sacerdotal, and the military; the demiurgic, [or pertaining to artificers] and the pastoral; the venatic and the agricultural. For the middle fabrication has at one and the same time the duadic, and the triadic; and both these numbers are adapted to Minerva. But one of these indeed, *viz.* the triad, is immediately adapted to the Goddess; but the other according to generation. For the hexad is a triangle from the triad.[121] By the trigonic therefore, and by the hexad from the triad, the diminution and at the same time alliance to the Goddess are manifested. For though every fabrication participates of Minerva, yet the first and supreme parts of the universe, and the first fabrication, and the first father, are filled from her in a more abundant degree. Thus therefore, if you alone select these genera, you will find the number adapted to the Goddess. But if you add, the presiding over wisdom, you will entirely find the heptad, which is of a Minerval characteristic. And this is one of the things that are of great notoriety. The feminine nature likewise of the heptad is celebrated, and that it is produced from the monad alone. *The monad also, the triad, and the heptad, are said to be especially images of Minerva; the first, indeed, as being intellectual; the second, as converting the monad to itself; and the third, as proceeding from the father alone.* After this manner, therefore, you may infer from numbers.

It is necessary however, from the quality of the genera, to survey the diminution and transcendency of these. For the sacerdotal is subordinate to the guardian genus, which ascends as far as to the first cause.[122] For Plato himself in the Politicus arranges the priests under the politician, and does not impart to them political power. The military also is subordinate to the auxiliary genus. For the latter arranges in a becoming manner, and sufficiently disciplines the inhabitants of the city. But the former pursues war alone, and things pertaining to it, and participates of this study alone. And the mercenary tribe is divided into the remaining genera. The polity of Socrates therefore surpasses that of the priest, as being more comprehensive, and after

a manner co-adapted to the genera prior to it. So that both from number and quality, it becomes evident to us that the polity which is now delivered, is subordinate to that of Socrates, and will rank as the second after it. We establish, however, the analogies of the polity of Socrates to the universe, to be as follows. The genus of guardians we arrange as analogous to the celestial Gods. The auxiliary genus to those more excellent natures, the attendants on the celestial Gods, and the defenders of the universe. And the mercenary genus, to those powers that connect a material nature with partial souls. The first of these also, is analogous to the fixed stars, the second to the planets, and the third to material natures. We may likewise assume in the celestial Gods themselves, all these according to analogy.

Here, however, it is worth while to survey how, and after what manner, these genera [enumerated by the priest] are to be assumed in the universe. For the philosopher Porphyry arranges them as follows: That the priests are analogous to the archangels in the heavens, who are converted to the Gods, of whom they are the messengers. But the soldiers are analogous to souls descending into bodies. Again, *the shepherds are analogous to the powers that are arranged over the herds of animals; which in arcane narrations are said to be souls that are frustrated of the human intellect, but have a propensity towards animals.* For there is also a certain curator of the herd of men. And there are likewise certain partial curators; some being the inspectors of nations; other of cities; and others of individuals. But the hunters are analogous to those powers that hunt after souls, and enclose them in bodies. There are likewise powers who delight in the hunting of animals, such as Diana is said to be, and another multitude together with her of venatic dæmons. And the husbandmen are analogous to those powers that preside over fruits. All this administration therefore of sublunary dæmons is said by Plato to receive many demiurgic distributions, in consequence of looking to the effect which now is, or is becoming to be. The divine Iamblichus, however, reprehends these assertions, as neither Platonic nor true. For archangels are not any where mentioned by Plato, nor does the military genus pertain to souls verging to bodies. For it is not proper to oppose these to gods or dæmons. For we should act absurdly, in arranging these in the middle genus, but Gods and dæmons among the last artificers. Nor must it be admitted, that those are shepherds, who are frustrated of human intellect, but have a certain sympathy to animals. For the existence of dæmons who govern the mortal nature, is not derived from men; nor are those powers hunters, who enclose the soul in body, as in a net; since the soul in not thus conjoined to the body. *Nor is this mode of theory philosophic, but full of Barbaric arrogance.*[123] Nor are husbandmen to be referred to Ceres: for the Gods are exempt from the proximate causes of nature. Reprehending, therefore, these assertions, he considers the priests as analogous through similitude to all such secondary essences and powers, as honour and worship the causes prior to themselves. But the shepherds, as analogous to all those mundane powers, that are allotted the government of the life which verges to body, and of the most irrational powers, and who distribute these in an orderly manner. The hunters he places as analogous to those universal powers who adorn secondary natures through the investigation of [real] being. But the husbandmen, as corresponding to the powers that give efficacy to the seeds that descend from the heavens to the earth. And the soldiers, to the powers that subvert every thing atheistical, and corroborate that which is divine. After this manner, therefore, the divine Iamblichus [interprets what is said by the priest.] But it is common to both these philosophers, that they divide the fabricative genus into the pastoral, the venatic, and the agricultural; but they do not produce the

four genera from one. For no one, who rightly considers the affair, can place either the pastoral or the venatic under the fabricative genus.

Will it not therefore be better to interpret the passage conformably to our preceptor, by admitting that the sacerdotal and military tribes form one duad, but the fabricative and agricultural another, and the pastoral and venatic a third duad; and assuming an order of this kind, to investigate the paradigms of them. For the sacerdotal genus subsists in the anagogic Gods, the military in the guardian, and the fabricative in the Gods who separate all the forms, and the productive principles of mundane natures. But the agricultural genus subsists in those Gods that supernally excite nature, and disseminate souls about generation. For Plato, likewise, denominates the lapse of the soul into generation, a dissemination. But to sow is most adapted to husbandmen, as is, also, to collect productions of nature. The pastoral genus subsists in the Gods that govern distinctly all the forms of life that revolve in generation For Plato, in the *Politicus,* delivers to us certain divine shepherds. *And the venatic subsists in the divinities that give in orderly distribution to all material spirits. For it is usual with theologists to call these Gods hunters.* All these genera likewise pertain to the middle fabrication, *viz.* the convertive genus, the guardian, that which administers the psychical allotments, that which governs the genesiurgic forms of life, every thing which fabricates and gives form to material natures, and that which arranges the last order of spirits. That, however, which pays attention to wisdom, and that which is contemplative, must be considered as different from all these genera, and which the Egyptian also celebrates above the all the rest, making mention in the first place, as being a priest, of the sacerdotal genus. All the genera, therefore, are seven, and the monad is exempt from the hexad. And the monad, indeed, is analogous to the one intellect which connects all the fabrication of generated natures; but the hexad is analogous to the more partial orders under this intellect, *viz.* to the anagogic, guardian, formalizing, and vivifying orders, and also to those that are the leaders of the herds of a tame life, and to those that rule over the brutal nature, which orders in the universe likewise are separated from the fixed stars. Moreover, he says, that these orders may be seen among men, in the first place, among the Athenians, but in the second place, among the Saïtans, according to the division of genera, each accomplishing its proper work in a definite manner. For he manifests this by saying, *separate from others,* in order that we may understand the unmingled purity of the genera, proceeding supernally through diminution, as far as to the last of things.

"The artificers, also, exercised their arts in such a manner, that each was engaged in his own employment without mingling with that of other artists. The same method was likewise adopted by shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen."

The whole of this tetractys has, indeed, the third order, according to a section of the genera into three, but is now enumerated by Plato as the second; in order that through this, what is said may imitate the universe, in which the last is the middle, comprehended on all sides by more divine natures. For that which is most material and gross, is enclosed by fabrication in the middle. For thus alone[124] can it be preserved, being adorned and guarded according to the whole of itself by all the comprehending natures [in the universe]. But again, it is here added, that the fabricative art was not mingled with the other arts, nor in a similar manner any one of the others with the rest, but that each remained by itself, and in its own purity. For this not only produces accuracy and rectitude in appropriate works, but likewise effects the sympathy of the citizens. For all will thus be in want of all, in consequence of

each not exercising many arts. For the builder will be in want of the husbandman, the husbandman of the shepherd, the shepherd of the hunter, and the hunter of the builder; and thus each being in want of the rest, will not be unmingled with them; hence, there is sameness in conjunction with difference, and separation accompanied with union.

"The warlike genus too, you will find was separated from all the other genera, and was ordered by law to engage in nothing but what pertained to war."

Every where indeed, but especially in the warlike genus, the unmingled and the separate are appropriate. For they have an alliance to the highest order, which cuts off every thing material, and obliterates that which is disorderly and confused. Very properly therefore does this genus pay attention to the concerns of war. For on account of this, the city remains free from external and injurious incursions; and this invests it with a guard from itself, imitating the guardian order. For as a guardian deity is present with the first, so likewise with the middle of the demiurgi. This, therefore, may be assumed from theology. But by law in the universe, we must understand the divine institutions proceeding from the one demiurgic intellection. For prior to mundane natures is the demiurgic law, which is seated by Jupiter, and distributes together with him in an orderly manner all the providential inspection which exists in the universe.

"A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts was employed by each. These we first used in Asia; the Goddess in those places, as likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use."

The narration extends the energy of Minerva supernally from paradigms, as far as to the last genera. For there are things connascent with this energy, participating of undefiled powers, more total and more partial, and which arrange the mundane genera from the middle fabrication. Analogously also to this, they comprehend and are comprehended, are vanquished by the Minerval energies, and remain perpetually undefiled with invariable sameness through it, in the universe. It is requisite, therefore, to know these things in common about all these particulars. We must however show what the armour, the shields, and the spears, are, and how these are antecedently comprehended in the Goddess. Porphyry, indeed, calling the body the shield, assumes anger for the spear. But these pertain to souls falling into generation and to material things, and are not the instruments of immutable safety, but of a genesiurgic life, corrupting the purity of intellect, and destroying the life which subsists according to reason. The divine Iamblichus, however, explains these in a divinely inspired manner. For since it is requisite that every thing divine should operate and net suffer, in order that by operating it may not have the inefficacious, which is assimilated to matter, and that by not suffering it may not have an efficacious power resembling that of material natures, which act in conjunction with passion; in order that both these may be accomplished, he says, that shields are powers through which a divine nature remains impassive and undefiled, surrounding itself with an infrangible guard. But spears are the powers according to which it proceeds through all things without contact,[125] and operates on all things, cutting off that which is material, and giving aid to every genesiurgic form. These powers, however, are first seen about Minerva. Hence in the statues of her she is represented with a spear and shield. For she vanquishes all things, and according to theologists, remains without declination, and with undefiled purity, in her father. But these have a secondary subsistence, in both the total and partial Minerval powers. For as the Jovian and

demiurgic multitude, imitates its monad, and as the prophetic and Apolloniacal multitude participates of the Apolloniacal peculiarity; thus, also, the Minerval number, adumbrates the undefiled and unmingled nature of Minerva. This, also, takes place in an ultimate degree in Minerval souls. For in these, likewise, the shield is the untamed and uninclining power of reason; but the spear is that power which amputates matter and liberates the soul from dæmoniacal or fatal passions; of which powers the Athenians participate in a purer manner, but the Saïtans in a secondary degree, receiving these through the measure of alliance to the Goddess.

"You may perceive, too, what great attention was paid immediately from the beginning by the laws to prudence and modesty, and besides these, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of health. And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated." {24b-24c}

A little farther on, he calls the Goddess both a lover of wisdom and a lover of war, in order that the arrangement of the polity of the Athenians and Saïtans might be produced conformably to her as a paradigm. And what indeed pertains to the exercise of war, is sufficiently indicated from what has been said; but that which pertains to wisdom, he exhibits to us in the present words; in order that by the one, the philopolemic, and by the other, the philosophic nature of Minerva might be adumbrated. What then is this prudence? The theory of wholes and of supermundane natures, from which, after the first of goods which are perfective of souls, a certain facility is obtained in the concerns of human life, proceeding in conjunction with divination and medicine. And in one way, indeed, this prudence is the source of disciplines in invisible causes, in another way, about the world, and in the last place, about human affairs. For since the Goddess herself is immaterial and separate wisdom, on this account, to the natures that are allied to her, she unfolds into light all the parts of divine and human prudence. For with respect to divination, also, one kind must be admitted to exist in the intellectual, and another in the mundane Gods. And of the latter, one kind proceeds from the Gods, another from dæmons, and another from the discursive energy of the human soul, existing rather as something artificial and conjectural. In a similar manner also with respect to medicine, one kind indeed exists in the Gods themselves, and this is of a Pæonian nature; but another kind, in dæmons, being ministrant and subservient to the Gods, from whom likewise matter and instruments are procured for the advents of the Gods. For as there are many dæmons about Love, thus also about Æsculapius, some are allotted the order of attendants, but others that of forerunners of the God. And another kind exists in human lives, being that which is imparted from theorems and experience, according to which some are adapted in a greater, and others in a less degree to divine medicine. But there is also a mixture of these two kinds of prudence, *viz.* the prophetic and the medicinal, with the Egyptians; because the causes of these are antecedently comprehended in one divinity, and from one fountain many streams are distributed about the world. And thus much has been said in common about the *prudence* which is now mentioned.

In order, however, to unfold each particular more fully, we must say, that *law,* indeed, is the order proceeding from the one intellect of Minerva; but *attention,* the providence pervading from wholes as far as to material natures; *and immediately from the beginning,* the natural aptitude of Minerval souls to prudence. For that which is neither adventitious nor foreign, appears to be signified by these words. But if some

one should refer what is said to the mundane order, because the distribution of things does not proceed from the imperfect to the perfect, but is always arranged and accompanied in its progression with that which is excellent, it appears to me that this is manifested by the words *immediately from the beginning.* The words, however, must be referred to the order of the whole world, because there are invisible causes of the natures that are arranged in the world, which perfect prudence [*i.e.* wisdom] primarily contemplates. For the form of prudence is not, as Porphyry says it is, artificial, or adapted to the arts. For this, as Iamblichus observes, is the gift of Vulcan, but not of Minerva. But *attention was also paid to divination and medicine,* because it is fit, in the first place, to contemplate the other powers of the mundane Gods, and thus afterwards, their prophetic and sanative production; since we are allotted the government of a generated body, and to us who are enclosed in body, futurity is immanifest. For a material life exhibits much of the contingent, and of an *hyparxis* differently moved at different times. But by *such other disciplines as follow from these,* he doubtless means geometry, astronomy, logistic, arithmetic, and the sciences allied to these; all which the law having established, led the Athenians and Saïtans to the possession of an admirable prudence. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Porphyry, however, says, that medicine very properly proceeds from Minerva, because Æsculapius is the lunar intellect, in the same manner as Apollo is the solar intellect. But the divine Iamblichus blames this assertion, as confounding the essences of the Gods, and as not always rightly distributing according to present circumstances the intellects and souls of the mundane Gods. For it must be admitted that Æsculapius exists in the sun, and that he proceeds from that luminary about the generated place; in order that as the heavens, so likewise generation may be connected by this divinity, according to a second participation, and may be filled from it with symmetry, and good temperament.

"According to all this orderly distribution therefore, and co-arrangement, the Goddess first established and adorned your city."

The word *all* manifests the united comprehension in the Goddess of all the natures that are adorned by her, and that neither is any thing pretermitted by her, nor the multitude in her suffered to exist in a divided state. But the word διακοσμησις, indicates the orderly distribution of the Minerval providence. And the word *co-arrangement* signifies the union of these, and their alliance to one world. Farther still, the word διακοσμησις signifies the progression of wholes from the Goddess; but *co-arrangement*, the conversion of them to herself. Since, however, of the natures in the universe, some are total, but others are partial, and some are analogous to monads, but others to numbers, and both participate of the Minerval providence, but primarily such as are total and monadic, — on this account what is at present said, attributes the more ancient and leading order to the Athenians, but that which is secondary and diminished to the Saïtans.

"Choosing for this purpose the place in which you were born; as she foresaw, that from the excellent temperature of the seasons it would produce the most sagacious men."

Prior to this, the Goddess was said to have been *allotted* the Attic region; but it is now said that she *chose* it. Both, however, concur, and neither is the being allotted contrary to her will, nor is her choice disorderly, as is the case with a partial soul. For divine necessity concurs with divine will, choice with allotment, and *to choose* with *to be*

allotted. What this place, however, is, has been before shown by us, *viz.* that it is interval, and that which is truly place. For the divisions of divine allotments, are divisions of these, in order that they may be established with invariable sameness prior to things which subsist according to time. But it must now be added, that the soul of the universe possessing the productive principles of all divine [mundane] natures, and being suspended from the essences prior to herself, inserts in different parts of the interval an alliance to different powers, and certain symbols of the divine orders in the Gods. For this interval is proximately suspended from her, and is an instrument connascent with her. As she is, therefore, a rational and psychical world, she also renders this [sensible] world endued with interval, and vital through divine impressions. Hence the interval itself, though it is said to be continued and immoveable, yet is not entirely without difference with reference to itself; since neither is the soul of the universe perfectly without difference in itself towards itself, but one part [as it were] of it, is the circle of *the same,* and another, the circle of *the different.* And why do I assert this of the soul? for neither is much celebrated intellect without difference in itself, though all things in it are, as it were, of the same colour. For all things do not possess an equal power in intellect, but some are more total, and others more partial. Nor is this wonderful. For the Demiurgus himself contains in himself, first, middle, and last orders. Whence, also, I think Orpheus, indicating the order of his powers, says, "that his head is the refulgent heaven, but his eyes are the sun, and the opposing moon." Though, therefore, this interval should have one essence, unattended with difference, yet the power of soul, and the allotted orders of dæmons, and prior to these, the Gods, dividing it, according to the demiurgic order, and the allotments of justice, demonstrate that there is much difference in the parts of it. Hence it must be admitted, that the choice becomes internal, and from the essence of the Gods, and that it is not such as we see in partial souls. For the former is essential; but the latter is alone defined according to the present life. And the former is eternal, but the latter temporal.

By *place,* therefore, we must not understand the earth or this air, but prior to these, the immoveable interval, which is always illuminated after the same manner by the Gods, and divided by the allotments of justice. For these material natures are at one time adapted, and at another unadapted, to the participation of the Gods. And it is necessary that prior to things which sometimes participate, there should be those which are always suspended after the same manner from the Gods. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars.

With respect, however, to the excellent temperature of the seasons, which is productive of sagacious men, Panætius, and certain other Platonists, understand the words according to their apparent meaning, *viz.* that the Attic region, on account of the excellent temperature of the seasons of the year, is adapted to the production of sagacious men. But Longinus doubts the truth of their assertion. For the contrary is seen to be the case, since about this place, there is a great want of symmetry in dryness from excessive heat, and cold tempestuous weather. Nor if the place was of this kind, would they yet be able to preserve the immortality of souls, if sagacity was implanted in them through the excellent temperature of the seasons. But he says, that this excellent temperature is not to be referred to the condition of the air, but that it is a certain nameless peculiarity of the region contributing to sagacity. For as certain waters are prophetic, and certain places are productive of disease, and are pestilential, thus, also, it is not at all wonderful that a certain peculiarity of country should contribute to prudence and sagacity. Origen, however, refers this excellent temperature to the circulation of the heavens; for from thence the fertility and sterility

of souls are derived, as Socrates says, in the Republic. He, however, apprehends the truth in a more partial manner. But Longinus is ignorant that he makes the peculiarity to be corporeal, and that he is entangled in the doubts which Porphyry proposes to him. For how can one peculiarity of air render men adapted to different pursuits? And in the next place, a similar peculiarity still remaining, how comes it to pass that there is now no longer the same natural excellence in the genius of the inhabitants? But if the peculiarity is corruptible, it must be shown what it is that is corruptive of it. It is however better to say, that the Gods having divided the whole of space conformably to the demiurgic order, each portion of place receives souls adapted to it; that portion indeed which is Martial, receiving souls of a more animated and irascible nature; that which is Apolloniacal, prophetic souls; that which is Æsculapian, medical; and that which is Minerval, prudent and sagacious souls. But this is effected through a certain quality, or rather each portion of place possesses a power of this kind from its allotted divinity; and Plato calls this adaptation, excellence of temperature; since there are many physical, psychical, dæmoniacal, and angelic powers in each portion of place, but each unity of the allotted divinity unites and mingles all these in an unmingled manner. Since however the Seasons are allotted from the Father, the guardianship of these portions of place and allotments, to whose care, as Homer[126] says, "the mighty Heaven and Olympus are committed," and according to which, the co-adaptations of souls similar to places is effected; hence Plato suspends this excellent temperature from the Seasons, the whole of it deriving from thence its subsistence.

The Goddess therefore perceiving that the [Attic] portion of interval which is always guarded by the Seasons, is adapted to the reception of sagacious souls, selected it for this purpose; not that this place was once deprived of Minerva, but at another time was under her allotted guardianship; for the text demonstrates the contrary; but because there are also in the interval itself, different aptitudes to the reception of divine illuminations, according to different parts; which aptitudes were inserted by the whole Demiurgus, who uniformly comprehends the powers of all the Gods posterior to himself. These powers, however, are corroborated and perfected by, or rather proceed from, the presiding Gods. As, therefore, with respect to the elections of lives, the soul that chooses its proper life, acts with rectitude; after the same manner, also, the soul which is arranged in a place conformable to the choice of its life, energizes in a greater degree than the soul which is disseminated in a foreign place. But to this arrangement, the one circulation of the heavens contributes, which introduces a fertility and sterility of souls. In fertile periods, therefore, there is a greater, but in barren periods, a less number of sagacious men. Hence, as when a husbandman chooses good land for the efficacious growth of the seeds knowing that when the season is fertile, he shall reap greater benefit, but when it is barren less, on account of the power of the earth; thus also the text says, that the Goddess chose this place, as productive of sagacious men, in order that when the period is fertile it may have more; and when the period is barren, may have less[127] of prudent and sagacious men, in consequence of falling off from a life adapted to the place. We must not however wonder, if Plato praises the excellent temperature of the visible Seasons. For there is one excellent temperature with reference to the health of bodies, and another contributing to the reception of sagacious souls, such as is that of the Attic region. For though there is not always the same sagacity in those that inhabit the region, yet there is always a certain greater abundance of it through the peculiarity of the place, and the aptitude of the Seasons. Such, therefore, is our opinion respecting these particulars.

The divine Iamblichus, however, does not understand by place, one corporeal-formed condition, but an incorporeal cause pervading through the earth, sustaining

bodies by life, and comprehending all interval. For in a place of this kind, he says the Goddess fashions truly good men, and causes them to inhabit. But whether he accords with the words of Plato, may be surveyed from what has been said. If, however, it be requisite, desisting from these things, to contemplate wholes according to the analogous, it must be said that this Goddess fabricating and weaving the universe in conjunction with her father, every where distributes to wholes, and to things of the better coordination, a more perfect allotment. But these are more replete with wisdom than their opposites, and are more adapted to the Goddess. We shall show, therefore, from the following words of Plato, how that which excels in prudence is of a more Minerval characteristic.

"The Goddess, therefore, being a lover both of war and wisdom, first selected this place for the habitation of men most similar to herself."

In what is here said, Plato delivers to us the most accurate conception respecting this greatest divinity, unfolding to those who are sufficiently able to perceive his meaning, the indications of theologists. Different interpreters however betake themselves to different arrangements of the Goddess; some indeed narrating their opinion more enigmatically, but others more clearly, yet not confirming what they assert. For Porphyry, placing Minerva in the Moon, says that souls descend from thence, which possess at one and the same time irascibility and mildness; and *that on this account, the mystagogues in Eleusis are lovers of wisdom and lovers of war; since it is said that the race of those who are leaders of the mysteries in Eleusis, is derived from Musæus, the offspring of the Moon; and also that the Hermes there subsists about the Moon, from which also the race of Cryers is derived.* The divine Iamblichus, however, blames these assertions, as not well preserving the analogy. For he interprets *war* was that which entirely subverts the whole of a disorderly, confused, and material nature; but *wisdom* as immaterial and separate intelligence. He also says, that this Goddess[128] is the cause of both these; which likewise the Athenians imitate through a prudent and warlike life. He adds, that the Athenian region is well adapted to the reception of suchlike souls.

If, however, it be requisite that the conceptions of these men should become manifest, and prior to these, that what is delivered by Plato should be shown to accord in the highest degree with theologists, we must assert as follows; deriving what we say from a supernal origin. In the Demiurgus and father of the whole world, many orders of Gods that have the form of *the one,* present themselves to the view. And these are of a guardian, or demiurgic, or elevating, or connective, or perfective characteristic. But the undefiled and untamed deity Minerva, is one of the first intellectual unities subsisting in the Demiurgus, according to which he himself remains firm and immutable, and all things proceeding from him participate of inflexible power; and through which, he intellectually perceives every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from all beings. All theologist, therefore, call this divinity Minerva, as being brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in him; being a demiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence.

Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as *theonoe* [θεονοη] or *deific intellection.* But theologists, also, consider her as in conjunction with other divinities sustaining all things in the one Demiurgus, and arranging wholes together with her father. Hence through the first of these, they denominate her philosophic, but through the second philopolemic. For she, who according to the form of the one, connectedly contains all the paternal wisdom, is a *philosopher.* And she who invariably rules over

all contrariety, may be properly called a *lover of war.* Hence Orpheus speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from his head,

With armour shining like a brazen flower.

Since, however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and third orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs, according to the undefiled heptad; but she generates every virtue from herself, and elevating powers; and illuminates secondary natures with intellect, and an undefiled life. Hence she is called *Core Tritogenes.* She likewise appears among the liberated Gods, uniting the lunar order with intellectual and demiurgic light, causing the productions of those divinities to be undefiled, and demonstrating the one unity of them to be unmingled with their depending powers. She also appears in the heavens and the sublunary region; and according to the united gift of herself, imparts the cause both of the philosophic and the philopolemic power. For her inflexibility is intellectual, and her separate wisdom is pure and unmingled with secondary natures; and the one characteristic peculiarity of Minerval providence, extends as far as to the last orders. For since wherever there are partial souls that resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and exhibit an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant choirs[129] of dæmons, divine, mundane, liberated, and ruling orders? For all these receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of this Goddess. Hence also, the divine poet [Homer] indicating both these powers of Minerva, in conjunction with fabulous devices says,

The radiant veil her sacred fingers wove
Floats in rich waves, and spreads the court of Jove.
Her father's warlike robe her limbs invest.[130]

In which verses by the veil which she wove, and to which she gave subsistence by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. But by the warlike robe of Jupiter, we must understand her demiurgic providence, which immutably takes care of mundane natures, and prepares more divine beings always to have dominion in the world. Hence, also, I think Homer represents her as an associate in battle with the Greeks against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates that she was an associate with the Greeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic island; in order that every where more intellectual and divine natures may rule over such as are more irrational and vile. For Mars, also, is a friend to war and contrarieties, but with a separation and division more adapted to the things themselves. Minerva, however, connects contrariety, and illuminates the subjects of her government with union. Hence, likewise, she is said to be philopolemic. For,

Strife, fighting, war, she always loves.

And she is a friend to *war,* indeed, because she is allotted the summit of separation; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are in a certain respect congregated through this goddess, in consequence of better natures having dominion. On this account, likewise, the ancients co-arranged Victory with Minerva.

If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, she is *philosophic* indeed, as being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial wisdom. Hence, also, she is called Metis by the Gods. But she is *philopolemic,* as connecting the contrarieties in wholes, and as an untamed and inflexible deity. On this account, likewise, she preserves Bacchus undefiled, but vanquishes the giants in conjunction with her father. She too alone shakes the ægis, without waiting for the mandate of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin; —

Shook by her arm, the massy javelin bends;
Huge, ponderous, strong! that when her fury burns,
Whole ranks of heroes tames and overturns.[131]

Again, she is *Phosphoros,* as every way extending intellectual light; the *Saviour,* as establishing every partial intellect in the total intellections of her father; *Ergane,* or the artificer, as presiding over demiurgic works. Hence the theologist Orpheus says, that the father produced her,

That she the queen might be of mighty works.

But she is *Calliergos,* or the beautiful fabricator, as connecting by beauty all the works of the father; a *Virgin*, as exerting an undefiled and unmingled purity; and *Aigiochos,* or ægis-bearing, as moving the whole of fate, and being the leader of its productions. We should, also, discuss the remaining appellations of the Goddess, if, what we have already said might not appear to be prolix through my sympathy with the discussion. Again, therefore, recurring to the thing proposed we must say, that Plato calls both these divinities, Love and Minerva philosophers, not for the same reason; but he thus denominates the former, as being the middle of wholes, and as leading to intelligible wisdom; and the latter as the summit of wholes, and as the union of demiurgic wisdom. For the Demiurgus is "Metis the first generator and much-pleasing Love." And as Metis, indeed, he brings forth Minerva; but as Love, he generates the amatory series.

"The ancient Athenians, therefore, using these laws, and being formed by good institutions in a still greater degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes those to do, who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods."

We learn from history that the affairs of the Athenians are more ancient than those of the Saïtans; that the establishment of their city is prior; and that their laws are more proximate to Minerva. But in the mundane paradigms, also, wholes are prior to parts; and there is an order in them which is more divine, a power which is greater, and a form of virtue which is truly Minerval. For the genus of virtue is adapted to this greatest divinity, as being virtue herself. For abiding in the Demiurgus, she is wisdom and immutable intelligence, and in the ruling [or supermundane] Gods, she unfolds the power of virtue.

By virtue's worthy name she's called,

says Orpheus. It is evident, however, that things which are more divine in the universe, may be called the progeny and pupils of the Gods. For they derive their subsistence and are perfected, or rather they are always perfect, through the fabrication of the Gods, and the undefiled production of Minerva. Every thing, therefore, which is suspended and originates from the Gods, and is converted to them, exhibits transcendent virtue. But this, also, is in wholes; since it must be admitted that there is divine virtue in the universe. And it is likewise in human lives, according to a similitude to wholes. Hence what is now said is applied to the Athenians. But making the life of the Athenians to be one and continued, it conjoins Solon to the ancient inhabitants of Athens. For it says, they "inhabited this region." For the paradigm of them is one, "and in continuity with itself;" since the whole of the Minerval series being one, extends as far as to the last of things, and originates supernally from the supermundane orders.

"Many and mighty deeds, therefore, of your city are recorded in our temples, and are the subject of admiration; yet there is one which surpasses all of them in magnitude and virtue."

The priest having promised summarily to relate the laws and deeds of the Athenians, he delivered, indeed, their laws according to a division of genera; and it, therefore, remained for him to celebrate their deeds, through which an encomium is passed on the city, and the tutelar Goddess is praised. Since, however, of deeds there is a number, and there is also one unity comprehensive of them, according to which the whole form of the polity is exhibited, he announces that he shall narrate the greatest deed, and which surpasses all the rest in virtue; this deed not being one of the many, but one prior to the many. For such a method of narration subsists appropriately with reference to the universe, in which wholes accomplish, and connectedly contain one life, and collect many contrarieties into one union with the Goddess. Hence, as there were many and great deeds of the city, the priest very properly relates one deed which was recorded in the temples. For there is, also, an intellectual paradigm of it, so far as it is surveyed in the world, and which transcends in magnitude and virtue; transcendency according to *magnitude* presenting to our view that which is *total,* but according to *virtue* that which is *intellectual.* For wholes and the more divine of mundane natures have many energies of the greatest magnitude,[132] and accomplish one life and polity, conformably to which fighting under Minerva, they vanquish all subordinate beings. After this manner, therefore, we must explain what is said. Porphyry, however, by great and admirable deeds, understands such as are accomplished by souls against matter, and material modes. But he calls dæmons *material modes.* For, according to him, there are two species of dæmons, of which the one consists of souls, but the other of *modes*: and these are material powers, which are noxious to the soul. For these dogmas, however, he is corrected by the interpreter that came after him.[133]

"For these writings relate, what a mighty power your city once tamed, which rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia."

Plato in what is here said, neither omits any thing of encomiastic augment, if the war of the Athenians against the Atlantics is considered as a mere history; nor falls in theological accuracy in conjunction with caution, if any one is willing to pass from partial natures to wholes, and to proceed from images to paradigms. As it is usual, therefore, in Panathenaic orations to celebrate most amply the Persian expedition, and the victories of the Athenians both by land and sea, with which more recent orators fill their orations; Plato in praising the Athenians, neither delivers the Persian invasion nor any other similar deed, but introducing the Atlantic war against the parts inhabited by us, and which rushed from the external sea with a force capable of entirely destroying these parts, he informs us that the Athenians were victorious, and that they subdued this mighty power. Since, however, the Persian expedition came from the east against the Greeks, and particularly against the Athenians, Plato introduces the Atlantic war from the west, in order that you may survey the city of the Athenians as from a centre, castigating a Barbaric multitude pouring against it on each side in a disorderly manner. To which may be added, that in the institutes delivered by the ancestors of the Athenians, and also in the mysteries, the Gigantic war is celebrated, and the victory of Minerva over the Giants, because in conjunction with her father she vanquished these and the Titans. Plato, however, does not think it safe immediately to

introduce war against the Gods; for this is the very thing which he blames in the ancient poets; and it would be absurd that Critias or Timæus, who were auditors of what Socrates said against the poets on the preceding day, should again ascribe wars and seditions to the Gods. But through the analogy of human to divine concerns, he delivers this Atlantic war prior to the fabrication of the world, assuming the Athenians instead of Minerva and the Olympian Gods, and the Atlantics instead of the Titans and Giants. For it is possible to survey the same things in images as in wholes. And that I may remind you of the analogy, through the name of the Athenians, he refers his readers to the Olympian coordination which fought under the command of Minerva; but through that of the Atlantics, to the Titanic Gods. For the mighty Atlas was one of the Titans. *Theologists also after the laceration of Bacchus which manifests the divisible progression into the universe under Jupiter from the impartible fabrication,* say that the other Titans had different allotments, but that Atlas was established in the *western* parts, sustaining the heavens.

By strong necessity the widespread heav'n
In earth's extremes, by Atlas was sustain'd.

Farther still, the victories of Minerva are celebrated by the Athenians, and there is a festival sacred to the Goddess, in consequence of her having vanquished Neptune, and from the genesiurgic being subdued by the intellectual order, and those that inhabit this region betaking themselves to a life according to intellect, after the procurement of necessaries. *For Neptune presides over generation; but Minerva is the inspective guardian of an intellectual life.* The things proposed therefore will contribute in the greatest degree to these analogies. For the Athenians bearing the name of the Goddess, are analogous to her; and the Atlantics through inhabiting an island, and through being called the progeny of Neptune, preserve an analogy to this God; so that it is evident from these things that *the Atlantic war indicates the middle fabrication,* according to which the second father [Neptune] being filled by Minerva, and the other invisible causes, governs diviner natures in a more powerful manner, and subjects all such things as have a multiplied, divisible, and more material hypostasis, to intellectual natures. For the Gods themselves, indeed, are eternally united; but the beings which are governed by them, are filled with this kind of division. After this manner, therefore, these things must be separately understood.

In order however that we may pre-assume certain definite forms[134] of the proposed analysis, it must be admitted, that the habitations within the pillars of Hercules, are analogous to the whole of the more excellent, but those external to them, to the whole of the inferior coordination, and that of this, there is one continued, and variously proceeding life. Whether, therefore, beginning from the Gods, you speak of the Olympian and Titanic divinities; or beginning from intellect, of permanency and motion, or sameness and difference; or from souls, you speak of the rational and irrational; or from bodies, of heaven and generation; or in whatever other way you may divide essences, according to all divisions, all the genus of those within the pillars of Hercules will be analogous to the better, but of those without to the less excellent coordination of things. For the true sea of dissimilitude, and the whole of a material life which proceeds into interval and multitude from *the one,* are there. Hence, whether you are willing Orphically to arrange the Olympian and Titanic genera in opposition to each other, and to celebrate the former as subduing the latter; or Pythagorically, to perceive the two co-ordinations proceeding from on high, as far as to the last of things, and the better adorning the subordinate rank; or Platonically, to

survey much of infinity and much of bound in the universe, as we learn in the Philebus, and the whole of infinity in conjunction with the measures of bound, producing generation, which extends through all mundane natures, — from all these, you may assume one thing that the whole composition of the world is co-harmonized from this contrariety. And if the illustrious Heraclitus looking to this said, *that war is the father of all things,* he did not speak absurdly.

Porphyry, therefore, here refers the theory to dæmons and souls, and makes mention of the fabulous Titanic war, adducing some things to what is proposed to be considered, with probability, but others, without it. The divine Iamblichus however, against those who adopt a more partial assignation of the cause of the analysis, is of opinion after a certain wonderful manner, that what is said is only to be understood according to the apparent meaning, though in the preface he himself delivers to us auxiliaries for the solution of suchlike narrations. May that divine man however, who has instructed us in many other particulars, and also in these, be propitious to us. Betaking ourselves, therefore, to the interpretation of the words of Plato, we think it fit to remind ourselves, of the before-mentioned forms of analysis; and that we must arrange the Atlantics according to all the total natures of the inferior coordination. For in these, also, some things are wholes, but others parts. But we must arrange their *insolent injustice,* according to progression, a division through diminution, and a proximity to matter. For matter is truly infinity and baseness. Hence through nearness to and being in a certain respect in it, they are said to have acted injuriously from insolence. For the paradigm of them is manifested by the theologist, through these names, when he says of them, "that their mind is replete with evil counsels, and their heart is insolent." And we must arrange *the rushing from external parts* according to a defection and separation remote from the Gods, and things of a diviner nature in the universe. For the external does not indicate comprehension of powers, but an hypostasis departing from every thing stable, immaterial, pure, and united. But the Atlantic sea must be arranged according to matter itself, whether you call it the abyss, or the sea of dissimilitude, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. For matter receives the appellations of the inferior coordination, being called infinity and darkness, irrationality and immoderation, the principle of diversity and the duad; just as from the Atlantic sea, the Atlantic island is denominated. For thus receiving the analogies in order, we shall understand that the whole of the inferior coordination, and the more total and partial genera in it, are characterised by progression and division, and a conversion to matter, and that thus it proceeds through all things, presenting itself to the view appropriately in each, and appearing analogously in each nature, *viz.* the divine and intellectual, the psychical and corporeal. Being however such, it is adorned and arranged by the better order, which you may properly say is Minerval, as being undefiled, and subduing through its power things of a subordinate; nature. But the inferior coordination becoming adorned, ceases from its abundant division and infinity; the genus of the Titans being connected by the Olympian Gods; but difference being united by sameness, motion by permanency, irrational by rational souls, generation by the heavens, and in a similar manner in all things. It must not however be supposed from this, that twofold divided principles of things are to be admitted. For we say that these two co-ordinations are of a kindred nature. But *the one* precedes all contrariety, as the Pythagoreans also say. Since, however, after the one cause of all, a duad of principles is unfolded into light, and in these the monad is more excellent than the duad, or, if you wish to speak Orphically, æther than chaos, the divisions are accomplished after this manner in the Gods prior to the world, and also in the mundane Gods, as far as to the extremity of

things. For among the supermundane Gods the demiurgic and connective orders are under the monad, but the vivific and the generative orders are under the duad. But among the mundane Gods the Olympian genus is under the monad, but the Titanic under the duad. And sameness, permanency, reason and form, are under the more ancient, but difference, motion, irrationality, and matter, are under the other of these principles. For as far as to these the diminution of the two principles proceeds. Since however *the one* is beyond the first duad, things which appear to be contraries are collected together, and are co-arranged with a view to one orderly distribution of things. For in the universe there are these twofold genera of Gods, the oppositely divided genera of being, the various genera of souls, and the contrary genera of bodies. But the subordinate are vanquished by the more divine, and the world is rendered one, being harmonised from contra contraries, since it subsists according to Philolaus from things that bound, and from things that are infinite. And according to the infinite, indeed, which it contains, it derives its subsistence from the indefinite duad, or the nature of the infinite; but according to the things that bound, from the intelligible monad, or the nature of bound. And according to a subsistence from all these, it becomes one whole and all-perfect form from *the one.* For it is God, as Socrates says in the Philebus, who gives subsistence to that which is mixed.

"For at that time the Atlantic sea was navigable, and had an island before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this island was greater than both Libya and Asia together, and afforded an easy passage to other neighbouring islands; as it was likewise easy to pass from those islands to all the opposite continent which surrounded that true sea."

That such and so great an island once existed, is evident from what is said by certain historians respecting what pertains to the external sea. For according to them, there were seven islands in that sea, in their times, sacred to Proserpine, and also three others of an immense extent, one of which was sacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and the middle [or second] of these to Neptune, the magnitude of which was a thousand stadia. They also add, that the inhabitants of it preserved the remembrance from their ancestors, of the Atlantic island which existed there, and was truly prodigiously great; which for many periods had dominion over all the islands in the Atlantic sea, and was itself likewise sacred to Neptune. *These things, therefore, Marcellus writes in his Ethiopic History.* If however this be the case, and such an island once existed, it is possible to receive what is said about it as a history, and also as an image of a certain nature among wholes. Unfolding likewise the similitude of this, we may gradually accustom those who survey things of this kind, to the whole theory of mundane natures. For it is possible to behold the same analogies in a more partial, and in a more comprehensive way. But it is necessary that doctrine proceeding from universals to the subtle elaboration of particulars, should thus give respite to theory. You must not therefore wonder, if before we assumed this analogy more generally, but now after another manner, and that we explore the same thing with an accuracy adapted to the things themselves. For since, as we have said, there is a twofold coordination in the universe, which originates from the Gods, and is terminated in matter and material form; and since each possesses things more total, and things more partial, [for this we have before said]; but other things are the middles of both these co-ordinations; for the divine genera are comprehensive of all things, and the last elements are the vilest of all things; and the intellectual and psychical genera subsist between these; — this being the case, we think fit in the first

place to divide in a threefold manner the inferior coordination, and to assume in it some things as most total genera, others as middle, and others as last genera. And to some things, we shall arrange the Atlantics as analogous, to others the other islands, and to others all the opposite continent. But we shall consider the deep, and the Atlantic sea, as analogous to matter. For all the inferior coordination is material, and proceeds into multitude and division. But it also has, with respect to itself, transcendency and deficiency. Hence Plato says that the Atlantics spread themselves externally, as being more remote from *the one* and nearer to matter; but C that they inhabited an island larger than both Libya and Asia, as proceeding into bulk and interval. For all things that are remote from *the one* are diminished according to power, but transcend according to quantity; just as such as are nearer to *the one,* are contracted[135] in quantity, but possess an admirable power. Here, therefore, magnitude is significant of diminution, and of progression and extension to every thing. But the sea was then navigable, since more total natures proceed as far as to the last of things, and adorn matter, but having arrived at the end of the order, they stop, and that which remains beyond it is infinite. For that which in no respect has a subsistence is successive to the boundaries of being. But the addition of *those,* has an indication that total causes proceed without impediment through matter, and adorn it, but that we do not always subdue it, but are merged in an infinite and indefinite nature. Since however the progression of things is continued, and no vacuum[136] any where intervenes, but a well-ordered diminution is surveyed from more total to middle natures, which comprehend and are comprehended; and from middles to the last and vilest natures, — on this account he says, there was a passage from the Atlantic island to the other islands, and from these to the opposite continent. And that the Atlantic was one, but the other islands many, and the continent was the greatest. For the monad is adapted to the first genus in every thing; but number and multitude to the second. For multitude subsists together with the duad. And magnitude is adapted to the third genus, on account of the progression of magnitude to the triad. Since, however, the extremities of the worse co-ordination are most material, he manifests through the term *opposite,* that they are at the greatest possible distance from more excellent natures. And he does not alone use the term *external,* as he does of the Atlantics, and which evinces that they belong to the other part, but he also adds the word *opposite,* that he may indicate the most extreme diminution. But he signifies by the words *about that true sea,* the hypostasis of them about matter. and the last of mundane natures. For the true sea is analogous to that which is truly false, and truly matter, which in the *Politicus* he calls the sea of dissimilitude. Moreover, because it is necessary that these twofold co-ordinations should be separated from each other without confusion, and guarded by demiurgic boundaries, on this account he says, that the Pillars of Hercules separated the internal from the external habitable part. *For he denominates flourishing demiurgic production, and the divine separation of genera in the universe, the latter of which always remains stably and strenuously the same, the Pillars of Hercules.* This Hercules therefore is Jovian; but the one prior to this, and who is divine, is allotted the guardian order of the generative series. Hence from both, the demiurgic division, which guards these two separate parts of the universe, must be assumed.

"For the waters which are beheld within the mouth we have just now mentioned, have the form of a port with a narrow entrance; but the mouth itself is a true sea. And the land which surrounds it may be in every respect truly denominated the continent."

The water within the mouth indicate the genera of the better co-ordination, as being converted to themselves, and rejoicing in a stable and uniting power. For the *mouth* symbolically manifests the cause which defines and separates the two portions of mundane natures. But the port with a narrow entrance, signifies the convolved, self-converging, arranged, and immaterial *hyparxis* of these mundane portions. For through *the narrow entrance* it is signified that interval and extension proceed from the worse co-ordination. But through *the port* an *hyparxis* is indicated, exempt from the confused and disorderly motion of material natures. For such are ports affording a protection from the tumults in the sea. If, however, some one should say, that an elevation to the more intellectual and divine natures in the universe becomes a port to souls, he will not be far from the truth.

"In this Atlantic island there was a combination of kings, who with great and admirable power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent; and besides this subjected to their dominion all Libya as far as to Egypt, and Europe as far as to the Tyrrhene sea." {25a-25b}

In what is here said it is requisite to recollect the Platonic hypotheses about the earth, that Plato does not measure the magnitude of it conformably to mathematicians; but apprehends the interval of it to be greater than they admit it to be, as Socrates says in the Phædo; and that he supposes there are many habitable parts similar to the part which we inhabit. Hence he relates that there is an island and a continent of so great a magnitude in the external sea. For in short, if the earth is naturally spherical, it is necessary that it should be so according to the greater part of it. That portion of it, however, which is inhabited by us, exhibits great inequality by its cavities and prominencies. Hence there is elsewhere an expanded plane of the earth, and an interval extended on high. For, according to Heraclitus, he who passes through a region very difficult of access, will arrive at the Atlantic mountain, the magnitude of which is said to be so great by the Ethiopic historians, that it reaches to the æther, and sends forth a shadow as far as to five thousand stadia. For the sun is concealed by it from the ninth hour of the day till it entirely sets. Nor is this at all wonderful. For Athos, a Macedonian mountain, emits a shadow as far as to Lemnos, which is distant from it seven hundred stadia. And Marcellus, who wrote the Ethiopic history, not only relates that the Atlantic mountain was of such a great height, but Ptolemy also says that the Lunar mountains are immensely high, and Aristotle informs us that Caucasus is illuminated by the solar rays during the third part of the night after the setting, and also for the third part before the rising, of the sun. And he who looks to the whole magnitude of the earth, bounded by its elevated parts, will infer that it is truly immense, according to the assertion of Plato. So that we are not now in want of certain mathematical methods to the development of what is said about the earth, nor do we attempt to recur to them. *For these methods measure the earth according to the surface which is inhabited by us; but Plato says that we dwell in a cavity, and that the whole earth is elevated, which also the sacred rumour of the Egyptians asserts.* And thus much concerning what is related of the magnitude of the Atlantic island, in order to show that it is not proper to disbelieve what is said by Plato, though it should be received as a mere history. But with respect to the power of this island, that there were ten kings in it who begat five male twins, and that it ruled over the other islands, certain parts of the continent, and some parts within the Pillars of Hercules, — all these particulars are clearly related in the Critias.

Now however, for it is proposed to make an analysis of the particulars, the power is said to be great and admirable, according to a reference to the universe, because it proceeds to every thing, and comprehends totally the whole of the second coordination. For it is held together by ten kings, because the decad comprehends the rulers of the two co-ordinations; since the Pythagoreans also say, that all opposites are comprehended in the decad. But they were twins, so that there are five duads, twins being five times begotten from Neptune and Clites; because according to the measures of justice, there is likewise an orderly distribution of this coordination, of which the pentad is an image. The progression of it however is through the duad, just as that of the better co-ordination is through the monad. Moreover, all of them are the descendants of Neptune, because all the connexion of contraries, and the mundane war, belong to the middle fabrication. For as this God presides over the contrariety which every where exists, he likewise rules over generation and corruption, and all-various motion. But these kings subdued the Atlantic island as comprehending all the first and most total genera of the worse co-ordination. And they subdued the other islands, as likewise comprehending middles through the wholeness of them. But they also vanquished parts of the continent, as adorning as much as possible the last of things. And they had dominion over certain parts of the internal habitable region, *because the last parts of the better are subservient to the first parts of the worse coordination. Nor is this at all wonderful; since certain dæmons are in subjection to certain heroes, and partial souls which belong to the intelligible portion of things are frequently slaves to fate.* Such also is the Titanic order with the Gods to which Atlas belongs. And the first of these ten kings was called Atlas, and as it is said in the *Atlanticus* gave the name to the island. The summits, therefore, of the second co-ordination, are adorned indeed by the Olympian Gods, of whom Minerva is the leader; but they subdue the whole of the essence which is subordinate to the Gods, but terminates in the worse coordination; such as the essence of irrational souls, of material masses, and of matter itself. Plato also appears to have called the power of the Atlantics great and admirable, because Thaumas and Bias are said by ancient theologists to have belonged to this order. Perhaps too, he so denominated it, because the whole of the second co-ordination is the progeny of infinity, which we say is the first [power[137]], just as the better co-ordinations the offspring of bound. On this account he celebrates the *power* of the Atlantics, just as he does the *virtue* of the Athenians, which belongs to[138] bound: for it is the measure of those that possess it. After this manner therefore, I think we may be able to make the analysis according to the Pythagorean principles.

The words of Plato likewise, have a great augment, in order to exhibit the work of the victors in a greater and more splendid point of view. For he says δυναμιν τε, through the union of the particle τε augmenting δυναμιν *power.* And he also adds, *great,* and *admirable.* But each of these is different from the other. For power may be great though it is nothing else, but it is said to be admirable from other things. And by how much the more admirable that is which is vanquished, by so much[139] greater is the victor demonstrated to be. Besides this also, indicating through divisions the multitude subdued by this power, he evinces that it is multitudinous and transcendent.

> "But then all this power being collected into one, endeavoured to enslave our region and yours, and likewise every place situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sea."

Plato does not say that there was once sedition among divine natures, or that subordinate subdued more excellent beings. But let these things indeed be true in

human affairs: the present narration however, indicates, that the most total of the genera in the second coordination of things in the universe proceed through all things. For there are both in the heavens and every where, a separating and uniting power, and nothing is destitute of these. In more excellent natures however, these powers do not subsist with division, nor multitudinously, but collected into one, and with one impulse; but this is, unitedly, and according to one and a continued life. For as in the worse coordination *the one* is multiplied, thus also in the better, multitude is united. Hence multitude is every where, and is vanquished through union. Of these things the Atlantics wishing to subdue every place within the mouth of the Atlantic sea, all their powers being collected into one, but at the same time being vanquished by the Athenians, are an image. For multitude and separation, though they may be surveyed in the better coordination, yet they will be seen to subsist there unitedly; multitude not being there victorious, but sameness, and in short, the better genera.

"Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength."

Plato opposes to the power of the Atlantics, the power of the Athenians; preferring this appellation, as being adapted to the middle fabrication. And he celebrates the more excellent power for its virtue and strength; in order that through *virtue,* he may indicate its alliance to the philosophic nature of Minerva; (for another theology,[140] and not the Orphic only, calls her virtue,) but through *strength* its alliance to her philopolemic nature. But he calls the power *conspicuous,* because it is mundane, and contributes to the fabrication of sensibles: and to the Atlantics indeed, he alone attributes power, and this continually, because they are arranged under infinity. But he says that the Athenians vanquished this power, through virtue. For as they belong to the co-ordination of bound; they are characterized by virtue, which measure: the passions, and uses powers in a becoming manner.

"For as its armies surpassed all others, both in magnanimity and military arts, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, and thus was in extreme danger, yet still it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those who were not yet enslaved, it liberated from danger; and procured to most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules."

As we have triply divided the inferior coordination, into first, middle, and last boundaries, thus also we must divide the superior, into the most total, and the most partial genera, and those that subsist between these. And having made this division, we shall arrange the Athenians as analogous to the first genera; but the other Greeks who were not enslaved, to the middle; and those who were now slaves, to the last genera. For according to this arrangement, those that belong to the Minerval series, vanquish those that belong to the series of Neptune, those that rank as first, subduing those that rank as second,[141] the monadic, the dyadic, and in short, the better vanquishing the worse. But the middle genera eternally preserve their own order, and are not vanquished by the worse co-ordination, on account of the union of themselves, and the stable genus of power. They likewise liberate from slavery those that are enslaved, recalling them to union and permanency. For some things indeed, are always in matter, others are always separated from it, and others, sometimes become situated under the material genera, and sometimes have an arrangement in a separate

life. Just as in the drama pertaining to us; at one time we are arranged under the Titanic, and at another, under the Olympian order; and at one time our course terminates in generation, but at another, in the heavens. This however happens to partial souls, through the invariably permanent providence of the Gods, which leads back souls to their pristine felicity. For as in consequence of there being genesiurgic Gods, souls descend, in subserviency to their will, thus also, through the prior subsistence of anagogic causes, the ascent of our souls from the realms of generation is effected. And thus much concerning the whole meaning of the words before us. Let us however, concisely discuss each particular.

The words therefore, *surpassed all others,* manifest the total comprehension of the first genera of the more divine part. But the words *in magnanimity, and military arts,* have the same meaning as Minervally. For through *magnanimity,* they imitate the philosophic characteristic of the Goddess, but through *warlike arts,* her philopolemic characteristic. And the words, *whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies,* signify that first and total causes, produce some things in conjunction with second and middle causes, but others by themselves, beyond the production of these, and being alone in their energy. For the genus of the Gods, and that which is posterior to the Gods, do not produce equally, but the effective power of the Gods proceeds to a greater extent; since every where more divine causes energize prior to, together with, and posterior to their effects. Credibility therefore of this may be multifariously produced. But *the extreme danger* manifests the last production of the first genera. And the *trophies* signify that the second co-ordination is perfected under the first, being adorned by it; that it is in a certain respect *converted* by the power of it; and that there are in the last of things invariably permanent indications of the conversion of less excellent natures, proceeding from the first of things. For whatever is arranged in the worse co-ordination, and invested with form, material causes receding, affords a sufficient indication of the inspective care[142] of the better order, which is especially the peculiarity of trophies. But *the most ample liberty,* is an indication of the divine and *liberated* order, proceeding from on high to all things; which liberty the Athenians imparted to the Greeks, by vanquishing the Atlantics; or rather the Olympic, by subduing the Titanic genera. For thus the demiurgic will is accomplished, and the worse is vanquished by the better co-ordination; in partial natures indeed the Atlantics by the Athenians, but in wholes, the Titan by the Olympic Gods. “Though they are robust, and oppose the better order, through pernicious pride, and insolent improbity,” says the theologist; whom Plato emulating, asserts that the Atlantics *insolently* proceeded against the Athenians.

> “But in succeeding times prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking place, and bringing with them desolation, in the space of one dreadful day and night, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. *And hence that sea is at present innavigable, from the impeding mud which the subsiding island produced*.”[143]

That what is here said has a physical deduction, is evident to those who are not entirely ignorant of the physical theory. For it is not wonderful that there should have been an earthquake so great, as to have destroyed such a large island; since an earthquake that happened a little before our time, shook both Egypt and Bithynia, and it is not at all paradoxical, that a deluge should follow an earthquake. For this usually

happens in great earthquakes, as Aristotle relates, who at the same time adds the cause. For where a deluge takes place together with earthquakes, the waves are the cause of this passion. For when the spirit which produces the earthquake, does not yet flow towards the earth, and is not able to drive backward the sea which is impelled by a certain contrary spirit, urging it in a contrary direction, through the wind which propels it, but nevertheless stops the sea by hindering its progression, it is the cause of much sea which is impelled by the spirit contrary to this, becoming collected together. Then however, the sea thus collected flowing most abundantly, the spirit impelling it in a contrary direction, enters under the earth and produces an earthquake. But the sea deluges the place. For after this manner also about Achaia, there was an earthquake accompanied with an ingress of the waves of the sea, which deluged the maritime cities, Bouras and Helice; so that neither will any physiologist reject this narration, who considers the affair rightly. Moreover, that the same place may become pervious and impervious, continent and sea, is among the things admitted by physiologists, according to Aristotle, and which history demonstrates. Aristotle also relates, [in his *Meteors,*] that there was mud in the external sea, after the mouth of it, and that the place there was marshy; so that if το πηλου καρτα βραχεος signifies *marshy,* it is not wonderful. For even now rocks concealed under the sea, and having water on their surface, are called *breakers.* Why therefore should any one contending for the truth of these things be disturbed?

That these particulars however, have reference to the admirable and orderly distribution of the universe, we shall be convinced by recollecting what is said by Orpheus about the hurling into Tartarus, near the end of the fabrication of things. For he delivering the demiurgic opposition between the Olympian and Titanic Gods,[144] terminates the whole orderly distribution in the extremities of the universe, and imparts to these also the undefiled providence of the Gods. Plato, therefore, knowing this, and delivering to us wholes in images, extends and leads into the invisible, these twofold genera, and through this *disappearing,* imitates the Orphic precipitation into Tartarus. For in order that the last of things may be adorned, and participate of divine providence, it is requisite that both the superior and inferior coordination, should extend their production from on high as far as to the mundane extremity. Each however, effects this in a manner adapted to itself; the one being shaken, and entering under the earth, which is the same as proceeding stably and solidly; but the other disappearing, which is the same as becoming material, disorderly, and formless; *under the earth,* being a symbol of the firm and the stable; but *in the sea,* of that which is very mutable, disorderly and flowing. For in the last of things, permanency and generation are from the better; but corruption, mutation, and disorderly motion are from the worse coordination. Since however these things are adorned, both the invisible and visible fabrication receiving their completion, on this account Plato says, they happened in one dreadful day and night, *night* indicating the invisible causes, but *day* the visible, and the *dreadfulness,* signifying opposing power, the inflexible, and that which proceeds through all things. But because all these are accomplished according to demiurgic powers, earthquakes and deluges took place, which are adapted to the middle fabrication. For if he wished to signify Jovian powers or energies, he would have said, thunders and lightnings happened. But since he delivers Neptunian demiurgic energies, he assimilates them to earthquakes or deluges. For it is usual to call this God *earth-shaker,* and *the source of marine water* (κυανοχετην). And because time signifies a progression in order, and a well-arranged diminution, he says that all these events took place *in succeeding time.* It is not therefore proper to say, that he who destroys an argument, takes away also the subjects, as Homer says of

the Phæaceans, and of the wall which the Greeks raised; since the things which are now asserted are not fictitious, but true. For many parts of the earth are deluged by the sea; and what he says happened is not at all impossible. Nor again, does he relate it as a mere history; but he introduces it for the purpose of indicating the providence which proceeds through all things, and extends even to the last of things.

In short, it is necessary to assert, since the whole orderly distribution of things receives its completion from the visible and invisible fabrication, that for the purpose of giving perfection to the demiurgic productions of the second father, the gifts both of the better and the worse co-ordination, proceed as far as to the last of beings; the former vanquishing the subjects [of its power] through *the warlike genus,* and illuminating a stable[145] power, through *entering under the earth,* [*i.e.* through proceeding firmly and solidly;] but the latter producing ultimate division, and connecting the most material and indefinite motion of Tartarus. But these things being adorned, it reasonably follows that what remains is an impervious[146] and uninvestigable place of the sea. For there is no other passage and progression of the adorning genera of the universe, but this is that which is truly mud; and which is mentioned by Socrates in the Phædo, when he is teaching us concerning the subterranean places. For the place under the earth obscurely retains the forms of corporeity, which it possesses through the inferior coordination subsiding, and proceeding to the end of the orderly distribution of things. For the Titanic order being driven by Jupiter as far as to Tartarus, fills what is there contained with deiform guards.

"And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon. But when yesterday you were speaking about a polity and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history. For I perceived how divinely from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon." {25d-25e}

That the war of the Atlantics and Athenians contributes to [the theory of] the whole fabrication of the world, and that the mundane contrariety is connected by the middle fabrication proceeding from on high, from the first to the last of things, the Minerval series adorning all things stably, and in a ruling and victorious manner, expanding indeed the natures which are adorning all things stably, and in a ruling and victorious manner, expanding indeed the natures which are detained in matter, but preserving those undefiled that are separated[147] from matter; and also, that the other fabrication imparts appropriately,[148] motion, division, and difference, to the things fabricated, and proceeds supernally to the end; — all this has been sufficiently shown and recalled to the memory by us, in what we have before said. Since however, he by whom this narration is made, is analogous to the God who connects this contrariety, he, in a certain respect imitates him. And through a recurrence to the fathers of the narration, through what was heard by Critias and Solon, he ascends to the Egyptians; conformably to what pre-exists in the paradigm, which is filled from first causes, and fills things posterior to itself, with demiurgic power. Farther still, since he brings with him an image of the second, which proceeds from another fabrication, hence he says, that he recollected the history through the discourse of Socrates. For the recollection itself, is not a transition from images to paradigms, but from universal conceptions to more partial actions. Hence, also it is adapted to the progression of the whole fabrication of things. For since all things are in intelligibles, every demiurgic cause distributes total productions according to its proper order.

Again, if you consider what is said after another manner, you will find that the Athenians are praised in an admirable manner, and that the polity of Socrates is fitly celebrated. *For that it is possible for this polity to exist, is demonstrated through the life of the* [*ancient*] *Athenians, and also that it is productive of the greatest good to those who belong to it;* which also Socrates thinks fit to demonstrate in his Republic. But he is likewise of opinion that those who live according to the best form of polity, should be shown to deserve the greatest admiration. For those who are fashioned according to the first paradigm are truly admirable; since of mundane natures also, the more divine which transcendently receive the whole form of their paradigms, are said to be, and are monadic; but material natures which have the same form in many subjects, possess the last order. This therefore, which in the fabrication of things, belongs to the Gods, *viz.* to partake transcendently of their proper paradigm, the city of the Athenians also exhibits, by applying itself in the most excellent manner to the best measure of life.

Moreover, the circle of benefits, imitates the mundane[149] circle. For the Egyptians are benefited by the Athenians, through warlike works; and the Athenians are benefited by the Egyptians through sacerdotal narrations. For the communication of an unwritten action, was a return of favour. But in addition to this, the doctrinal narration of the deeds of their ancestors, exhibits a multiplied retribution. The mention also of fortune and divinity, and the excitation of our reasoning powers, are worthy of the theory of Plato. *For fortune and her gifts are not without a scope, or indefinite; but she is a power collective of many dispersed causes adorning things that are without arrangement, and giving completion to what is allotted to each individual from the universe.* Why then did Socrates collect many things which agree with the narration of Solon? I answer, on account of the cause which collects many dispersed causes, and on account of the one divinity[150] who connects the common intellect of Socrates and Solon. For, being of a Minerval characteristic, they are excited as it were from one fountain, their tutelar Goddess, to similar conceptions.

"Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as, from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remembrance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. I consider it therefore necessary, that I should first diligently revolve the whole in my mind."

These things may also be surveyed in the universe; *viz.* that the demiurgic cause of beings which are generated according to time, gives subsistence to his own progeny prior to that of partial natures.[151] And that the hypostatic cause of things generated, first[152] intellectually perceiving himself, and seeing in himself the causes of his productions, thus gives also to other things a progression from himself; in order that he, being sufficient and perfect, may impart his own power to secondary natures. *Conception* therefore and *resumption,* and every thing of this kind, manifest the comprehension of demiurgic productive principles in one.

"And on this account, I yesterday immediately complied with your demands; for I perceived that we should not want the ability of presenting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Hermocrates has informed you, as soon as we departed from hence, by communicating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair." {26a-26b}

Why did Critias *nearly* remember? For he promised to accomplish what was enjoined him. Because he did not *accurately* remember. But he first revolved the affair in his mind, conceiving that in mandates of this kind, such as that in which Socrates wished to see his polity in motion, the greatest undertaking is to find an hypothesis from which it is possible to give what is adapted to the mandates. And this Critias accomplishes, by receiving from history the war of the Atlantics and Athenians, as a thing capable of exhibiting a life productive of the best polity. He also revolved this narration by night, in order that he might impart it to his associates without error.

Again therefore, from these things, let us betake ourselves to wholes. For there the demiurgic cause being filled from an invisible cause (since all intellectual causes are there primarily, to which he is united[153] according to the highest transcendency), produces the power of himself into the visible world, conformably to their will and judgement. Farther still, not to give the narration immediately, but afterwards, is a symbol of the preparatory apparatus of nature, from which perfection is produced in physical effects. You may also consider the caution of Critias ethically. For it is not proper to attempt things of such a magnitude rashly, without first revolving the whole undertaking by ourselves, in order that we may bring them forth as from a treasury through speech, which is truly the messenger of internal reasons. Moreover, the repeating the narration to himself, imitates the conversion of demiurgic reasons to themselves, according to which [the soul] surveys in herself [by participation] the productive principles of beings. And *to present a discourse accommodated to the wishes of those who enjoined it,* indicates in the fabrication of things the suspension of visible effects from their causes.

"And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood, abides in the memory with a wonderful stability. For with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of yesterday's discourse; yet I should be very much astonished if any thing should escape my remembrance, which I had heard in some past time very distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight; who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently gratified me with a repetition of it. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in, remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly established in my memory." {26b-26c}

That children remember better than men is seen in works, and has many probable causes. One indeed, as Porphyry says, because the souls of children have not an experience of human evils. Hence, as they are neither distracted nor disturbed by externals, their imagination is void of impressions; but their reasoning power is more sluggish. For experience renders this power more acute. But another cause is this, that the rational life in children is in a greater degree mingled with the phantasy. As therefore, in consequence of the soul being co-passive, and commingled with the body, the body becomes stronger and more vital; after the same manner also, the phantasy is strengthened through the habitude of reason. And being strengthened, it has more stable impressions, from receiving through its own power reason in a greater degree; just as the body is more powerful, in consequence of being more vital, through a more abundant communion with the soul. A third cause in addition to these is, that the same things appear to be greater to the imaginations of children. Hence they are in a greater degree admired by them, so that they are more co-passive with them, and on this account especially remember them. For we deposit in the memory things which vehemently pain, or vehemently delight us. They therefore operate on us

in a greater degree. Hence as that which suffers in a greater degree from fire, preserves for a longer time the heat imparted to it; after the same manner, that which suffers more from the external object of the phantasy, retains the impression in a greater degree. Moreover the imagination of children suffers more, on account of the same things appearing to us to be greater during our childhood. Hence children in a greater degree retain the impression, as suffering in a greater degree from the same things. And it appears to me that Critias indicates this when he says, that he heard this history from the old man with great delight, and that on this account it became firmly established in his memory, like the marks of letters deeply burnt in. But as Socrates in the recapitulation of his polity asserts, that the cause of memory to us is the unusualness[154] of the things which we hear, thus Critias, in what is here said, ascribes this cause to the age of children. For every thing that occurs to children at first, appears to be unusual. And perhaps this brings with it an indication, that the prolific fabrication of Gods of the second rank is suspended from the stable sameness of those of the first order; just as the memory of a boy is the cause of memory to the associates of Critias. If some one however, in addition to these solutions, should adhere to the whole theory of things, let him hear Iamblichus asserting, that the memory of children indicates the ever new, flourishing, and stable production of reasons; the indelibility of the letters, the perpetually flowing and never-failing fabrication; and the alacrity of the teacher, the unenvying and abundant supply afforded by more ancient causes to secondary natures. For these things also have a place in conjunction with the before-mentioned solutions.

"In consequence of this, as soon as it was day, I repeated the narration to my friends, that together with myself they might be better prepared for the purposes of the present association. But now with respect to that, for which this narration was undertaken, I am prepared, O Socrates, to speak not only summarily, but so as to descend to the particulars of every thing which I heard. We shall transfer, however, to reality the citizens and city which you fashioned yesterday as in a fable; considering that city which you established as no other than this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived, as no other than those ancestors of ours described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the affair will harmonize in every respect; nor will it be foreign from the purpose to assert, that your citizens are those very people who existed at that time. Hence, distributing the affair in common among us, we will endeavour, to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming manner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite therefore to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whether we should lay it aside, and seek after another."

Before, Critias made his associates partakers of his narration; but now, he calls on them to accomplish in conjunction with him, the employment assigned them. Because in the paradigms all things indeed are united on high, and fill each other with intellectual powers; but in the demiurgic world [or in the world in the intellect of the Demiurgus,] they subsist with each other, according to a certain divine and total conspiration; conformably to which, and through which, all things are every where appropriately in each. Hence in the heavens the paradigms of generated natures pre-exist, and in generation there are images of celestial natures. Since, however, wholeness every where precedes parts, this also may be seen in the second fabrication. On this account Critias first summarily discusses the war; but afterwards he endeavours to explain more copiously every particular, narrating all the polity of the Atlantics, and the principle of their generation; how they turned to injustice, how

the Athenians proceeded to war; from what apparatus, from what legations, through what ways, with whom they were co-arranged, and such things as are consequent to these. The genuine polity, therefore, [of Socrates] is an imitation of the first fabrication. Hence indicating the mystic nature of it, and its pre-existence in pure reason, he says, *that it was fashioned as it were in a fable.* But the hypothesis of the Athenians has an indication, as in images,[155] of the second fabrication; in which that which is more partial presents itself to the view; and what remains consists of contrariety and motion, and that which is circumscribed in place. Since, however, the second is suspended from the first fabrication, and is in continuity with it, hence he says, "*that the affair will harmonize in every respect, and that it will not be foreign to the purpose to assert, that the citizens in the Republic of Socrates are the very people who existed at that time*."

"SOCRATES. But what other, O Critias, should we receive in preference to this? For your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the present sacrifice to the Goddess. And besides this, we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, *that your relation is not a mere fable, but a true history of transcendent magnitude.* It is impossible, therefore, to say how and from whence, neglecting your narration, we should find another more convenient."

Socrates approves the narration of Critias, in the first place as adapted to the festival of the Athenians; for the [Atlantic] war is an image of mundane wars; and as a hymn accommodated to the sacrifice to Minerva. *For if speech is of any advantage to men, it should be employed in hymns.* And besides this, since the Goddess is the cause of both theory and action; through sacrifice, indeed, we imitate her practical energy, but through the hymn her theoretic energy. But, in the second place, Socrates approves the narration as bearing witness to the possibility of his polity. For this, in his discourse about it, he thought worthy of demonstration. For it was sufficient for him that this scheme of a polity existed in the heavens, and in one man; since all things that have an external, have an internal subsistence, and that which is truly law, begins from the internal life itself. If also he shows, that this polity once prevailed among the Athenians, he certainly demonstrates the possibility of it. This, therefore, has suchlike causes as these. Again however it may be assumed from these things, that the narration about the Atlantics is not a fiction, as some have supposed it to be; but a history indeed, yet having an affinity to the whole fabrication of the world. So that such things as Plato discusses about the magnitude of the Atlantic island, must not be rejected as fabulous and fictitious on account of those who enclose the earth in a very narrow space.

"Hence it is requisite that you should speak with good Fortune, but that I on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest from speaking, and be attentive to what you have to say."

Plato does not, like the Stoics, assert, that the worthy man has no need of Fortune; but he is of opinion that our dianoetic energies, since they are complicated with corporeal energies, according to external progression, should be inspired by good Fortune, in order that they may proceed fortunately, and that their effect upon others may be friendly to divinity. And as Nemesis is the inspector of light words, thus also good Fortune directs the words both of those that receive and of him that utters them, to a good purpose, in order that the former may receive benevolently and sympathetically, but the latter may impart in a divinely inspired manner, that which is adapted to every

one. Thus, therefore, in partial natures. But in wholes, good Fortune signifies a divine allotment, according to which each thing is allotted an order adapted to it, from the one father, and the whole fabrication. Moreover, for Socrates to rest from speaking, and to be attentive to what may be said, has indeed an appropriate retribution. For the other persons of the dialogue did this, when he narrated his polity. But this shows from analogy, how all demiurgic causes being united to each other, have at the same time separate productions. For to hear is indicative of receiving through each other. And for the others to rest, when one speaks, signifies the unmingled purity according to which each demiurgic cause produces and generates secondary natures from its own peculiarity.

"CRITIAS. But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of discussion. For it seems proper to us that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and is eminently knowing in the nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the narration and law of Solon, as to proper judges, should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us, in the report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse concerning them, as about citizens and Athenians." {27a-27b}

The intention of this arrangement is to make Timæus a summit, and at the same time a middle. For he speaks after Socrates and Critias, and prior to Critias and Hermocrates. And thus, indeed, he is a middle; but in another respect, he is a summit, according to science, and because he generates the men, whom Socrates indeed educates, but Critias arms. This, however, is also a manifest symbol of total fabrication, which is at one and the same time a summit and a middle. For it is exempt from all mundane natures, and is equally present to all. The summits likewise, and the middle of the universe, belong to the Demiurgus, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. For the tower of Jupiter is, as they say, situated there. But Critias, who spoke as the middle after Socrates, now again summarily speaks prior to Hermocrates. *For the duadic pertains to the middle fabrication, and also the whole in conjunction with parts; just as the whole* [*prior to parts*] *belongs to the first, but parts to the last fabrication.* Hence Socrates summarily delivered his polity, and Hermocrates contributed to the parts of the history which was about to be narrated by Critias. And thus much concerning the whole arrangement.

Someone, however, may doubt, what will be left for Hermocrates to accomplish after Timæus has delivered the generation of the men, Socrates their education, and Critias their actions. For to these things there is nothing successive. May it not be said that Hermocrates is the adjutor of Critias in his narration; for the relation of the history was a mixture of deeds and words. And Critias himself promised to make a discussion of the actions, but calls on Hermocrates to assist him in the words. For the imitation of these is difficult, as was before observed. Hence in the Atlanticus, Critias having assembled the Gods, as consulting about the punishment of the Atlantics, he says "*Jupiter thus addressed them*." And he thus terminates the dialogue, as delivering to Hermocrates the imitation of the words. But there is no absurdity in his not discussing [in the Atlanticus] the remainder of the deeds. For, in short, having assembled the Gods, for the purpose of chastising the insolence of the Atlantics, he

has every thing consequent to this comprehended in the Gods being thus collected, *viz.* the preparation of the Athenians, their egress, and their victory. Timæus, therefore, generates the men, Socrates educates them, Critias leads them forth to actions, and Hermocrates to words; the first of these, imitating the paternal cause; the second, the supplier of stable intelligence; the third, the supplier of motion and progression to secondary natures; and the fourth, imitating the cause which converts the last of things to their principles through the imitation of reasons [*i.e.* of productive powers]. Thus, therefore, these particulars may be symbolically understood, and, perhaps, in no very superfluous manner.

Some one, also, may doubt why the Timæus had not an arrangement prior to the Republic, since in the former dialogue the generation of the world, and also of the human race, is delivered. For it is necessary, as Timæus says, that men should be generated; and also, that they should be educated, which Socrates effects in the Republic; and that they should energize in a manner worthy of their education, which in a certain respect the Atlanticus exhibits. And if, indeed, Plato beginning from the end proceeded to the Timæus, which is first by nature, it will be asserting, what is usual to say, that for the sake of doctrine, things that are first to us, though posterior by nature, are first delivered; but that now he appears to have arranged the middle as the first, and the first as the middle. And if, indeed, this arrangement had been adopted by those who are studious of ornament, it would have been less wonderful; but now Plato himself appears to have acted in this manner. Here, therefore, there is a recapitulation of the polity, as having been already summarily narrated in the shortest manner. In answer to this doubt it must be said, that if all hypotheses were assumed from the nature of things now in existence, or which were formerly, it would be necessary that the doubt should be valid, and that the Timæus is not rightly ranked in the second place. If also, all the narrations were devised from hypothesis, it thus would be requisite that such things as are first according to nature, should be first assumed. But since the hypothesis of Socrates subsists in words alone, and surveying the universal, applies itself to the nurture and education of men, but the hypothesis consequent to this discusses beings and things in generation, these are very properly conjoined to each other; while the hypothesis of Socrates, as only subsisting in words, and being on this account accurate, has an arrangement prior to the rest. Perhaps, likewise, Plato wished to indicate this to us, that such things as divine [human] souls, and which are ascending to the intelligible, produce, these are some time or other effected on the earth, according to certain prosperous vicissitudes of circulations. As Critias therefore asserts this, bearing testimony to Socrates, we must say that those true ancestors of ours of which the priest spoke, perfectly accord with those citizens which Socrates mentally conceived, and our opinion is not to be rejected that they were those who existed at that time. If however the Republic is inferior to the Timæus, because it is conversant with that which is partial, and to discuss mortal affairs is to dwell on an image, yet the universal prevails in it. *For the same form of life exhibits indeed in the soul justice, but in a city a polity, and in the world, fabrication.*

Farther still, the deliberate choice of virtue is free, but the energy which is directed to externals, requires the mundane order, and hence the Atlanticus is posterior to the Timæus. But the habit of the citizens shows that virtue is without a master. Plato also manifests through these things, *that the soul when she is of herself* [*and does not depend on another*] *is superior to every physical hypostasis, and runs above Fate; but when she verges to actions, is vanquished by physical laws, and is in subjection to Fate.* In addition also to what has been said, it is requisite to know this, that from the

order of human life delivered in the Republic, the connexion of these dialogues, may be obtained. For in that dialogue the men are first educated and instructed through disciplines. Afterwards, they ascend to the contemplation of [true] beings; and in the third place, descend from thence to a providential attention to the city. Conformably to this congruity, the Republic has an arrangement prior to the Timæus; and the Timæus to the Atlanticus. For the men being instructed by the Republic, and elevated according to theory by the Timæus, will, living happily, wisely[156] perform such actions, as the Atlanticus narrates. After this manner therefore, we dissolve the doubt. The philosopher Porphyry however, not directly for the sake of this doubt, but discussing something else, affords us the following aid in its solution; that those who wish[157] to apprehend the whole theory genuinely, ought first to be instructed in the form of it, in order that being similar to the object of intellection, they may be in a becoming manner co-adapted to the knowledge of the truth. This therefore, the order itself of the dialogues demonstrates. For the auditors of the Timæus ought first to have been benefited by the Republic, and having been adorned through it, to attend afterwards to the dogmas concerning the world, evincing themselves to be most similar through erudition to the excellent order of the universe. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

Each particular however of the text must be considered. Timæus therefore, is now said to be most astronomical, not as directing his attention to the rapidity of the celestial motions, nor as collecting the measures of the courses of the sun,[158] nor as being conversant with the works of Fate, but as astronomizing above the heavens, conformably to the coryphæus in the Theætetus and contemplating the invisible causes which are properly stars. Hence Socrates does not exhibit the visible man, but the man that is purely essentialized in reason; and he does this as imitating the whole demiurgus, in whom the heavens and all the stars subsist, as the theologist says, intellectually. Timæus begins however, from the generation of the world, and ends in man; because man is a microcosm, possessing all things partially, which the universe does totally, as Socrates demonstrates in the Philebus. But there are certain persons educated by Socrates in the most excellent manner, who also educates the whole city, and these are the guardians and auxiliaries. For in the universe, that which transcendently participates of intellect is heaven, which also imitates intellect through its motion. The men however, are introduced by Critias, conformably to the law and conceptions of Solon, because Solon narrates, that the Athenians were once thus governed, and established laws how children ought to be introduced into the polity, and into the tribes, and how they ought to be registered; and likewise, by what kind of judges, they should be tried, in one place from the tribes, but in another, from other appropriate persons. As Critias therefore admits that the men educated by Socrates were Athenians, he follows the conceptions and the law of Solon, conformably to which certain persons are introduced into the polity.

"SOCRATES. I seem to behold a perfect and splendid banquet of discussion set before me. It belongs therefore, now to you, O Timæus, to begin the discourse; having first of all, as is fit, invoked the Gods according to law."

The *perfection* and the *splendour* of the narration indicate the supernatural production of things on account of their paradigms, and which takes place universally. And to these the words of Socrates refer. The *banquet of discussion* indicates the perfect plenitude of demiurgic forms; but the *calling on Timæus,* the conversion of partial causes to the whole, and an evocation of the goods thence derived; and *the invocation*

of the Gods, the fabrication supernally suspended from intelligibles. For the expression *according to law,* is not such as many of the Italic or Attic interpreters suppose it to be, but it has the same meaning as the words usually employed by the Pythagoreans, "Honour in the first place, the immortal Gods, as they are disposed by law." For law manifests the divine order, according to which secondary are always suspended from prior causes, and are filled from them. But law thus beginning from intelligibles, extends to the demiurgic cause, and from this proceeds, and is divided about the universe. At the same time, however, Socrates indicates through these things, that the Pythagoric doctrine requires that physiology should commence from a divine cause, and that it should not be such as that which he reprobates in the Phædo, which blinds the eye of the soul, by assigning airs and æthers as causes, conformably to Anaxagoras. For it is necessary that true physiology should be suspended from theology, in the same manner as nature is suspended from the Gods, and is divided according to the total orders of them; so that words may be imitators of the things of which they are significant. For mythologists also narrate that Vulcan who presides over nature was in love with Minerva, who weaves the order of intellectual forms, and is the supplier of intelligence to all mundane essences. As far as to this therefore, the preface of the Timæus receives its completion; of which Severus, indeed, did not think fit to give any interpretation; but Longinus does not say that the whole is superfluous, but only such particulars as are introduced about the Atlantics, and the narration of the Egyptian; so that he is accustomed to conjoin with the request of Socrates, the promise of Critias. I mean, he connects with the words, "*I now therefore stand prepared to receive the promised feast*," the words, "*But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of discussion."* But Porphyry and Iamblichus show that this preface accords with the whole design of the dialogue, and one indeed more partially, but the other with more profound intuition; so that we also shall here finish the book in conformity to Plato, having adopted their order.

End of Sample